

S. DOUGLAS MARTIN

Interviewed by: Charles Stuart Kennedy

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[Note: This interview has not been edited by Mr. Martin.]

Q: Today is the 13th of January, 1999. This is an interview with S. Douglas Martin, and is being done on behalf of the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training. I'm Charles Stuart Kennedy.

Doug, let's start at the very beginning. Tell me when and where you were born and something about your parents.

MARTIN: I was born December 6, 1926, in Brooklyn, New York, in the Norwegian Hospital, now the Lutheran Medical Center. My parents were John F. Martin and Helen Girard Toglund. My father was a policeman. He was born in 1890, not too far from the Lutheran Medical Center, maybe two miles away, down below Fourth Avenue in Brooklyn; and my mother was born in Greenwich Village in Manhattan in 1898. My father went through eighth grade and had about 21 jobs before he was 21. Then he began training for the New York City Police Department, [and] became a cop and eventually a detective. He retired from the New York City Police Department in 1944 or the beginning of '45. I think he had 31 years service at that time. Later he went on to become a checker on the docks in Brooklyn and worked for another 19 years. Then he retired, and died in 1970.

My mother was born in 1898, as I say. Her father was also a policeman, a sergeant of police in the New York City Police Department. He was a traffic policeman at the Ferry Slip in Manhattan, and eventually, against his wishes and desires, he was transferred to Brooklyn. So in my family, we always had a Brooklyn group - my father and his sister - and a New York group - my mother and her parents, my grandmother, who was alive (I never really knew my grandfather, who died a couple of years after I was born). When my mother went shopping, she always went to Manhattan, and my aunt always went to Downtown Brooklyn.

Q: One always thinks of the New York Police Department as being very Irish. Do you consider yourself Irish, English, or what?

MARTIN: All of my great-grandparents, eight of them, were born in Ireland, and all came to the United States. The first one came in 1846. [They were] Patrick and Bridget Martin. They were 23 and 21 years old. They came from Northern Ireland, but I don't know the town; I'm trying to trace it now. My mother's family came later, around the Civil War, and they were from the south of Ireland. In fact, there used to be a dispute in my family whether they were from Knock or a place called Kilmurray McMahan. When I researched it, I found out Kilmurray McMahan was the Catholic Church parish, and the hamlet - it's really a hamlet of about 30 houses - in Knock, which means 'hill' in Ireland. There are many places named Knock. It's not the famous Knock which is a shrine. Not that one. It's a place. It's right on the estuary of the Shannon River. It's a very boggy area, in County Clare.

Q: Tell me, let's talk a bit about growing up as a cop's kid in Brooklyn. There have been books and movies and all made about this era. Can you tell me what it was like?

MARTIN: We never had any thought that we were disadvantaged, or that being a cop's son or in a cop's family was anything but the best. Because my father had only an eighth grade education, he considered himself very lucky that he had become a policeman and even luckier that he had become a detective, something that had a little higher cachet to it. You know, people talk today about low self-esteem. There's no self-esteem in my family, even though others might think it; we think of ourselves as somebody special, all of us, and I think people in the neighborhood did to. To be that was to have status, to have a certain prestige.

My mother had it even more so, because my mother had an education. She had gone to Bay Ridge High School, where girls in that neighborhood went, and she was a personality. She finished high school and became a registered nurse, something she was very proud of. She had practiced as a nurse, and then as a school nurse at the time that she got married. When she started having children, she stopped working, which my father expected. He understood that. Then when World War II came along, my mother, who was a real personality, had a friend who was running a nurses' service and kept calling my mother, "Please come back to work. There's such a desperate shortage of nurses." My mother wanted to do that, and eventually she did. My father was upset by that, but my mother went back to work one day a week and then sometimes a couple of days, taking individual cases.

But we had a special thing in my family because I'm a twin - not an identical twin, but a fraternal twin - and my brother had cerebral palsy, although they didn't diagnose it then. He was never able to walk or talk. When he was about 12 years old, he was able to move around the house a little bit. He started to do that. And he could say a few words. But he was home all the time, and as one of my brothers-in-law said, he was like a pet in the family. Everybody loved him, everybody acknowledged him, but he just really was unable to do anything. This had a certain advantage because in every neighborhood, there are children who are retarded, disadvantaged, or whatever, and very often they get into trouble with the police or cause problems for the family. My brother never caused any problems at all.

My father's name was John. My brother's name was John. I was named after my uncle, who was a world champion dancer. He was in show business, and he met my aunt when my aunt was a singer. The two of them teamed up as Doug and Clare. When my mother was expecting, he said, "Gee, you're awfully big. Maybe you'll have twins." My mother didn't know then. He said, "Will you name one after me if you have twins?" She said, "If it's a boy, I'm going to name it John." So anyway, my brother got named John because when we were born, he was the stronger one and was first born, and I was born next, and so they named me Doug. But you had to have a saint's name, so that name was Stephen. But his name was Stephen, too. So I was Stephen Douglas Martin.

They claimed that there was a legend in the family that, because they were rabid Democrats, he was named after Stephen Douglas. I doubt if that's true, but my uncle used to tell stories. He was a great one for that. He had been in show business, traveled all around the country and had even signed up the group to go to England, which turned out to be a disaster. He knew people in show business, Fred Allen, for example, who was also Irish, and my uncle Doug and his brother, by the name John, once had - show business people are always broke - Fred Allen stay with them in the hotel, and then they were sneaking out, trying to get him out without paying the hotel. Fred Allen mentioned that in his autobiography - I read it one time - and it mentions Doug and John Hargreave, who were dancers. And he knew some other people. He knew George Burns and Gracie Allen. He was on the same bill with them once. He was on the same bill with George M. Cohan.

Q: This is the era of Vaudeville.

MARTIN: Yes. Now that's the story of my mother, because when vaudeville died, from one month to the next, he was out of work. My father used to call him a "cellar door dancer"; he was a tap dancer, but he could do all kinds of dancing. He was Irish reel champion of America in 1911 and Irish jig champion in 1910. He had different certificates, and he was a champion dancer, and he really was a great dancer. He had all kinds of pictures, you know, that show business people had. So my mother said, "Okay, you're out of a job. You've got to do something. Why don't you start a dancing school?" He said okay, and they rented a place, which they kept for many, many years, on the second floor of a two-story building on Ovington Avenue and Fifth Avenue in Brooklyn. And my mother was the one - because, as I say, she was a great personality and knew many people - who went around to friends of the family and said, "Doug Hargreave's starting a dancing school. Could you send your daughter to learn?" And the dancing school was an instantaneous success. From then on, right through the depression - that would have been about 1932 so right through the depression, they made between \$75 and \$300 a week, of which, of course, being Uncle Doug, he never saved a penny. Later on, when he couldn't work any more, when the dancing school business faded out - which was not until 1950, I guess, then he was actually on welfare, and he died. I remember visiting him in the hospital as he was dying - and he told me, "Don't worry, don't worry." He was always an optimistic, upbeat kind of a guy. As I say, low self-esteem does not run in my family.

Q: Did you get stories about police work and all?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, yes. My grandfather did something, and it parallels the State Department, and what happened to Foreign Service officers. When he was about to retire, after he had about 35 years' service, he used to interview police applicants, because to get onto the New York Police Department, you had to pass a character and fitness exam. You had to be interviewed, and then he would go around to the neighborhood and do what later on we'd call a "neighborhood check" and then give the okay that the person was all right. Well, one of my last assignments was on the Board of Examiners, and we had all these guys in what they call "the elephants' graveyard," but it was a job I loved.

Q: Oh, it's a great job.

MARTIN: It was an absolutely great assignment, and even though I was over complement - you say, "Over complement oh, isn't that too bad." No. To be over complement very often means you get to do what has to be done that they never really planned for, and it was great, with traveling all around the US.

My father's first post was in Downtown Brooklyn, and he had friends that he kept his whole life that he met when he was a young cop, his fellow cops. Then he became a plainclothesman, because he was very good-looking and also knew how to handle himself. So he was in the Safe and [Burglary] Squad for a while and did something in the Vice Squad, which my mother did not approve of. She didn't like it at all that he would be even doing something, even though he said he never did anything, and cops didn't. He did a little bit in the Vice Squad, but then mostly he was on the Safe and [Burglary] Squad. So we'd hear stories about safecrackers.

Then he was assigned to the Pickpocket Squad, and he and my mother used to go down when there were sailings of ships. Right at the foot of 58th Street in Brooklyn was the German-America Line, the Rex and the Bremen, the two big German-America liners. Whenever there was a sailing, my father would go down. Talk about an interesting story of corruption in the New York City Police Department - his first day in the pickpocket squad, some friend of his, was going to help break him in. He took him to lunch at Lindy's Restaurant. My father didn't know it at the time, but every pickpocket in New York City was there, to get a look at the new guy in the pickpocket squad. My father heard that the fellow who took him there had gotten \$500 for that. The pickpockets knew who my father was. And he looked like a cop anyway. He would get on the Europa or Bremen, they were two German ships, and he and my mother would walk around for an hour or so before sailing time, till they told everybody to get off. The pickpockets would scramble away because my father would be watching. He'd go up and say, "Get the hell out of here. You don't belong here. You're not on this ship. Get out of here." They would go, or they would just see him; they wouldn't even let him come up to them; they would just leave. Then, I don't know what happened, but he got into some kind of trouble, and in the movies, they used to say, "I'll have you transferred to Canarsie." Remember that? Old scenes in the early movie days the guy says to the cop, "Who do you think you are? I'll have you transferred to Canarsie." Well, my father was transferred to Canarsie.

Q: Canarsie being -

MARTIN: Canarsie is two hours away from where we lived by the subway. It took him two hours to get there and two hours to get back. He didn't like it, because he didn't like his partner, who was not Irish. My father was there for about two years. My mother talked to a friend of ours who worked in police headquarters, and she went and talked to his wife and said, "You've got to get John out of Canarsie. He's been there now . . . it's too much for him." Anyway, he was transferred to Claussen Avenue. Then my father was transferred to Brooklyn Police Headquarters and then from there to the next precinct over, which was the precinct where he grew up. The 72nd Squad was on 60th Street and Fifth Avenue in Brooklyn. It's somewhere else now. That's where he spent his last about 12 years or so in the police department before he retired.

Q: What about as a kid growing up there in the early '30's and all. Obviously the Depression was on. Did kids run in what were then considered gangs? Today gangs are quite a different matter. In those days, I mean, a bunch of kids getting together.

MARTIN: Not really gangs. I wouldn't say they were gangs. We had friends, we naturally had friends. No, I would not say that. In my earliest memories, I remember, though, being out on the street in a baby carriage. I remember hearing talk about "Lucky Lindy" Lindbergh. That's one of my earliest memories of hearing about somebody; it was about Lindbergh and the Lindbergh kidnapping. And I remember the night that Hauptmann was executed, everybody expected all the lights to dim. Of course, they didn't. But anyway, that was sort of the idea.

But they weren't a gang. But I had friends, and we were different because my mother insisted that we go away in the summertime, so at some sacrifice we went to the Catskills. It was a place that had an outdoor [pool] and all that. We used to go swimming in a quarry in a place called Morgan Hill, near a place called West Hurley, which is not far from Woodstock, an artists' colony even then, and a nice place. So we used to go there for two months in the summer, and I learned to swim. And then also in the '30's, in Sunset Park, which is the nearest big park, they put in a swimming pool. But most of my friends didn't know how to swim. Those that did learned in Sunset Park. That was built by Mayor LaGuardia.

I went to parochial school, Our Lady of Perpetual Health School on 59th Street and Sixth Avenue in Brooklyn, which was a very good school. A Cardinal by the name of Ratzinger wrote a book and one of the chapters is "A Church without Nuns." He writes about the drop-off in the numbers of nuns, but in those days there were thousands of nuns. There were, I think, 3,000 nuns in the Diocese of Brooklyn, and every teacher in our school, every teacher, was a nun, right through. They had two grades for each year for boys and two grades for each year for girls, over 2,000 kids in the school and we had over 60 kids in my class. But I'm telling you, we were ahead of the public schools. We did better. And the New York City public schools in those days were good. Certain ones were better than others, but in general those schools were all good, and our schools were better, as shown by the Regents' exams, because we took the New York State Regents' Exam -

Q: Which is very strict.

MARTIN: - at the end of the year, yes. And when you graduated, you got a Regents' Diploma or you didn't. If you didn't, you would get a school diploma, like my sisters got. If you couldn't pass all the Regents' Exams, they still graduated you, and you could get out of high school, but you did not get a Regents' Diploma.

Now in my neighborhood, they were Irish, I would guess by 60 per cent. And I would guess 30 per cent were Norwegian, so it was very markedly Irish and Norwegian, and there was a Norwegian church nearby, which now, I think, is Korean. And then 10 per cent were mixed, a couple of Italians and mostly Poles, Croats, and other Slavs. That was the ethnic composition of the neighborhood, and the two groups were pretty much separate. The Irish oriented to the Catholic Church and Catholic schools and the Norwegians went to public school and to the Lutheran Church. They also had their national customs. I know about Sjutte Maj, May 7th, a Norwegian holiday. There were also a few Swedes in the neighborhood, and they were there because they worked on the docks and the boats. They were seamen.

In general, we were fairly separate. My father's closest friend in the police department, I mentioned, was a Norwegian himself, and I know that one of the crises in my family came when he asked - he had about seven children, and I guess he was running out of godparents for his kids - and he asked my father to be the godfather. Well, my father thought he was not supposed to do that, but he just couldn't say no to a friend, so he did it. And that worried him for a while, but he got it straightened out after a while.

Anyway, the neighborhood has changed over the years, very slowly, to Puerto Rican - a lot of Puerto Ricans, but still the Irish dominated - and then it was changed more markedly in recent years. As the Norwegians and Swedes have moved out, it has become Chinese. So down on the street where I lived, where I go back all the time - my sister still lives in the house - my end of the street is mostly Hispanic, and the Puerto Ricans have been replaced a lot by Dominican Republic people. But as you go down the street towards Eighth Avenue from Sixth Avenue, you get more and more Chinese, and Eighth Avenue - it's like Hong Kong. It's absolutely, totally Chinese. It's the third largest Chinatown in New York City. Chinatown, you know, has expanded in Manhattan so it has crowded out Little Italy. Little Italy is now "Tiny Italy." A couple of famous Italian restaurants are still there.

Q: How did you find it? Were the nuns rather strict?

MARTIN: Yes, when you think about it. Those nuns - again, it was a remarkable age, as I look back and think about it, because I'm interested in history too; I majored in history in college - anyway, those nuns were graduated from high school, and a lot of them were smart. They graduated some of them at the age of 17. They would go for one year called a novitiate, and at the end of one year they would be - not ordained, I forget what they call it - professed, I think they call it, as nuns. And then they'd be thrown into a classroom with 60 kids. How do you keep discipline in a class like that? Well, they used physical means, but not only that. They had presence. You know, when that nun walked into the room, everybody stopped. We would go to school in the morning, we'd go into a schoolyard and play, running around, and then the nuns would come over from the convent, and ring a bell. You know how kids make a big thing of whatever they were doing. We had to stop right there. So a kid would be running, and he'd stop like that, you know, and freeze. And then ring the bell again, you had to run to your place. Everybody lined up. Then we saluted the flag. It was very patriotic, I'll tell you.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: There was nothing lacking in patriotism because it was a Catholic school. That's why I could never understand when Dr. Conant said that Catholic schools were divisive. I think I know what he was talking about, but anyway, they were not divisive in that sense. They were very patriotic. We were the most patriotic people. We had some right-wing ideas, but we were very patriotic, no doubt about that. The US was the best, no matter what country you came from.

Anyway, everybody would go to class then, and I remember you got into your seat and knelt down, sort of facing the back, and there would be a holy picture or something, and we'd say a very short prayer - Our Father, Hail Mary, Glory Be - and then turn around, sit down, and the day's lesson would start. It was very interesting, really, when you think about it.

Now, as I say, the presence of the teachers was enough, but for example, if you came late to school, you couldn't get into school. Sister Elise was the principal, and she would come out with a ruler. You'd have to wait in this vestibule of the school. A bunch of kids, maybe 10 kids, would be lined up. And you had to put out your hand, and she had a ruler, and she'd go L-A-T-E, and then you'd go ahead, L-A-T-E. So you got four raps on your hand stretched out like that. It wasn't much, but people didn't like it. I mean, you didn't want it.

Then if somebody was really bad, they would slap the kids. And some of the older nuns would slap a little more; some of the younger ones wouldn't, because these nuns, as I say, were 18 or 19 years old, and they would come to that school and then two days a week and Saturdays they would go to St. John's University and study education. It would take them maybe 8 years - they'd still be pretty young - and they'd be getting a bachelor's degree. The smarter ones might go on and get a master's degree and teach in the Catholic high schools. So that they were qualified teachers, they were on their way to being qualified. And you know yourself, when you're a student, you're better sometimes than when you're fully trained. Later on, you might forget.

Q: Oh, absolutely.

MARTIN: Those teachers were very good, and they wanted us to do well in the Regents. Now I think somebody criticizing the system might say, well, yes, and this was true: we would get the old Regents' Exams and go over them and over them and over them. Well, that's what kids do now getting ready for the SAT's [Student Aptitude Tests].

Q: I went through the old Regents. I was up in Connecticut, and we used the old Regents' Exam, oh, absolutely. It was a good exam.

MARTIN: Oh, it was a good exam, and if you knew the answer, you also knew a lot already. But I think people might say you were learning by rote, you weren't learning to think for yourself. That was a criticism, I think, that would come out of, say, Columbia Teachers College, that you were learning by rote. But in a way there's nothing wrong with that.

Q: While you were at elementary school, do you remember anything about reading? Did you read much, or did you find yourself constrained, or maybe not interested in reading?

MARTIN: Oh, no, we read all the time. We had a reading book, and we started in just like in any other school I can't remember which textbooks we had.

Q: I was thinking more about recreational reading.

MARTIN: Oh, well, I was a reader. Once I learned to read, I was a voracious reader. I had a friend named Billy O'Connell, and his family had an encyclopedia. That's another thing about an Irish neighborhood like that. I could walk down - there were four or five houses on that block - I did not have to knock on the door; I'd just walk in. The O'Connells' house was right around the corner. I'm still friends with Marie O'Connell, who lives in that house. They had an encyclopedia. I used to go in that house and read that encyclopedia from cover to cover.

The greatest honor you could have in that school, as growing up, a real prestige thing, was to become an altar boy. You had to be in the fourth grade, then they took you in in the fifth grade. And in the fourth grade you had to learn Latin - it took you about six months. You had to memorize the Latin responses to the priest's prayers at mass. I did that. The altar boys had something called the altar boys' library, which was just for their use. They wanted those guys to become priests. My class was one of the worst classes ever. Very few people went that way. We had about three guys go that way. But some classes had as many as 10 priests.

That church, Our Lady of Perpetual Health Church in Brooklyn, was elevated to the rank of basilica. First, it's a great big church. All the bishops in Brooklyn, when they become bishops, are consecrated in that church, even though it's not the cathedral. (The cathedral is St. James's.) And it's run by a group of priests called the Redemptorist Fathers, founded by St. Alphonsus Liguori, an Italian lawyer. They're famous as moral theologians. To become an altar boy in that church was something, and they treated us like we were the elite of the class. It was great because there were a lot of funerals. There might be two or three funerals a week, so I would be serving at a funeral mass maybe every other week. And that was great because you could get out in the middle of class, serve mass, and come back to class. So that was prestige, to stand up in a class, "Sister, I have to go. . . ." you know, serve a funeral. And you'd go up; she'd say okay; you got kind of a blessing and went and came back. So anyway, to be an altar boy was something elite, and the altar boys' library had a complete set of Tom Swift. Tom Swift and his Magic Motorcycle, Tom Swift and his Automobile, Tom Swift and his First Aeroplane. So it went on and on and on. Dick Prescott's First Year at West Point, Dick Prescott's Second . . . . third and fourth year, Dick Prescott, Second Lieutenant, Dick Prescott, First Lieutenant - I read all those books. And they had the same thing for Annapolis. They had other boys' books, some Dickens books there; there was a complete set. These were not religious books. I said altar boys' library - no, it was a boys' library that kids would like. In addition to that in Brooklyn they had the public library at 51st Street and Fourth Avenue. Now I didn't join that until I went to high school, but in high school on my way home, I went by the public library. I always went into the public library, and as I say, I was a voracious reader. I read everything in sight. I'm still a reader. I've got the book reviews right here. I read the, New York Times and Washington Post and the Washington Times Book Review all the time. So, did I read? I was a reader.

Q: Then what about high school? Where did you go to high school?

MARTIN: As I say, they wanted us to become priests. They were encouraging that, but they couldn't say, "You should be a priest"; that's not allowed, by Canon Law. You had to have the vocation, the calling. They would talk a lot about the calling, and you knew they were talking about you, but none of us guys were. I got interested in girls when I was in about the sixth grade. I knew I was not going to be a priest. So anyway, people took exams. Those going away to be priests would go away. They would go up to a place near Erie, Pennsylvania, called Northeast College, and it was a junior seminary. Then there was an exam that was given to everybody in the Diocese of Brooklyn. Every Catholic kid could take it, public school or Catholic school. To take this exam, on a certain day you went to the school, you took the exam, and then they'd pick, by quota, six from our parish (because it was a very big parish), then two from some, three from others, and so forth. It was St. Michael's Diocesan High School.

And St. Michael's Diocesan High School, really a great school, although it had probably the worst facilities that you could imagine, because it was founded in 1928, and the monsignor, I guess he went there. They wanted to do something good. I mean, brothers agreed to teach there on the understanding that a real high school would be built. And then came the Depression. There was no money around and no possibility to do that. So we had awful facilities, but we had a wonderful school. And we had these Xaverian Brothers and some lay teachers in the school, and everybody had to have two years of Latin (I had three). I had four years of science, four years of math, four years of English, and I think two years of history, plus we had religion that was also a subject. And I'm telling you, it was a wonderful school. I got there in 1940 and graduated in 1944.

Q: I assume, on the social life, that one dated only Catholic girls.

MARTIN: No, nobody dated anybody at all at that age. In the first place, we were aware of girls, and people say, well, you know, in seventh or eighth grade, people say, "You like Mary" - "No, I don't. That's wrong!" You know, it starts out that way. Then in the first year of high school, Friday nights they had religious teaching for the public school kids. We used to go just to sit there, but afterwards they had a dance, and we danced, and I'll tell you, we are the greatest dancers, the people from Brooklyn. My father was a great dancer. My uncle I mentioned. And I was a good dancer. And we went dancing. But you didn't "date." No, I didn't date at all.

Q: It was the era of the great bands, and dancing was, of course, very much part of it -

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: - both swing and jitterbugging -

MARTIN: Right.

Q: - but I mean the whole -

MARTIN: The whole thing. There were six of us. Two are now dead, but there were six of us, and two of us went to St. Michael's. The other school we used to go to was called Brooklyn Tech. Brooklyn Tech was for somebody who wanted to be an engineer or something scientific.

Q: It's well known.

MARTIN: It's a wonderful school. So two of the guys went to Brooklyn Tech. One guy went to a school called St. Francis. He didn't get into St. Michael's. And the other guy eventually finished high school, but he didn't do very well. He went to public high school, but he was the kind of guy who used to run away from home every once in a while. But I liked him. He used to read a lot. He was a smart guy. Anyway, he was in our group too. So there were six of us.

And then there were girls. On 61st Street there was a gang of girls, and you might say we "related" to them, but we didn't date. Nobody dated anyway. The biggest thing, maybe the first date I ever had, was finding somebody to go to my high school prom. Nowadays, they have a baby in the high school prom, you know. But anyway, that was the biggest thing. I took a girl. I never took her out before or after. We had a good time. I remember her name: Theresa Smith.

That was another thing, the names that people had: Theresa. That was a big name then. Bernadette. You know, you don't meet many Theresas or Bernadettes now.

Q: I have a daughter-in-law named Theresa, but she's one of the few.

MARTIN: I mean there's a lot of them. But you know, naming is much different today than it was before.

Q: Again, going back to reading and to interests, you say you've always been interested in history. How did you pick history?

MARTIN: Well, we had very good history teaching, I think. In grammar school you learned about men, great men, and in each class we had a class president, not like class presidents today, where the guy is the president of the class - none of that - but we had a favorite president, you had to know something about Abraham Lincoln or George Washington, and the final exam always had questions on that. We had a class poem. You had to memorize eight lines of a poem. We had a class poem and we had a class saint. You might learn about St. Patrick: what did he do? You had to know a short biography of a saint. We had one in each class, so by the time you finished, you knew a lot of different saints, you knew a lot about presidents, a lot of stories. And then they also studied about war. You studied mainly the war itself and this battle and that battle. I remember even in grammar school, we learned that the Battle of New Orleans took place after the war was over.

Q: The War of 1812, yes.

MARTIN: Yes, people didn't get the word. So anyway, I would say history was about heroes. And my mother had insurance, life insurance on my father. And I remember the guy would come around and collect like a dollar twenty every month. And he used to hand out blue pamphlets which had the life of some hero. I remember reading about Fremont.

Q: John Fremont.

MARTIN: John Fremont - all about him and California, the Great Bear flag that they had, and that kind of thing. So I would say that the history teaching we got was American history - and as I say, we were very patriotic. I wrote an essay - I guess I wrote it in eighth grade - called "The Importance of Cultural and Commercial Relations between the Americas." It was New York State-wide essay contest, and I got a fourth prize.

Q: Oh, that's very good.

MARTIN: I was already in high school by then, the first year of high school. I remember the principal of the school said I should go over to the awards ceremony, which was in City Hall. It was very nice. Anyway, so I knew enough from my general reading and also from my history teaching that I was able to write an essay in a city-wide contest that got a prize.

Q: Well, now, you were in high school from 1940 to '44.

MARTIN: Right.

Q: Obviously there was a certain event taking place at that time. Can you talk about how World War II affected your interests and what you all were doing?

MARTIN: Okay. By the time I left grammar school, everybody was interested in what was happening in Europe, and of course we always got everything from a Catholic point of view. And I remember when I was a kid, we thought Franco was great.

Q: Oh, yes. I was just going to ask about Franco.

MARTIN: Franco was one of our heroes. And part of it was because - and I remember this caused a little bit of trouble in my mind - because the Loyalists were on one side and Franco was on the other. Now the word loyal was a good word to me, so how could the Loyalists be on the wrong side? I didn't quite understand that, but I also knew Franco was a good guy and then we were hearing these horrible stories about what was happening to the Catholic Church in Spain. You know, they killed - I didn't know that then - but I think they killed something like 11,000 priests.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: They killed over 20,000 nuns. They had to start orphanages for nuns who were raped and had babies, and all that kind of stuff. That was true. They were true. So we were for Franco, and not Roosevelt at that time. You see, my family, politically, were Al Smith Democrats. They loved Al Smith. So they were what my mother used to say - and the word comes up again now, they try to use it, but somehow it never catches on - but the word progressive. My mother and my family were progressives. They thought of themselves as progressive people, so they welcomed new ideas and thought the government should be doing something for people. And of course, everybody favored the government, because the thing to do then was to get a civil service job. They had newspapers that were just about the civil service that would tell you when the next exam was. I remember my father and my mother talking about somebody in the neighborhood; he passed the letter carriers' exam, or he passed the cops' exam, or he didn't pass the cops' exam. And the promotion exams. People were studying to get promoted all the time. It was one of my father's disappointments that he never really did get promoted in the Police Department, and it was because he had an eighth grade education. He never really was able to go beyond that. He could have become a priest if he had wanted to. The pastor of his church in Brooklyn even told his mother that, "if he wants to be a priest, we'll see to it that the money is taken care of for the tuition and the seminary." But anyway, he thought he should work to support his mother.

Q: Well, what about World War II? In the first place, your family were Al Smith Democrats. Did this cause a problem with Roosevelt?

MARTIN: Oh, yes.

Q: Because there was at first, at one point, the relationship was great, and then there was a real divergence.

MARTIN: The thing was, people believed - maybe it was true - that Al Smith had been stabbed in the back by Roosevelt, and therefore we didn't like Roosevelt for that, even though people really did favor his policies. Certainly Social Security was something that later on became very important to my family. At that time it was just being passed. I don't think my father was eligible at that time, because he was a policeman. But I'm not sure of that. Anyway Roosevelt tried to pack the Supreme Court; I remember that very well. I remember my father being very upset about that.

Q: 1938 or something like that?

MARTIN: It was earlier than that, I think. Maybe '37, '36 or so. And I heard later the justification was "the nine old men." I remember the picture in the paper, and the nine old men were just too old to be on the Supreme Court. Five or six of them were over 70. At that time, that was really ancient. I heard later that the justification for replacing those guys was that they couldn't handle their workload. It turned out when it was investigated, their workload was current. Of course, the workload of the Supreme Court in those days was so light. I heard in law school that people had been known to resign from the Senate to become a Federal court judge because it was not quite a sinecure but it was a lifetime job, good pay, and not a heavy workload.

Although my family was never rabidly anti-British, we were kind of. The English, you know, "The English will fight to the last American," or something like that, I did hear that. But, I never heard a word against Queen Victoria, and a lot of my reading was from British books, and I read a lot of war stories about British regiments like the Prince's Patch, the Canadian, and The Black Watch. I remember a book called Fifty Famous Stories with all the classical stories in about five or six pages. It was given to me by my cousin Elizabeth, who was my father's favorite cousin. She lived out in Greenport, Long Island. We used to go to see her, and something happened in her family, and they got divorced. It was a big shock, a big shock. Well, her husband was Protestant; somehow it could happen, and she was, too, because earlier on somebody died and the children had to be sent to their Protestant cousins. They raised them as Protestants, and so Cousin Elizabeth was Episcopal. She came and stayed with us while she was looking for a job, which she found quite quickly. But she was grateful, and my family naturally wouldn't take anything from her, but she felt an obligation to us, and she came with books. I got books from the National Geographic Society. I remember I got The Book of Fishes, The Book of Animals of North America - I got all those. We had books in the house, too - not many, but some, and good books, which I could read. And Fifty Famous Stories, I read that book a hundred times: Thermopylae, you know, how roast pig was discovered - I remember in one of the books.

Q: My wife and I were talking about that just yesterday, about Dissertation on Roast Pig, by Charles Lamb.

MARTIN: Yes. I loved those stories. A lot of them were World War I stories, and my Uncle George had fought in World War I. That was interesting because in New York City he had tried to join the Marines. They wouldn't take him because he was too light. When they started drafting people, he went down, and they took him. He was in the 77th Division, which was the Statue of Liberty Division. Later on he worked in the American Museum of Natural History on the West Side of Manhattan. This got me kind of interested in the Foreign Service, though I really didn't know anything about it, but it got me interested in exploring and overseas and all. He was a painter. He had only an eighth grade education. He got along as a painter, but then he got promoted. He was in charge of the exhibits section that mounted exhibits for the explorers, when they would come back. You've seen them, like a diorama. He'd be in charge of that. So he knew Roy Chapman Andrews. You've seen this movie about Indiana Jones? Well I read Indiana Jones is supposedly modeled after Roy Chapman Andrews -

Q: - who wrote stories about exploring.

MARTIN: Right, and he also wrote a marvelous book, which I read, called Under a Lucky Star, his autobiography. He tells some funny stories in there. He was in Japan, where he studied whaling, whales. He was a mammalogist, or something, at the beginning, and a general anthropologist. He's the guy that discovered dinosaur eggs.

Q: He went into the Gobi Desert.

MARTIN: Right, and he discovered the dinosaur eggs in the Gobi Desert. His book, *Under a Lucky Star*, tells about living in Peking. One of our colleagues in DACOR [Diplomatic and Consular Officers Retired] was Dick Butrick.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: He was in China and closed the embassy in Peking, and he knew Roy Chapman Andrews. He said he was a spy. I'm sure that the OSS would call up a guy like Roy Chapman Andrews and use his knowledge, because he was a brilliant guy and had a wonderful life as an explorer.

Q: One of the things that was almost seminal for many people of our generation and for the Foreign Service, really, was World War II and the fact that we really learned about geography and the world beyond. How about that? I mean, were you reading the papers and hearing about Guadalcanal and Guam.

MARTIN: I remember I was reading the New York Times - we used to get the Sunday Times - and we were reading the New York Times on Sunday, December 7, 1941, when the word came over radio that Pearl Harbor had been attacked. Before the war we were talking about events in Europe. I remember hearing the French army is so great, and it turned out they weren't so great; the German army was greater. We were interested in all those things, and then I was in the first year of high school when Pearl Harbor happened. We said the war will be over in no time; we'll beat these Japanese. We were mainly focused on the Japanese at that time, at the very beginning; and then later on people realized it was going to be a long time. But I was too young to join up, although as a kid I always had had an interest in going to Annapolis. In high school, my eyes were such there'd be no chance of my going to Annapolis, so I didn't think much about that after a while. In high school everybody knew he was going to go in the military. I had guys in my class who graduated with me and who went in immediately, and one of them was wounded in the Battle of the Bulge, a guy in my high school class. He was hit, and he didn't like to say where he was hit. I think he was shot in the backside. He said, "I was hit outside Liège." 1/2ge."

Everybody was thinking about going into the military. My uncle George was in World War I. It was in my family. He was on the Draft Board in the neighborhood. It was unthinkable that I would not go into the military, but I also was thinking about my education, so the navy had a program my eyes weren't good enough to get into. They had the best program. The V-12 and the V-5 programs were to be an officer, and you got at least two years of college at a good school before it could happen. That was the V-12 and the V-5 program. V-5 was to be a naval aviator. But the army had something called the Army Specialized Training Program [ASTP], and so I applied for that, and was accepted. I was assigned to Rutgers. I was also taking other scholarship exams, and I won a scholarship, a four-year full scholarship to St. John's University. Actually, I came in third or something, so I won a half scholarship. But the brother in charge of the school said, "If you'll go now, they'll give you a full four-year scholarship." Because they were desperate for students. They were down to about 112 students in the whole college, guys who were IV-f [exempted as physically unfit] or had been discharged for one reason or another. The brother said, "You can resign." I said, "Resign? You can't resign from the army." He said, "That's right. You're not resigning from the army, but you can resign from the Army Specialized Training Program." Well, I really had my orders to go to Rutgers, so you would have been talking to a Rutgers graduate if I had not taken the brother's advice. I'm glad I did, because the big thing I did in high school was to be on the track team, and then at St. John's I also ran on the track team. My main interest in college, I would say, was track. I loved track. I was captain of the cross-country team and then also on the track team. So I was looking forward to it. I went immediately to college upon graduation in June.

Q: 1944.

MARTIN: A couple of days later, 1944, I started at St. John's, and they have a one-year course in the summer on chemistry. I had had chemistry in high school. We had a great teacher of chemistry, so it was a walkover for me. I took one of these general exams - like an SAT - and I came out in the 97th percentile in chemistry at the end of this seven - week course. I was really good. I wanted to be a doctor at that time. I was taking pre-med. Then in the fall I took analytic chemistry, and I didn't do so well. It was a different professor. I also took college algebra and a course in American history, I think up to the Civil War. I forget what else I took; I took entry level courses. The first-year English course you have to take. And then in December 1944, I turned 18. The New York Times reported at that time - I remember reading it - that they were going to draft one million men, the last big push. They anticipated victory and the million men were going to do it. It was going to be over in Europe, and they needed them for Japan. I went into the army on Valentine's day, 1945, and reported to Fort Dix. On the same orders with me were these guys who had been at Rutgers. I'm talking with them, and they said ASTP. So anyway, I had a year's credit in college, and I went back there later. That's when I got my degree.

We were at Fort Dix about 10 days. I remember I wrote something about it in my memoir. I remember that basic training very well. We were there about 10 days, and then we got on a train and went down to Camp Croft, South Carolina. They said they were going to train us to be heavy weapons infantrymen, which meant 18 millimeter mortars and .50 caliber machine guns. About two weeks later, they said, no, we're shifting you over to riflemen, and that was for cannon fodder. That's what they needed. At that time, the ships were built, the planes were there, the big battles had been established, and all the training had taken place. The pilots, the infrastructure for the invasion of Japan, was there. All they needed was more cannon fodder. I don't want to say that, but that's the way it worked.

Q: There really was a manpower shortage towards the end. We had something like 88 divisions, large divisions, and they were all hurting.

MARTIN: Yes. I went through basic training at Camp Croft, South Carolina, which I remember very well, and it was great. The people in our group were mostly 18-year-olds, but a couple of guys 19 somehow snuck in. Then we had some between the ages of 39 and 42 who had been deferred for one reason or another. We had a group that were illiterate and who had gotten literacy training that the army gave. They gave five months of training and brought people up to the fourth grade level. They considered that to be enough to be in the army. I remember helping some of them because a lot of them lived nearby. They were from the hills of North Carolina, and I helped some of them write letters home. Some of those guys couldn't find their way home on a weekend. I was going all over the place, and my first girlfriend I had when I was in the army was in a place called Shelby, North Carolina. It is a wonderful little town, a real southern town with the Confederate soldier in front of the courthouse in the main square.

Q: Facing south - facing north, I mean.

MARTIN: Is that right? Well, anyway, okay.

Q: Usually Union soldiers face south, Confederate soldiers face north.

MARTIN: Aha. Okay. That's great. I remember that little town, and that girlfriend I had. I used to meet her at an American Legion Hall dance. When I got a weekend pass, I would go up there. At the end we went to Fort Meade because the Army had tracks, and the track from Camp Croft ran to Europe. While I was in basic training, President Roosevelt died, and V-E Day took place, and both times the training stopped. Instead we trained for parade, and we had a memorial parade for each event, in honor of Roosevelt and in honor of V-E Day. Then our training was extended a little bit, and we did more problems and so forth. I remember marching with a 60-pound pack, 22 miles. Because it was hot, we marched at night. We knew we couldn't march in the daytime or people would have been dropping like flies. We trained on every weapon the army infantrymen could possibly have, and then we went to Fort Meade. That was my first visit to Washington one weekend; my first visit to Baltimore another weekend.

From there, I went on a train, and I remember being struck by the waste in the army. At Fort Dix, they'd given me an overcoat that was just like the one my Uncle George had in World War I. At the end of 10 days I had to leave that overcoat. I didn't mind that so much, but I had a pair of shoes in basic training, and as far as I was concerned, I could still wear those shoes. I couldn't understand that they made me throw away these shoes and they gave me a new pair of shoes, combat boots. We went by train across the United States to Camp Stoneman, California. We stayed in Camp Stoneman, again, about 10 days.

Q: That was the shipping-off point for Japan.

MARTIN: For the Pacific. Not Japan, for the Pacific.

Q: I was there in 1952 being sent off to Korea, in '51. It's still being used for that.

MARTIN: Yes, so Camp Stoneman, and Stoneman was the name of a General in the Civil War. I think he was a Union General.

Q: Yes, a cavalry general.

MARTIN: Anyway, Camp Stoneman. I went to San Francisco, my first visit. That was my first visit to the West Coast. Then we got on a boat. It was like an excursion boat or a ferry boat, converted. It was called the Ernie Pyle, and we sailed down the Sacramento River to San Francisco, and got off and walked across. The day, when we got on the ship, first of all, I remember still something very vividly, the way the army worked. In the first place, on the dock they had these "gray ladies," Red Cross ladies, giving us coffee and doughnuts. Then when we went on the ship, they would call. You know the way the army does it. They'd say "Martin" and I'd say, "Stephen D." - and then go up, and they would check me off that I was accounted for. They had a big sign that said THE ARMY GROUND FORCES TRAINED YOU. THE ARMY TRANSPORTATION CORPS GOT YOU HERE. Then they had a sign, NOW IT'S UP TO YOU. Effective. It made an impression. I can still remember.

You know, because you're going overseas as infantry, you don't know what the hell's going to happen. We also had a seasickness pill, but I didn't get seasick. We got on, and they grabbed us for guard duty. It was a merchant ship, the Media, and it sailed, and the newspapers on the dock - there were daily newspapers there, and it told about the atomic bomb, and the big discussion was, is this just a bigger bomb, or is it some kind of a new-type bomb? We were saying, "Well, you know, who knows?" The ship sailed, so it must have been August 5 or something like that, and they said we were going to go north of Hawaii. I couldn't understand why. But anyway, we went on a great circle route. We went to Ulithi [Caroline Islands] and Eniwetok, or maybe Eniwetok then Ulithi.

Q: These are in the Marianas, I think.

MARTIN: Yes, and this was the route, and they were very big Navy bases.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: We used Eniwetok later for atomic bomb tests. At that time there were ships there. We did not get off the ship, but the ship pulled in there. I guess we got more provisions and then sailed on. We were headed for the Philippines. We went to Leyte. At Leyte, we were almost immediately put in this replacement camp and then were assigned to divisions. My best friend in the army, whom I was friends with later, Ed Delaney, went to New Guinea. But I was assigned to the 81st Division. It's called the 81st Wildcat Division, and I went to a reunion with them recently. The 77th Division was also in the 9th Corps, or in the same corps, and I was thinking, maybe I should volunteer to get in the 77th Division because that's where my Uncle George was in World War I. I was in the 81st Division, Company L, 322nd Infantry, and they made me, the last guy in, you can imagine, an 18-year-old private (at least the others were private first class), an ammunition bearer in a mortar squad. That was my assignment as a private. Anyway, we stayed there three weeks, and we had training every day, but it was mostly just the kind of training you get in the army when you have nothing to do.

Q: Well, by this time the war was over, wasn't it?

MARTIN: The war was over. I landed in the Philippine Islands on V-J Day, and we were getting ready to go to the Army of Occupation in Japan. I think it was the Sixth Army and the Eighth Army that went, and then the Sixth Army was deactivated, and the Eighth Army had headquarters in Yokohama, and they had a corps headquarters later on in Sendai. I was in this infantry unit, and we did a combat landing in Japan. They didn't want to use up the box that the ammunition came in. I had to carry the shells in the box, even though I also had over my pack this thing where you could put three shells in the front and six in the back. In wartime you could throw away the box. But they didn't want to do that, so my first day in Japan we made a combat landing. It was really thrilling to see it, it was so well done. We got off the ship and climbed down the net. They let down the box of shells, and actually the rope broke, and it crashed down. I climbed down the net, got into the boat, and the boat pulled away, another one came up, and they did a circle. Then somebody did a signal, and they go out in a line, and they're lined up going into the shore. There was some poor guy - this was Aomori, Japan, the northernmost city of Honshu - some poor Japanese guy standing on the end of the dock with a little thing that said "Interpreter." One of the officers - we couldn't see what transpired, but anyway it must have been, dismissed the guy. He decided he didn't speak English well enough, so they took off the interpreter sign and sent him away. I suppose the guy went and committed Hara Kiri or something. We did have Japanese interpreters with us, you know, Japanese-Americans, Nisei.

We got on a train and went to a place called Hirosaki, which was a town which had not been bombed, beautiful with a wonderful castle up on the hill, from the 14th century. It was apple country. I remember going to a dance with Japanese girls, and they served apple wine, and some of us got a little tipsy on the apple wine. That was apple country, cold, and the snow was this high in winter.

Q: You're showing about three and a half feet.

MARTIN: Yes, it was in the snow country, the snow country of northern Japan. I think it's a ski resort now. The mountain nearby that you could see we used to call "Little Fuji." That was our name for it, but it was named Iwakiyama. I used to be on guard duty, just like I had been on guard duty on the ship. I really loved to get up in the morning, four o'clock, from four o'clock until eight to be on the ship. It's pitch dark when you go up on deck. You're sailing along. You're seeing other ships lights sometimes. Gradually dawn comes. It's nice.

In Japan, we used to get a daily newspaper, and I saw a notice one day. It was just two pages, one sheet, two pages, with world news on one side. The other side was division news; the 81st Infantry Wildcat was the paper. It said if you would like to work on the Wildcat, send in your qualifications. I said, Yes, I'll do it. That sounds good. I sent it in. People were surprised. The company commander endorsed it, and then a couple of days later somebody said, "Battalion headquarters, they sent your paper forward." People couldn't quite believe it when I got transferred to division headquarters. I was a big guy in the outfit, and I went off in a truck. I worked on sports, and I would cover, I would go around the division area, which is a very interesting place. Misawa was in our division; the 321st was there, and later on the U-2 flew from there. This was northern Honshu, very close to Siberia.

Q: Actually, Masao was later an air force base which was used for monitoring with Soviet radio broadcasts out of Vladivostok. I know because during the Korean War at one point I was up in Misawa, listening to Vladivostok Soviet military.

MARTIN: When I was in Misawa, it was nothing but mud. Maybe a Japanese army battalion had been stationed there, but in our place in Hirosaki, when I first got there, the biggest problem was the rats. I was assigned to the Rodent Control Squad, and we got a lecture from the battalion surgeon on the life-cycle of the rat, how you can spot them. If you are in a room and this far from the floor on the wall there's a black line, that's a sign of rats. They run around a room - they don't run across, generally - they run around the room, and the hair from the rat comes off and marks a line. We used to have to search. We used to have to put out rat poison.

We did a poison count. I remember the battalion surgeon saying, "You have to put out six little bits of poison at places where you think the rats might be" - and we should know from the life-cycle of the rat - and then we should inspect them the next day and see if any of them had been touched. He said, "About half of them should have been touched." He gave us a signal as to what should be in our report. At least, that's how I understood him. I can't remember, but there were no rats when we left. We did take care of the rats. This poison, whatever it was, made the rat unbearably thirsty, and he would flee any building and go out and look for water.

Anyway, I was accepted on the newspaper, and that is how I got promoted to private first class. When I arrived, the lieutenant asked me how I would write a story, and I explained, because I had been on my high school newspaper. We were told how to write a lead, write a story, get people's names right, and at the end, try to have a little wind-up, which is standard journalism even today. And so I told that to him, and he said, "Okay, you're going to be writing sports." Later on, when some people were starting to leave (people were going home then), they shifted me over to features, which I liked. And when the division broke up - it broke up somewhere around December or January - half of the guys on the outfit who could type (I couldn't type) went to Stars and Stripes. That was one of my disappointments in life. The other half of us went to the Ninth Corps Grenade. We were assigned to Ninth Corps headquarters. I was a feature writer on the Ninth Corps Grenade, and I wrote - I still remember my story; it was a great event for me - "The Anniversary of the Bombing of Sendai." The B-29's were bombing. They dropped leaflets on a whole lot of the cities in Japan, that said, "We're going to bomb this city. Get out of town." More or less. Everybody fled the town, because they believed it. And then the Japanese Government announced nobody could get his rice ration except at the rice station near his home. So people came back.

Then one night the bombers came, and of course they heard them coming, so they had an air raid signal and everybody ran into the air raid shelters. The bombers didn't bomb. They went over the city without bombing. People thought they were headed someplace else, but then they turned around and they dropped their bombs on the way out, not on the way in. You could see the shape of where the bombing was. I could see it from a hill outside town where I went. A Japanese newspaperman went over the whole thing with me. I wrote a story in our Ninth Corps Grenade.

I also got trips to Tokyo during that time. I remember going to see MacArthur. You had to be six feet tall to be in MacArthur's honor guard. He used to come out at a certain time every day, and people would stand to see him. At that time, the Korean nationalists, who had been considered an enemy country, were petitioning that they were friendly to the US that they had been occupied by. So they were trying to give a petition to MacArthur. He knew, of course, they were there, and they were yelling and all this, singing their national song, which is similar to "Old Black Joe" or "My Old Kentucky Home" - whatever, it's an American folk song. He came out and just as if they weren't there, got into his car and drove off.

I was there exactly a year. I arrived in Japan September 25th, and I left on September 26th, '46.

Q: How about fraternization rules? Were there no fraternization rules at that time? With the Japanese women, I was wondering.

MARTIN: No. On the typical day, we would go to the enlisted men's club at night, and the Ninth Corps was only two divisions. It had the 1st Cavalry Division in the south, and the 11th Airborne Division in the north. The jump school was there in Sendai, and the people who flunked out of the jump school generally came to corps headquarters. So we had a lot of guys who would tell stories about jump school, and they'd made three or four jumps. I remember a friend named Four Jumps Keepover as we called him, because he wouldn't make the last night's jump, and he flunked out of jump school. But fraternization? Our social life was mainly drinking beer in the enlisted men's club at night, but also people used to go to the local whorehouse, and there was some black marketing going on, selling cigarettes, but not much, really. People were pretty straight. But I would say that the discipline was way down. People were sitting around mostly.

We did get one series of lectures by the corps commander, who was a famous general in World War I. He had been relieved of command in the first big battle in Kasserine Pass. His name was Charles W. Ryder, a great big lean guy. Somehow he took the rap. I read something about him in a history book, that he was considered to be the best tactician in the US army before World War II, but that he tolerated poor subordinates. He was not strong enough to relieve a subordinate, and he got relieved. I guess he spent most of the war then back in the States, and then he went to the Philippines. He became a corps commander in Japan in the occupation. He was a very impressive person. He ordered that we have a series of lectures about what a corps command does. We had a lecture by every member of the staff, G-1 to G-4, and then army signal corps, and engineer corps. The heads came and gave a talk about what his job was, what he did. It was very interesting for me to learn something about military science from these lectures.

For social life, because we were in a corps headquarters, and we did have a lot of spare time, I remember going out on a Sunday afternoon. We had a jeep, and we had a lot of food with us, sandwiches and such. We weren't going to eat it all, so we left them by a Japanese house, and we knocked on the door for them to come, and then we drove away. They came out and took the food. I also remember when I first went to corps headquarters, we got our food in a mess kit. When we came out, there were Japanese kids waiting for us. We always saved some of the food. They would reach out and sweep their hands around and scoop out all the food and eat it. They were hungry. Within a very short time, they would do the same scoop out and take out the meat or whatever and throw it on the ground and take just what they liked. It showed how people can adapt and change so fast.

I saw the suffering of the Japanese people there, and you couldn't help but like them - or admire them. I'm not sure I would have said that at the time, but yes, they were going through something. I like to read Japanese novels. They're short, and they're very, very good, especially a writer named Endo. I really like his stuff. He writes about that period as a heroic period, that the Japanese today look back on that immediate postwar period with a great deal of nostalgia. They feel that they were made to suffer, and they did.

I stayed, and one year later I sailed for home. I arrived at Fort Lawton, Washington, right in the city of Seattle. We stayed there for two nights, got on the train, went across the northern United States, Milwaukee, St. Paul, south to Chicago, across to Fort Dix, and into the chapel for a farewell ceremony. I remember they asked me if I wanted to join the reserves. I didn't want to join the reserves, at least not as a private first class infantry guy. Your army experience was to train you for something outside. Since my MRS number was rifleman, they gave me the job description that in civilian was comparable to a rifleman, and it had this army jargon which said I could work on an assembly line in a factory. That was what my army training had qualified me for.

I intended to go back to college and did. I went back to St. John's. I was very interested in the track team. We really got it started again, because there was no coach. Our coach had died during the war, a guy named Jimmy Rosenberger. A fellow named Bill Ward became the coach the next year. In between, we ran the team ourselves. They gave us enough money so we could pay the entrance fee to meets, and we still had the uniforms from before the war, and it was fun getting the thing started again. I ran on the mile relay, and I also ran half mile. I was captain of the cross-country team, so two letters, cross-country and track.

Q: What was your major?

MARTIN: History. History and a minor in philosophy. I had started college as a premed, but I had long since given up that idea, though I still didn't know what I wanted to do. I was always a voracious reader. While I was in basic training in the army, I got the idea for the Foreign Service, because there was a guy in the next bunk from me, named McKinnock, and people said his father was a very important person. His father was consul general in Toronto. He told me about efficiency reports and working for a political appointee, and how his father was upset. I guess he hadn't gotten a good efficiency report when he was down somewhere in Latin America. But I was intrigued then, because I had read, *My Ten Years in Japan*, by Joseph C. Grew. I saw what it was to be a diplomat, but what I didn't know was that an ambassador is backed up by a lot of other people. I had no idea of that. I'd never been overseas myself, and never visited an embassy. But I could see from what McKinnock told me that you could join the Foreign Service, and there's a lot to do, and you might become an ambassador or you might not. His father didn't. They asked me how I came into the Foreign Service when I took the Foreign Service Exam. I told that story, and the man on the board - it was the Director General; his name was Jerry Drew - remembered McKinnock. That was my first interest in the Foreign Service came from the army.

I first took the Foreign Service Exam in 1948 and missed it by two points. I didn't take it the next year. I graduated, and decided to go to law school. I was accepted at Columbia Law School. I had very good scores on the law school aptitude test, and Columbia Law School is really a great school. They have some marvelous professors. I didn't take the exam in '49 or '50, but I took it in '51 and again in '52. In '51, I took it at the last minute. I really wasn't trying halfway, and I did worse. I missed it by two points the first time; I missed it by 10 points the second time. Then the third time I scored, I passed it. My best scores were in economics, even though I had not studied economics. I used to read the financial pages. I was interested in that, and it was a lot of reading of statistics and graphs and charts, which I was good at. Also general knowledge. Remember the general knowledge tests?

Q: Oh, yes. Well, this was a three-and-a-half-day exam.

MARTIN: Right, international law, everything. It was a big writing exam. I was just reading the other day in the paper about Varilla - you know Varilla, who was connected with establishing the Panama Canal. That name was on the exam, I remember. I don't think I knew who he was at that time. Yes, it was a three-and-a-half-day exam, and I took it, and passed it. Then in '53, '54, I took the oral exam. But before that you had to take the physical and pass the security check. So they knew a lot about us when we went in.

Q: Do you remember any of the questions that were asked you on the oral?

MARTIN: They started off asking me why I wanted to come into the Foreign Service, and the purpose of the exam was not really to find out how much you knew. They assumed that they had a pretty good reading on that from the written exam. What they tried to do was to get an impression of how you would be as a Foreign Service officer, how you would handle yourself in a situation where you were being opposed by somebody in an argument. They asked me about the voting age. At that time, there was a lot of talk about reducing the voting age to 18, and the arguments in favor. Then they wanted me to give the arguments against it. They were trying to see whether you were flexible enough that you could see both sides of a question. We talked about Abraham Lincoln. Some of the stuff I'm giving now - they wanted to know my background, what schools I had gone to, why I wanted to be a lawyer, why I wanted to come into the Foreign Service rather than practice law, what experience I had had in practicing law at that time. Then they ran over some words, and I bet you these were words that I had gotten wrong on the exam. They asked me about some people. A name, I remember an Italian name, a prominent figure, I guess, in Napoleon III's government, Baretta?

Something like that. Then he asked me about the word condominium, which I should have known about - the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, which was a condominium. And nowadays everybody knows what a condominium is as far as housing is concerned, but then it was not a word in wide use, and I really didn't know condominium. I was trying to analyze it from my knowledge of Latin, con meaning 'with,' dominium. That's what it is; it's sharing domain over something, which you do in a condominium, or the public areas of it. Then they asked me to get up and go over on a map the expansion of the United States, which apparently was a standard question, but they started off by asking me what I thought about the policy of massive retaliation and whether it was a new policy or not. It had been on the pages of the New York Times that day. I should have known better than I did. I said I didn't think it was really all that new. I think that we would have relied on massive retaliation anyway because our military hadn't been run down after World War II. They asked me if I was going with a girl. At that time I had no plans to get married in the immediate future. I can't remember any more questions. But I remember they tried to upset you. They tried to test you. Rather than find out how much you knew, they tried to test you to try to put you off, and then they wanted to know about working with people. They wanted to know whether you thought you could work with people, to which I said, of course, yes.

I was different in that I heard later that normally there were three people on the review. In my case there were five, including the Director General of the Foreign Service. So I didn't score very high in that written exam. I'd passed, but not with all that high a grade. I think I was really maybe a close case. I met the other guy who was tested that day on the street later. He didn't pass, and they told him they didn't take him because he was married and had a child already. They thought that it was a little late for him. They couldn't say that now, but they said that to him. I was a bachelor. They could send me anywhere. They asked me if I was willing to go anywhere, and I said yes - go anywhere, do what I'm told. I thought of it as like the army, where you go where you're sent and you do what you're told. That still is a basic requirement, although some people act like they don't believe it.

Q: Well, you went into the Foreign Service when?

MARTIN: June 1st, 1954. I took the oath of office - they had called me up at home two weekends before. They wanted me to come down immediately, and the reason was, there was something called the Refugee Relief Act. It had been passed as a successor to the Displaced Persons Act, which was over in about '49 or so. There was much criticism that the refugee relief act was not being implemented fast enough. President Eisenhower promised that he would implement it if he became President, and he did. It took a while, and they still weren't implementing it fast enough, and then apparently he said, "We're going to do it now, and I don't want any more excuses." So they took in a whole bunch of people at that time, in early 1954, and they wanted us to go overseas immediately. I did not go into an A-100 course. I had no introductory course to the Foreign Service, so I came in in June. About the third week in June, I was on a ship, the America, on my way to Bremerhaven and then to Bonn. At that time, the authority for personnel assignments was delegated to the Personnel Office in Bonn. I read at one time one-tenth of all the Foreign Service officers were assigned to Germany during the occupation.

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Q: Today is February 11th, 1999. Doug, let's go back. You said you wanted to pick up some points we didn't cover last time.

MARTIN: Yes, I wanted to make three points, really. We talked about nuns, and you said, "you know they use to hit us". That's true. At the same time, there couldn't have been a better relationship between the home and the school, and the Catholic schools liked to say "home and school," rather than "parent-teachers." Believe me, my family was supporting school. I had to do well in school, because the family expected me to. The nuns were strict, but there was a feeling that they were on our side and that they were trying to help us get ahead. When you look back, that whole Catholic school and immigrant population, up to and after World War II, up to about 1960, was really a remarkable thing in American history because it doesn't exist in the same way any more. It was almost a kind of aid program that the bishops carried out that benefited the immigrant population.

Then I wanted to say something about this idea of all politics being local. The local Democratic captain came around to my mother once and asked her to become the block leader. We were always Democrats. Everybody knew that. But she said, "Richie, I'm voting for Eisenhower." He said, "That's okay, Mrs. Martin, you've just got to remember Rooney, Fiore, and Kalish." John Rooney was our congressman. And my mother said, "Just make sure people get out the vote and remind them we can't forget John Rooney," not that he was in trouble. But when I hear all politics are local, this thing that the Speaker of the House, Tip O'Neil, became famous for: that's what I think of.

The third point. I mentioned Franco and how we were anticommunist, patriotic and so forth. I didn't mention Joe McCarthy, because during that time, we were almost violently anticommunist, and there was a feeling that President Roosevelt had given away Eastern Europe.

Q: The Yalta Agreement.

MARTIN: Yalta, everything. This couldn't have been done unless there was some skullduggery, unless there was something, and so people believed there was Communist influence. When McCarthy came along and played on that note, believe me, he got a responsive chord. In that Irish neighborhood where I grew up, McCarthy could have been elected President if he'd wanted to be. Looking back, I personally was right with him up until he attacked General Marshall. I was a great fan of General Marshall, I had read the World War II report, and when McCarthy attacked him, I said there's something the matter here. This guy is crazy. It turned out he was a loner, so he really had no support in the Senate from any other senators. He was a drunk.

Q: He died of cirrhosis of the liver.

MARTIN: Yes, and after he was censured, people wouldn't invite him to things at all, they really ostracized him, and he just vanished and became an alcoholic. What has only come out in the past year or two are these Verona Tapes that show that the Rosenbergs were guilty. Alger Hiss, guilty. And he said there were a hundred or something Communists in the US Government. Well, it turned out there were more than that. The Verona Tapes show there were agents, not just in the US Government, but around the country, people supporting them.

Q: Well, the Verona Tapes - these were intercepts of telegrams between Soviet officials showing that the American Communist Party was fully supported and acting as an agent of the Soviet Union.

MARTIN: Right. People didn't believe that at the time. Anyway, I want to say that McCarthy, as it turns out, that his assertions about the number of Communist agents around were true, and people who supported Alger Hiss were wrong. There are still guys in DACOR - not still, one died recently - but he worked with Alger Hiss, and was a great admirer of Alger Hiss.

Q: I know. I remember, I really felt very early on that Alger Hiss, one, was guilty and, two, he let the side down. You went to Bonn in '54.

MARTIN: Right.

Q: And you were a part of what, the Refugee Relief Program?

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: You were in Bonn from when to when?

MARTIN: I was only in Bonn for about a week. At that time, personnel authority within Germany was controlled in Bonn. Later on it was taken to Washington, but at that time, people were assigned to Germany, and then in Bonn they'd be assigned wherever needed. I knew I was going to be an immigrant visa issuing officer, and I knew I was going to be somewhere in one of the posts but not at the embassy. So as soon as I got there, they told me that I'd be going to Berlin. I had been told that I'd be assigned to one of four places, and I was hoping to go to either Hamburg or Munich. I didn't want to go to Frankfurt. And I didn't really want to go to Berlin, either. Well, going there was one of those lucky things, and I've had some other lucky breaks like that. The best place for me to be was Berlin. Somebody once asked me whether I got the posts I wanted in the Foreign Service, and I said, "You know, I always got the post I wanted, but I never realized it until I was there about eight months."

Q: I just like to get at the beginning of each of these sections, you were in Berlin from when to when?

MARTIN: I was in Berlin from '54 to '56.

Q: Okay.

MARTIN: Although I was technically with the Refugee Relief Program, there was another vice-consul, an older guy, a staff officer, Tom Burke. He was very happy to take over that kind of work, and they wanted me to get more general experience. It was really good that they did that. People were really good to me. So they set me up as a visa issuing officer. We issued about a hundred immigrant visas a month, and about 50 soldiers from the Sixth Infantry would get married every month, and then we had about 150 non-immigrant visas. When I first got there, the quota was filled, but it was soon beginning to show signs that not everybody who had signed up to emigrate would go; when you asked them if they still wanted to go, they changed their minds. Things were changing in Germany. But pretty soon the quota opened, and from then on, when a person came to me, if they wanted to immigrate into the US and they qualified, they could go. It was a very easy consular assignment to have.

Q: Could you talk a bit about Berlin in the '54 to '56 period?

MARTIN: This was the height of the Cold War, or almost the height, and you couldn't just go over into East Berlin. People had to be told when you were going over there. The whole post was set up, because of the importance of Berlin. The chief of mission was the ambassador. The deputy chief of mission was the military commander, a two-star general. And the State Department officer in charge was the assistant chief of mission. And we also had a section that just looked at what was going on in East Germany and East Berlin. And of course, there were very close relations with the military, and there were, everybody knew, a large number of intelligence agencies operating in Berlin at that time.

I did general consular work. I had some death cases I dealt with, very interesting, and I had some interesting visa cases. I had one case of a fellow, a soldier, black. He wanted to marry a woman. He had three children from three different tours in Germany by that woman, and her name was on a list. We had very good information there. It showed that this woman had signed up to be a member of the Communist Party in Kassel, Germany. She told me that she didn't realize she was joining the Communist Party, that she needed a house - she had no place to live - and they said, if you want an apartment, you have to sign the paper. She signed up, and her name was forever after on the list.

She was barred, but at that time there were two exceptions. One was an involuntary member of the Communist Party or of some cover organization or a defector. We were looking for defectors of some sort, but I never was able to find one. I sent in a request for an advisory opinion to the Department stating the case, and I really thought this woman was an involuntary member of the Communist Party, and she had three children. The father was an American sergeant there, and he wanted to legitimize his children and marry the woman. They sat on the case for a very long time, but eventually they came back and okayed it. I think that's quite remarkable, and I wonder if anybody in Germany at that time was ever able to get anybody through as an involuntary member of the Party rather than a cover organization.

Q: Cover organizations, that wasn't too difficult, but no, not the Party.

MARTIN: A large number of the people who came in to us were from the east. They were refugees who had come through West Berlin from East Germany and East Berlin. I knew all about how people came through. They had to give up their papers. We had a congressional visit one time by a Congressman Eagan, from Ohio. He was worried that people were streaming in from the East and coming to the United States, and that the Communists were invading us, which was pretty much nonsense. He took a little convincing. We had to show him exactly how the system operated. When people came in, they had to go to a camp, and give up their East papers. They were debriefed. There was a record of them. Then they got West Berlin papers. If they eventually came to us, we saw them and treated them like every other applicant. The general situation in Berlin then was rather peaceful. One year before, there had been demonstrations right at the East Berlin line, the June 17th [1953] uprising, and that came shortly after uprisings in Poland. And it preceded what happened in Hungary.

Q: It was a serious time. I was a GI in Germany. I remember we were confined to the barracks because they didn't know what would happen, and you know, the troops were kept ready.

MARTIN: Right. One of the big events that occurred when I was there was the tunnel, the famous tunnel in Berlin.

Q: Would you explain what that was?

MARTIN: The CIA came up with the idea of constructing a tunnel. The guy's name was Harvey, Bill Harvey. He had been an FBI man, and he was the head of the CIA station in Berlin. He was pretty much of a daredevil. Later on Kennedy admired greatly what happened. Harvey eventually got involved with the Cubans, and because of his FBI connections and, like the mafia, I think he was the one who tried to get the exploding cigar to Castro, which didn't work. I think a lot of their ideas didn't work, but this one worked in a magnificent way. The tunnel was built. It was obvious when I was there that this one intelligence group, which turned out to be the CIA (they never said that) were very, very secret. They were doing something. It was apparent that it was very important from what people were saying, and it was very, very secret.

After a while, there was something there called the Allied Travel Office and the Interzonal Facilities Bureau. These were remnants of the Cold War, because in 1955, the occupation of Germany ended, and General McCord made a speech about it at that time that they were going to change. But it didn't end in Berlin. Berlin was still an occupied place, and the Allied Travel Office provided the documentation for American officials in Berlin. It just happened that the guy who was doing that work, an employee of the intelligence agency, went home, and they asked me to replace him for a couple of months. I stamped all of the passports of all of the officials - or had them stamped and signed them - the official Americans in Berlin. There were several hundred of them, maybe a thousand. And the Interzonal Facilities Bureau was set up to control the travel of Soviet officials between West Berlin and West Germany - not West Berlin, because the city was open. When they wanted to go to West Germany, they had to go to the Interzonal Facilities Bureau and get an application. Then I had a procedure to follow. I had to notify USAREU (United States Army Europe) headquarters, and then they arranged for these guys to come. They had to tell us exactly when they were coming, what crossing point they were going to go through, and obviously people would be there to watch them. We had very close relations with all the intelligence agencies there. They would tell us stuff, and we would also provide them with our files if they wanted to look at it. At the Interzonal Facilities Bureau, I used to go there half a day. On almost a daily basis, I would be going over to East Berlin and applying for permits for Americans to go into East Germany, and we would ask for a [Russian permit?]. Well, they didn't like that. They wanted us to go to the East German Government, which we did not recognize. When a Russian wanted to come, he had to come to us. One day, this intelligence guy came to see me and said, "This afternoon, you're going to get five requests for permission to go into West Germany from Russians." And he said, "You're going to get them. It's very important that you get the passports of these three guys." I said okay. It was interesting because just at that time our ambassador in Moscow said, if we wanted to go to East Germany, we had to give our passports. They would give us their ID cards. A practice had developed where we accepted that, and when Toon came in, he said, "No, no more. If we have to give our passports, they have to give us theirs." Reciprocity, basic principle of diplomacy, I guess. Anyway, when I asked them for that, they screamed. They didn't want to do it. They were very reluctant to do it. They would have excuses. This guy said, "You're going to get these five applications, make sure you get these passports". I think the passports were looked at by somebody, I reckon NATO.

Q: Right, sure.

MARTIN: They were running the passports next door and taking pictures and giving them back. I worked in conjunction with my two colleagues, my French and British opposite numbers. When somebody came in, I would hand it to the guy and say, "It's being typed now. I'll be right back," and make some kind of a crazy excuse. One thing we did do, and which was playing on a weakness of the Russians - they are a very sloppy people. They cannot fill out an application correctly. There'll be spelling errors, there'll be dates wrong, there'll be blanks and so forth. So this always was our excuse. We had to examine the application carefully. In the meantime, we were getting pictures of the passports.

Sure enough, a guy came in, and he said, "This is important. We have to get this out by tomorrow." I said, "Okay, let's see the passport." He said, "These three men are traveling in East Germany. I don't have their passports. I only have their military ID's." "Sorry." It was interesting how they were fighting to avoid giving their passports. I later found out that anybody could issue those military ID cards, but the passports were issued in Moscow. The passports had a higher validity or a higher level of authenticity, and that's why the CIA guy wanted them. The guy eventually came through with the passports. I wondered at that time, how did this guy that I dealt with in the intelligence office know that these three guys were not likely to have the passport? Later, when the news of the tunnel came out, I said, "Now I know".

I talked to somebody since then who told me they got so much information that they're still processing some of it. He said, "I doubt if what you say (about the three passports) is true. I doubt if they were that good." But I think they were that good. They were listening for certain calls, and they were looking for any calls that came from that source.

I did that for about three months, every day going over to East Berlin and seeing the Soviet officer who was my opposite number and also another Soviet officer who became somewhat famous later on, a guy named Khriboshei. Khriboshei is mentioned in a number of books. Later, he apparently established a contact with somebody in Berlin who was annoyed that he wasn't promoted and he went in and offered to give information to the Soviets, and he dealt with Khriboshei, who spoke English and was in the habit of showing up in West Berlin. Whenever there was some kind of a function, Soviet nurses - pretty hot army nurses - Khriboshei would turn up with them. He was obviously a very active character. He cultivated his contact, an army sergeant who went to the United States. They followed him, in the sense that they told him, "When you're coming up for assignment, let us know." They told him to apply to go to NATO, and he did. He got the combination to the safe, because he worked right there. An officer had the combination, but he was a little careless. One night, the Soviets came into our NATO headquarters and took away a bundle of documents.

That guy was later caught, convicted, and sentenced to jail. His son fought in Vietnam. The son went to see him in jail and stabbed him and killed him. It's all been told in a book called KGB, I think. He tells how the KGB would recruit people. They never tried to get people on ideological grounds. You see, Americans are not susceptible to that kind of a plea. They get them on blackmail or some disgruntlement or money.

I had some interesting death cases. We had a couple of women officers and they asked me to do them. A guy was dead in a hotel. The hotel owner wanted me to get the body out so they could fill the room. I said, "I'm sorry, we have to call the police." The police came, and I did the inventory of the guy's effects. It was rather pathetic because he had a bunch of calling cards in his wallet, all in Hoboken, all on one street, and they were from Charlie's Bar, Al and Phil's Bar and Grill, Mike's Bar and Grill. He was going to send postcards back to his buddies. He had turned 65, just got his first Social Security check, and went straight over here. He said he was interested in genealogy, but he was born in Königsberg, which was then Kaliningrad. You couldn't go there at all. I don't know what he was going to do.

When we sent the telegram back, the daughter answered, "He must have had" - I think she said - "\$6,500 on him." It turned out the ticket had cost \$1,500 and he had a little less than \$5,000. She still said, "Oh, that \$1,500 must be there. What happened? Who stole it?" She picked out the cheapest possible outcome, which was burial locally. We arranged for him to be buried in the Central Cemetery in Berlin, and there was a Lutheran pastor there, a very nice guy, who was head of the German-American Association. We agreed this guy must have been a Lutheran. We made him a Lutheran after he died, because 99 per cent of the people who were born in Königsberg were.

He got a Lutheran funeral with one Catholic present - that was me - and nobody else, and it was very interesting anyway to go through that experience. I really look upon that as a great time. People used to avoid consular work or complain about consular work, but I enjoyed it.

Q: Did you feel under any particular threat during this '54 to '56 period. Here you are in Berlin, surrounded by the Soviets? What was the feeling?

MARTIN: People talked about world events, but there was no "feeling." Somehow we had a lot of confidence in the US military, that somehow nothing was going to happen. Things were going on, so there might be a confrontation, and nobody wanted to think what would happen in Berlin itself if war broke out. It's obvious that there couldn't be resistance there. We just would have been captured, that's all. But nobody was concerned. In fact, I wanted to stay longer.

I got married while I was there, and had my son while I was there, my first child.

Q: Was your wife German?

MARTIN: My wife was Hungarian. I was there six or seven months before I got married, because at that time, to marry an alien, you had to get permission. I would not have gotten permission to marry a Hungarian, but she was already in the United States when I met her and graduated from an American university, graduated from Manhattanville College, which is where the Kennedy daughters went. We agreed she would become a citizen, and then come over, so I didn't have to ask anybody's permission to get married. I just had to notify the government that I had gotten married. Since she was from Hungary and spoke German she was a great advantage to me. She had gone for a year to the University of Munich and had spoken German since she was a kid. Her ethnic background is really more German than Hungarian. Her father was a three star general in the Hungarian army, the highest-ranking general, when he got pushed out in 1936. He told me when he and Admiral Horthy had conversations, they spoke German to each other, even though it was Hungary. It was a carry-over from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had gone to Austro-Hungarian military schools all the way through.

Q: In West Berlin, did you ever travel into East Berlin?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, I used to go there all the time. When I had this job for three months, I went there every day.

Q: What was your impression of East Germany and the difference between the two zones?

MARTIN: It was like going from life into death. The West was booming. Right down by the East Berlin border it was still all smashed down. You could see evidence of the bombing of Berlin everywhere, but at the same time there was also a tremendous reconstruction. Germany was pretty much back by that time, and East Berlin was not. There was a stream of people coming across every week, and later on, when I worked on the German Desk, just before the Wall went up, there were about 5,000 a week coming across. All the way through the Cold War, there were between 3,000 and 5,000 refugees coming to the West, almost all of them through West Berlin, because you could get on a subway and go to West Berlin from East Berlin. The controls were very limited. Later on, they started to put more and more controls on, and then they put the Wall up that made it impossible.

You would not make an effort to get into conversation with people, because you might get them in trouble, and they would be very nervous about that. But you could go over, and you could go to bookstores, and into the cafés. The East German currency was worth much less than the West German. The exchange rate was very favorable, and you could walk over there any time, just get on the subway and go over. Going to East Germany was a different story. There you had to get permission, but I did make a couple of trips. One time it would open up would be for the Leipzig Fair every year, and I went to the Leipzig Fair three times when I was there. There used to be a spring and a fall fair. I remember a conversation I had with a family. In Leipzig, of course, you would go to a housing office, and they would assign you to a place, a private house. The family would make money during the fair by having guests. You could talk to them. And it was interesting to go to church there; that was mainly a Protestant area, Leipzig.

And I remember one conversation with a young woman. She, and a kid, 16 years old, and her father and mother and I were having a talk. We were talking about how World War II got started, and I explained to them that Germany had declared war on the United States. She couldn't believe it. And then her father told her, yes, the Japanese attacked the United States, and the next day, Hitler declared war on the United States, because they had this agreement with the Japanese. She was shocked by it, and then she said, "Oh, that was a terrible mistake." The truth wasn't getting through all the time to people in the East.

Q: How was the Leipzig Fair used? What was our feeling about the Leipzig Fair as a trade fair?

MARTIN: The Leipzig Fair had its roots back in the middle ages, a crossroads area. This was a place where any company went that wanted to do business with East Germany. They used to claim also that doing business in the whole Soviet Bloc could be done by going to the Leipzig Fair and participating or at least attending it. All the countries would come and have exhibits - all the countries from the East, the Soviets and Hungarians and Poles would have big exhibits - and then American companies would go if they had an interest in doing business there. I don't think it really was all that good because there was something in those days called the Interzonal Trade System. Later it was incorporated into the Treaty of Rome. As far as trade was concerned, East Germany and West Germany were considered one, and there were no customs. The trade would take place, and all West German firms could trade in the East very easily. So the way for an American firm to participate in trade with East Germany was not to go directly, but to find a German company that was doing business. Still, from the political point of view, everybody wanted to go for a chance to get into the East, a chance to get into the Soviet Zone. I was happy to make those trips.

I also got a chance once to go by car from Berlin to Hamburg by the road that was not the regular Autobahn to the West, not the Helmstedt thing. But to go directly, the direct route and to go through East Germany and to see how poor those farmers were - I think that must be a poor area any time, but it was really poor. The war had gone right through there, but I don't think the war had done that much. It just was poor from the start.

Q: The war had pretty well ended by the time that fell. That was just the tail end of the war.

MARTIN: Yes, but that was still very interesting, to go through that area. Anyway, I loved it in Berlin, and actually I went back on a private trip, my wife and I, and we went to all the places I had gone to.

Q: Did you have much contact with the West Berliners while you were there?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. You could have a lot of contact with them, and while I was a bachelor, I went out with quite a few German girls. I also made contact with a couple of people. One guy was studying to be a doctor. He had a friend who was a visa applicant who was a priest, or studying to be a priest. He was going to California. This guy wanted to make contact with an American. His father was a doctor, and I learned something about the German medical system, which of course went back to the time of Bismarck and was socialized medicine. Because he lived down near the East Berlin border, he still had a lot of patients from East Berlin who could come over to him. He had a problem with money, getting money from them, because their money was worth nothing. So he used to collect this East Berlin money.

I used to go out to West Germany at that time. I went skiing. That was a lot of fun. Being a bachelor gives you a lot of freedom that you don't have otherwise, so that was very enjoyable. But after I was married, we had a baby just 10 months later and so that ties you down a little bit.

I was very lucky with one case there. And life happens this way. Maids would come in very often when they had a relationship with an American soldier, and they could only get permission if they could get a visa to go to the States. And so I was the one that decided that. This case had been looked at before by somebody else who had turned it down. Anyway, when she came to me I looked at it and said, "There's no reason to turn this woman down." I said, "We should issue the visa." I wrote up a little summary as I saw the case. But then my boss, Virginia Ellis, a very nice lady, said, "Oh, these people, oh, these . . ." She used to have a funny viewpoint about Germans; she didn't like the Germans getting visas, basically.

Q: This was one of the problems we had often, particularly in those days, I think, with our visa officers. Often they came with really rather limited outlooks.. I had the same thing down in Frankfurt, and so they would allow their personal feelings to be very much a problem.

MARTIN: I was very much influenced by my legal training, because the requirements were there. It was very simple. If you had any legal training you would see because these women were being turned down as prostitutes, and they were not prostitutes. That's ridiculous. No more than say, Monica Lewinsky's a prostitute. Loose living and accepting gifts. That's not prostitution. But some of these people had that attitude. Anyway, there was something else with her too. She didn't want to change a decision that was made.

The first time I met Betty Toon, the wife of the new consul, the first thing she did was hit me with this case that her maid had been treated badly at the consulate and she shouldn't have been turned down. I said, "I don't know anything about it." I couldn't remember the specific case at that point, but when he came in, the first case he looked at, he saw that I had said she should be issued a visa. He told his wife that too. From then on, he was on my side. I got along extremely well with him. And he also liked that I was going down, when I had this job in the Interzonal Facilities Bureau. There I was responsible for an entire building, all the army property. I was assigned it because the 1954 Foreign Ministers' Conference had taken place in that building. It's where the Air Traffic Control Center was. But I was the one who was signed out for 1,000 cups, 1,000 saucers, 1,000 sets of silverware, and all kinds of stuff that was all there. It was the largest building in Berlin, downtown. Of course, I occupied just a little office with a huge number of files, because it had been the control system for all travel within Germany.

Crazy things would happen. For example, one day we got an emergency call from Tempelhof Airport. There was some German guy at the airport, and they were looking at his papers and they had some kind of a lookout card on him. The lookout, when I looked at the guys file, for some reason it said "This man not to be allowed to travel into Berlin." And here he was in Berlin; should they let him out? I said - well, I mean, you don't have to be a brilliant logician to figure that if he shouldn't be in here, let him out - So I said, "Let him out." They let him go, and they didn't hear any more from it.

Q: Was this part of the Berlin Document Center?

MARTIN: No. That was located somewhere else. The Berlin Document Center was where all the Party records were, and when I was in German affairs, I got involved with some of those cases, too. Some of them were extremely interesting. The Germans saved all their papers, and then we captured them all, which was very good. We almost had more information than we wanted to have. But some of the more interesting stuff in there were these cases of the Nazi court trials, because besides the whole German legal system, the Party had its own system, and the Nazi Party could try people and impose sentences on them, and execute them. And somebody was writing a book later on when I was in German affairs, and we had these various cases. To read them was really kind of pathetic. There was a fellow, a priest who was executed for telling a joke about Hitler - just a simple, ordinary joke. Somebody turned him in, and he confessed that he had told that joke, and said he didn't mean any harm by it. Then they accused him of having a defeatist attitude towards the war (he probably thought they were going to lose the war - a lot of people had as it wore on) and the guy was executed. There were maybe a couple of dozen cases where people were executed that we had records on from the Berlin Document Center.

But I was down there and I visited the Center. We knew all the people, the Americans, there. I think eventually, didn't we turn the Center over to the Germans?

Q: I think we microfilmed everything and turned it back to the Germans at the end, only quite recently, as a matter of fact.

MARTIN: Yes, I know it was not too long ago. A lot of these things are still happening.

Q: Let me see, then in '56 - when did you leave Berlin?

MARTIN: I left Berlin in September, but let me just mention a couple of other cases I had, or one in particular. There was a woman who applied for a visitor's visa, and there was in her record that she was a drug addict and she was on a list that doctors got because people who were drug addicts would tell a story to a doctor in order to get certain drugs. Anyway, she also had a positive Wassermann - which meant she had syphilis, at least in her body. But it had been stopped because penicillin stopped it dead in its tracks. In her case the medical requirements were that they had to do a spinal tap to determine if the brain had been involved. I remember the doctor came to me, and said, "You know, I really don't want to do this if I don't have to. Would you please reverse the usual procedure, and interview her first? If you're going to turn her down, then I won't do that. She'll just be turned down."

Q: It was not a very comfortable procedure, a spinal tap.

MARTIN: Dangerous and painful, and something could go wrong, too. So I remember that case. And then there was another case where somebody I issued a visa to went to Italy and took the Andrea Doria to the United States. She was on the ship when it went down. She was saved, but the headlines in all the Berlin papers were "Berliner Goes Down with the Andrea Doria but Rescued."

Q: Did you have any Americans who would get to Berlin and run out of money, and you had to get them out of there.

MARTIN: Yes, and it was a funny case, because one of the guys that was with me, a staff officer who was one of the other vice-consuls, whenever he had a difficult case like that, very often, he'd get them to Bremen. We used to send them to Bremen, and then they would eventually maybe go to Bremerhaven and then to the States.

Q: Get them on a troop ship.

MARTIN: Get them on a ship. In other words, get them to the next consular district, which is an old consular trick, I think.

Q: It is.

MARTIN: Anyway, he was always doing that, and darned if he wasn't transferred to Bremen - because, you know, they could transfer us within the country. Then he was complaining that we were sending cases to him that we should have handled ourselves!

There had been an annual ball in Berlin before the war, and there was a slush fund, not very large but large enough; and the consular officer dealing with passports and citizenship could disburse it.

Q: The money for this was generated by the ball.

MARTIN: The ball, yes. The custodial fund - it's all against the rules now.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: They don't allow that at all. Even then it was probably against the rules. But it was there, and it was approved, and everybody knew about it. There was no dishonesty involved. And then we had Lutheran nuns who ran some sort of a guest house, and we used to put people up there for a couple of days until arrangements could be made for them to leave. They would come in to complain about the place as you couldn't read because they said there was only a 25-watt bulb in the middle of the room. The quarters were not particularly comfortable. And we would say, you know, "You don't have any money to stay anywhere; this is all we can afford. We can't put you up in a hotel. You've got to stay there." It was practically free.

Because of the special status of Berlin, the commanding general had the authority to expel people, Americans, from the American sector. We had a case of a character, an American tourist who came, and he met some guy on the street, an American who conned him into buying some Hitler souvenirs and a camera from East Germany - Zeiss, from East Germany. He was going to get him a Zeiss camera if he would give him 600 marks. He would meet him the next day on the corner there and have the camera and the souvenirs. Well, of course, the next day the guy was not there, so the American tourist went to the police. The police said, "What did he look like?" and they said, "Wait a second, is this the guy?" They had his picture. They knew who it was right away. He was wanted for burglary in several different states. He was a combination burglar and con man, and he had been living with a German woman and he had a child. She had tuberculosis, and was about to be put into the sanitarium, so I was going to break up the relationship. He was pretty much ready to go back to the States anyway, but they tossed him in jail, and I went to see him. I used to bring him cigarettes and chocolate bars to keep him going. He complained it. A German jail can be pretty tough.

Q: German jails were not pleasant. I mean, if you've got to do it, go somewhere else.

MARTIN: Denmark, yes, someplace like that. German jails are cold in the winter, and I don't think the food is all that good. So he wanted some help. While his case was being processed, the general signed the expulsion order. We had a liaison officer with the police, and it would be an American policeman doing that work. One of them came to me and said, "Well, this is a bad guy". I was going to escort him out of the country, to Bremerhaven. We were going to put him on a troop ship. And this fellow said, "Oh, you've got to watch him. . . . dangerous and so forth." I said, "Well, he seemed okay when I talked to him in jail."

We got on the troop train to Bremerhaven and then to Bremen from Bremerhaven. We stopped in the morning in Bremen. You remember the train used to take a couple of hours to get there. I was asleep. Later on, when we all got up and were on our way, he said, "You know, Mister, I could have escaped. I could have escaped, but I didn't want to get you in trouble." He was a con man.

When we got to the ship, he wanted to know where he was going to be on the ship. He thought he'd be up maybe in a stateroom or something. Well, on the troop ship, I remember he said, "Well, where is that?" And the military guy who was arranging said, "That's all the way down." I mean, this guy was below decks. He was in the bottom of that ship, but he had some cigarettes and chocolate bars I gave him, and he had meal tickets for meals on the ship.

Before we left Berlin, I was told, if he wants to escape, let him escape. The general's jurisdiction extends only to the American Sector. Once the train pulls out of the station, a half hour later, when we leave West Berlin, whatever he does, don't put up any resistance; just let him go. But he didn't go, he wanted to go home to the States, and then I never heard from him again. But that was kind of a fun trip.

Well, that pretty much completes my Berlin experience. I did get to know some newspapermen there, a guy who wrote for Tagesspiegel who later became a TV announcer. I don't know what happened to him. But anyway, my friend Erhard Sundermann, whose father was a doctor, he is still around. I looked him up when I was visiting Berlin. I knew I would be able to get in touch with him. I called him. He's still there.

Q: In September of '56, where did you go?

MARTIN: I came back to the United States. I was assigned there. During this whole time I was in Berlin, something called "Wristonization" was going on, so the trend was for people in Washington to become Foreign Service officers and go overseas.

Q: These were civil servants who were amalgamated into the Foreign Service.

MARTIN: Right. For Foreign Service people, there were lots of openings in the States. I was transferred to one. They wanted to put me into cultural affairs, which I didn't want and didn't happen. But before I left, Mack Toon had talked to me about what I was going to do in the future. I felt I was interested in Eastern Europe, particularly after talking to my wife and her father. I felt I knew a lot about the area. He recommended me for Russian language training and sent in a very nice airgram. Anyway, I was not accepted for that. But they did accept me for Eastern European language and area training, and they offered Bulgarian, because by the time I got to the States, the Hungarian uprising had taken place.

Q: October of '56.

MARTIN: October of '56, right. I was just arriving in Washington. They needed people to help out on the Hungarian Desk. I helped out Jim Sutherland at that time, an extremely interesting period for me. At the same time, I was being processed for this Eastern European language and they said, kind of apologetically, "Would I be willing to study Bulgarian?" I said, "Gee, Bulgarian - I hadn't thought of that, but yes, sure, go ahead. I'll study Bulgarian." A few weeks later, they came to me, and said, "Look, because of what's happening in Hungary" and because at that time we didn't recognize Bulgaria - we didn't have diplomatic relations, but they were planning and they were going to have people learning the language - they said, "We've decided to cancel that and we've had another cancellation. Would you be willing to study Serbo-Croatian?" I said, "Fine, I'll do it." So I was waiting to go into Serbo-Croatian language area. In the meantime, I worked on the Hungarian Desk, another fascinating time.

Q: Let's talk about that because timing's rather important. When did you start working on the Hungarian Desk?

MARTIN: It would have been right after Maleta got shot. It was right after, because I went home with my wife's family on home leave. In fact, I left earlier than that. I didn't leave in September. I left earlier. Maybe I even left in the end of July, beginning of August.

Q: That would make more sense.

MARTIN: Yes. But I did complete home leave, and then reported to Washington.

Q: What was your father-in-law's reaction to this? Did he see the Soviets coming in? What was the feeling that you got from him?

MARTIN: He was a very interesting character. At the age of 10 he was an orphan. He was from the German gentry or lower nobility. He went to Austro-Hungarian military schools. He was a captain and then a major at the end of World War I, and on the Austro-Hungarian general staff. He had been in 10 battles on the Italian front, where Hemingway went.

Q: Sure, this was the Italian campaign.

MARTIN: Yea. He was in the Italian campaign and met Rommel at that time, because Rommel led the war at the Battle of Caporetto. They brought in a special German unit and made the attack. Later he was in the Hungarian General Staff and he was the chief of the military chancery for Admiral Horthy. He was his military advisor. Then he was chief of the General Staff. The prime minister got kidney cancer and was sent off to Germany. He had been the prime minister and minister of war. He didn't give up the prime minister job, but he gave up being minister of war when he went to Germany. My wife's father became the minister of defense for about six months. After World War II, he remained in Germany. His idea was that the war might break out again. The Americans had the atomic bomb and would win and the family could go back to Hungary. They were hoping to go back until 1948, when the Russians developed their atomic bomb, and he said it's a stalemate, it won't happen. He was convinced that we would not go to war to liberate Hungary. He was a very shrewd and also an objective thinker, not emotional. He never joined any Hungarian refugee organizations and never tried to play a role in any national council. He wrote a letter at the end of the war to Admiral Horthy, when he first was planning to come to the US, to say that "I'm going, and I'm going to become an American citizen, I hope, so I have to break off any official contact with you." Admiral Horthy was still in Portugal writing letters to various people. My father-in-law encouraged his daughters to be American. The other part of my wife's family encouraged them to stay Hungarian, which I think has had a limiting effect on them.

Q: Oh, yes. In our culture, absolutely. Well, when you were on the Desk, what was the attitude towards developments there, and what was the focus.

MARTIN: By then, it was very clear that we were not going to intervene. We tried to calm the situation down. It was interesting that the Hungarian Desk officer, Bob McKissin, went on leave just when the thing broke out. And there was another funny thing. Hungary was in the Office of Balkan Affairs or the Balkan Affairs Section. Every single Hungarian who came to talk with us, without exception, would say, "Balkan Affairs? Hungary? No. Hasn't anybody told you, Hungary is not in the Balkans?" Well, we say that is just as a designation. It doesn't really mean anything. We know it's not in the Balkans. But they would always say something.

Q: Well, the Balkans - the Greeks never liked being included in the Balkans either. The Balkans has a bad name. It continues today to be the Balkans.

MARTIN: We were trying to calm things down. That was quite clear. The work was overwhelming, because there were letters coming in all the time. I was there right when things were happening in Budapest, right when the Cardinal Mindszenty went into our Embassy.

That happened a few days before I came on board. It got me into the European Bureau. One of the first things I did was write a letter to George Meany.

Q: He was the head of the..?

MARTIN: He was a good letter writer. George Meany was the head of the AFL-CIO, the most important labor leader in the United States. Originally a plumber from the Bronx who worked his way up in the labor movement, he was fiercely anticommunist. He wanted us to help the cardinal and wanted to know what he and the labor movement could do. So I wrote a letter which I remember he said was a good letter; he liked it, it went out, and he complimented me on it. That was one of the first things I did in the Department that I would say was significant or important.

There were loads of other letters and telegrams to be sent out for people looking up their relatives. What happened to so-and-so? There was a flood of people. I think something like two per cent of the entire population left at that time. The people wondered, where is my cousin? Did he come out? There was a lot of liaison with the consular people, and people going over to work in Vienna. There was more work than you could do, and so it was fascinating. I remember also getting letters from various people who wanted to get money to the cardinal. The cardinal from Montreal wanted to know if we could get some gold over to him. Of course, we couldn't do any of those things, but it was extremely exciting to be doing that.

Q: Then did you go to Serbian?

MARTIN: Yes. I went to Serbo-Croatian. I started in January, and in September - well, you know what language training is: every day. I was with Nick Andrews, who later became the head of the office of Eastern European affairs, now retired (I just saw him a few months ago), and also Oren Wilson, who later was in NATO at our embassy. There's lots of embassies in NATO.

Q: Well, you took Serbian from when?

MARTIN: From January until July.

Q: Of '57.

MARTIN: Of '57, yes. And it's intensive language training.

Q: Did you have Janko Jankovic or Dragan Popovic?

MARTIN: I had Jankovic.

Q: You're lucky.

MARTIN: I love him, wonderful guy.

Q: Popovic was a problem.

MARTIN: Later on, Popovic examined me when I came back. I qualified, barely. I used to speak German with my father-in-law. My best language was German, and in Zagreb, German was a very useful language.

Q: Very much so.

MARTIN: Also Hungarian was useful to my wife. But anyway, yes, Janko Jankovic. I guess both of them are dead long since.

Q: Yes, they were brothers-in-law.

MARTIN: Then I went to Berkeley, to the University of California at Berkeley. Nick and Oren went to Columbia University. We had our choice: Columbia or Berkeley. I had never lived on the West Coast, and I'm a New Yorker. I said here's an opportunity. I'll take. And Oren and Nick were very happy because they wanted to go to New York.

When I got there we lived in Oakland, near Berkeley. Sometimes I drove, but most of the time I took the bus. There was something called the Center for Slavic Studies. It had a couple of professors there who were experts and they had a well-known Russian. I had to take two courses for credit, but they would not let us enroll in a degree program. Later on it changed. I had great freedom to study whatever I wanted. I took a course in cultural history, "Western European Cultural Thought," by a famous professor. I wish I could think of his name, a wonderful guy. He wrote one of the standard American history texts. And I took my credit course in the history of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy.

You had to write a paper. I wrote mine on Cardinal Stepinac, the cardinal in Croatia. He was still in Zagreb at that time and still alive. I wrote a critique of his trial, a typical Communist trial. I studied the language. I had a prof, another guy I liked a lot, I kept in touch with him later on. He was named Jelovic. He died not too many years later, even though he was young. He was of Dalmatian background. He was American born, but in California. You know, along the coast, there are lots of Croatians.

There are fishermen from Dalmatia. Same thing in Chile; they have the same kind of group. Ante Kadic was the name of my language teacher. He was a brilliant guy. I enjoyed very much my studies there. I studied pretty hard and enjoyed it a lot and learned a lot. I got some wrong ideas too, some of which got straightened out when I got to Zagreb.

Now at that time, the three of us were going to Yugoslavia. There were three slots - two slots in the Political Section in Belgrade and one for deputy chief of the consulate general in Zagreb. All three of us wanted to go to the embassy, maybe because we thought that was better career-wise. It turned out they said, "You're going to Zagreb." I said okay.

My father-in-law was very familiar with Zagreb. When he was in the General Staff, he had spent two years in what he called Laibach, which was Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, because he was the Austro-Hungarian General Staff officer responsible for a division near Italy. Later on he was in the Italian section, and he also did the micro scientific work. The Austro-Hungarian General Staff had a railway section, a signaling section, a medical section - all that. All this was scientific stuff in its own separate section. He handled all that, all their technological things. He was the officer responsible for the Austrian fliers. They didn't have an air force, but he was the first Austro-Hungarian General Staff officer to fly across the Danube River, and his name was in the paper because they made a big thing about it. But he said the problem then was to get the pilots to do something, and most of them were killed in World War I, not in plane crashes. They were killed in automobile crashes on their way down to the front to fly, because they would transport the planes right close to the lines and then they'd use them.

He had been in the General Staff railway car when the news came in that Franz Ferdinand had been shot. He said they knew right away that this was war because the Austro-Hungarian General Staff was champing at the bit to have a preemptive war.

Q: This is the assassination in Sarajevo in 1914.

MARTIN: Right. So they gave an ultimatum, which was something that the Serbians could not possibly accept, and they forced the war to start. Anyway, he was familiar with Zagreb. We got to Zagreb. There was no housing there. This was in the early days, you know.

Q: Let's see, you were in Zagreb from when to when?

MARTIN: From 1956 to '57-58 - no, '58 to '60. At that time I was an FSO-5, which is now the equivalent of FS-3. I was the deputy principal officer. The main duties were East-West trade, end-use checks of export items, a lot of specialized petroleum products. There was one fascinating case, which I'll mention. My boss was a marvelous guy, the best boss I ever had in the Foreign Service. I loved the guy, Ted Montgomery. He was a graduate of the Naval Academy, 1924. I think he was supposed to be in the class of '23 but he got sick and lost a year. So he went into the navy at a time when we were sinking our own ships. So he left in the minimum time and settled in England, and he was a wonderful writer. He wanted to be a playwright, and he wrote a couple of plays that were produced. In fact, he used to get (and he really was so happy when he did) a check every three months or so, and sometimes it would only be like \$10 or \$15. He would get a royalty on one play he had written which was in some kind of a book of plays which could be done by local amateur theater groups. He was married to a British woman. While he was in England, he was married to an American, got divorced, and married this British woman during the war. She was a little bit difficult, but nice. Ted Montgomery, as I say, was a writer, and he wrote for the London News-Chronicle, and then during the war they didn't need him. He loved cars and was the auto editor. But then during the war there was no need for an auto editor, so he started doing political stuff.

When I first arrived in Yugoslavia, I got a shock, because I had been studying for nine months, and I had tried to keep it up by paying for tutoring in California. When I arrived, I couldn't understand a word the guy was saying. Well, it turned out he was speaking Slovenian, which is related but different, and then when I got to Zagreb, it was still a shock because Croatian is different from Serbian, and Janko Jankovic was definitely a Serb.

I remember the first day my wife said to me - we were living in a hotel, but she wanted to go and get some bread. She said, "What's the word for bread?" and I said, "The word for bread is hleb," which I had learned - hleb. Well, my wife went to the store and said, "Hleb." And they wouldn't pay attention to her. They would ignore her. They could see she was a foreigner and an American, but that's the way the Croats were. Finally, they said, "Kruh! Kruh! The word is Kruh!" Well, the word is hleb, but I learned later, the word hleb is from a Gothic word  $hl\ddot{e}if$ , which is an ancestor word of our word for loaf, and it has become the word for bread in all the Slavic countries, but not Croatia. They have still kept the pure, original word for bread - I guess - which is kruh.

That was one example, but many, many common words, like the word for doctor are different. The word for doctor in Serbian is lekar, and the word in Croatian is  $le\ddot{c}nik$  - same root. But if you say lekar, they'll look at you, you know, and they'll correct you. Since they always had good will toward us, it didn't cause much of a problem. But my best language is German. I used to speak German at home with my father-in-law, and he and I read *The Decline of the West* in German. I did the whole thing and a couple of other books while I was in California, because many of the books about Yugoslavia are written in German. And I wrote a summary of a couple of books.

When I first arrived in Zagreb, Elwood Rabinold was the consul, and he was about to leave. He was not very helpful. He's retired and living on the Eastern Shore. He's a very unsympatish character, in the sense that he didn't give me any help in finding a place. I was in a hotel. He said, "You have to talk turkey with these people. You have to talk turkey with them." Yes, you had to talk turkey with them. Do you have any ideas? He didn't have any ideas. My predecessor was living in a place, but somebody else took that place. So I was the odd man out looking for a place.

I finally found a place, and of course we wound up paying top dollar, and we let the guy keep some stuff in the house locked up, which was okay, but my rent was enough. We had a favorable exchange rate. We had a good rent allowance. The rent I was paying was enough for him to go down to the Dalmatian coast, to Split, where he was from originally, and to live there in a hotel. Can you imagine that? Later on, Senator Stennis came to Zagreb for the Zagreb Fair, and he was a nice guy. He said to me, "Mr. Martin, is there anything we can do, are there any ideas you have, any thoughts you have, how we can improve conditions here?" He may have mentioned the rent allowance. I said, "Don't increase the rent allowance." I told him, "The rent allowance would be good if we could buy places and have them." They did that later, but at the time, that was a no-no. I said, "Don't increase the rent allowance because somehow the word gets out. When you start negotiating, you go right up to your limit. No matter what happens, you always wind up there in negotiations." It used to happen here in Washington, if you remember. You stayed at Alban Towers, the bill was always whatever limit the government was paying - that's what you wound up paying. I think he was taken aback that someone would tell him, don't increase a particular allowance.

Rabinold was on his way out, and he was an ARA type for his whole career. He spent his whole career there, a lot in Argentina. He used to sell the grass on his house to a local peasant, and he had a little slush fund that he turned over to me, which, again, was okay then, and I'm not suggesting anything wrong. He was scrupulously honest about it. He had every penny accounted for, using it for certain purposes that were reasonable. I was a little shocked. Zagreb was a place where you could go down to the flower market (a beautiful thing; any town that has a flower market is nice), and buy flowers - but they might be the flowers from your garden that some peasant had clipped on his way down to the flower market. Again, that didn't bother me much.

Q: What about the political situation? What were you doing there?

MARTIN: We were following Croatian nationalism and Serbian nationalism. Various Balkan nationalisms are really very strong, unbelievably strong. As I reflected already when I told you about the language, they were fiercely loyal to their own language and didn't want to use any Serbian words. Everywhere you went, people at a party or something, somebody would come up, "Hey, that guy over there - he's a Serb . . . he's a Croat."

We were worried naturally about Communism in Yugoslavia and the relationship that the Yugoslavs had with the Soviet Union. The breakaway had taken place in 1948. We were pouring aid into Yugoslavia in order to support them in their independence from the Soviet Union. Later on, people estimated that we put a billion dollars in there. People now think we could have gotten away with half a billion. We had all kinds of programs. There was a big AID program in Belgrade, but I was not in the AID mission and really didn't have anything to do with the AID mission. The head of the AID mission was also head of the economic section; Len Weiss, a brilliant, young guy, and actually very nice.

Within Zagreb, again, there was this nationalism and separatism. When I first arrived, after Rabinold left, almost the same weekend, Ted Montgomery, the new consul, arrived. We had three local employees, all in USIA. Over that weekend one had committed suicide. Her husband had been carrying on an affair with another USIA local employee, and so the first thing I told the new boss, we've had a suicide. One of our employees committed suicide. He said, "Okay, tell the man not to come to the office." We got in touch with Belgrade, and they said, "Fire him," which we then did. He may have been half expecting it. That was quite a way to get started.

Q: It is.

MARTIN: Among my other duties was being security officer. Shortly thereafter, this guy we had fired married the woman he had been having the affair with. One of the librarians, an American librarian, asked me if she could go to the wedding. She was invited; she had been good friends with them; she wanted to go. I said, "Sure, go ahead, but keep in mind" - her boss didn't want her to go, and so they came to me as security officer and said can she go. He was sort of saying should she go to the wedding or not? I said, "Go ahead, she knows what happened. Just use your own common sense and act accordingly. We're not going to show any approval, and we're not going to change any decisions or anything. It's okay." She was happy with that.

Our consular district included all of Croatia and Slovenia, and they had set up recently a consulate in Sarajevo. If you haven't done it, you should interview the guy who was our first consul down there.

Q: Who was that?

MARTIN: I'll think of his name in a minute. He was a wonderful character, and I refer to him when I talk to him today as my old sparring partner, because almost the first thing that I heard about him was that "he's trying to steal part of our consular district." We were reporting, and his was the most prolific reporting I've ever seen. He was good in language, and he was sending in tons of stuff, far more than we were. I like to think that we sent in some better quality stuff, but maybe I was wrong.

He used to go to Dubrovnik, and he went to Split one time on a trip. Both were in our consular district. He wrote a very funny and a very good airgram entitled "Two Split Personalities," about two journalists he talked to. Yugoslavia was a wonderful place in that you could go to see anybody, and they would talk. They would talk and talk and talk. You could say, "What do you think about the situation in India?" You could get a half-hour discussion from the guy, and you could write it all up and send it in. After a while I was doing that. If we'd get any reaction from the Department, we'd do it. But our political reporting at the beginning was very weak.

People were very interested in Cardinal Stepinac, who was confined to his native village. People would say under house arrest. He was not under house arrest, but it was such a small village - only about 50 people - where he had been born and raised, and he was living in the pastor's house in that place and couldn't leave.

Q: You might explain who he was and why he was under arrest.

MARTIN: Cardinal Aloysius Stepinac [Step-EE-natz] in this country is known as STEP-in-ak. There were three cardinals at the end of World War II that the Communists cracked down on - Mindszenty in Hungary, who was maybe more famous, Stepinac (as people in the United States call him) in Zagreb, and Cardinal Wyszynski in Poland. In Zagreb people say that Tito had tried to appeal to Cardinal Stepinac in 1946. He had supported Croatian nationalism during the war. He was not a Lustase supporter, but he was definitely a supporter of Croatian independence.

Q: Lustase being the equivalent to the -

MARTIN: - SS.

Q: - to the Fascists of Croatia.

MARTIN: The Fascists. The Croats took a huge beating at the end of the war because the Croatian army was under German command, and when the Germans were finished, the German commander got instructions from Berlin to release the Croats from his command. He suggested that they might want to retreat to Germany, which of course they did want to do - not Germany but Austria. They fought their last battle against one little Bulgarian battery that blocked them for an hour or so, and then they surrendered in Austria to the British. The British had them lay down their arms, and the next day turned them back. Every single Ustasi, whether he was officer or enlisted man, was executed right there. And every single domobran - that was the Croatian regular army - every officer was executed. The enlisted people were not executed. They were marched back to Belgrade to work in labor camps. By the time I got there, they were all released and back home.

At the end of the war, Tito for political reasons, offered to support Cardinal Stepinac if he separated from Rome and led an independent Croatian Catholic Church; he refused. About a year later, he was put on trial. I wrote a paper about the trial. It didn't meet our standards of justice. But he was sentenced to jail. I think he was in jail. He may have been in a monastery for a while. He contracted a disease called polycythemia vera, which is - he used to joke about it - the opposite of leukemia. It's too many red corpuscles. It's the only disease in medical science today where bleeding has some benefit - but only up to a certain point. It causes clotting and all kinds of trouble. It's a fatal disease.

He was going to die eventually. They released him and let him go to his native village, but he wasn't able to do anything. Legally, he had an interesting status from the canonical point of view. Normally when a bishop can't function any more, they appoint a coadjutor. In his case he could function. They wouldn't appoint a coadjutor for him, but they appointed a coadjutor for the archdiocese, a guy named Šeper, who was the most impressive person I ever met in my life, really a brilliant guy.

We were supposed to be on the alert for anything relating to Stepinac and his illness, because there were two doctors in Chicago who were treating him. The treatment was an injection of a radioactive material. When they gave him his first injection, there was an immediate dramatic improvement. He was completely okay. Then he would be treated by bleeding and various drugs and blood thinners. But it would get worse, and then he would get another radioactive shot. Each shot had to be given at shorter intervals, and each was less effective than the previous one. We were supposed to be on the lookout for that, and we were in close touch with Šeper, the coadjutor archbishop of Zagreb.

When Rabinold was there, Rabinold said, "Don't go to see him." My predecessor was also a Catholic, and he would try to find out what was going on through a couple of priests that he knew, but they really didn't know. Finally, there was a report in *Libre Belgique*, a left wing Belgian newspaper which said that there were negotiations going on between the Catholic Church and Tito's government in Yugoslavia. They sent a copy to us and said, can you find out something about this? And Montgomery, who was Episcopal, Church of England, a very nice person, said, "Doug, how can you find out about this?" I said, "There's only one way. I'm not going to talk to some nun and find out what's happening with negotiations on a church-state matter. We should go to see the bishop."

He said, "Fine, let's go." I wrote out a little note. The driver took it over. The archbishop told him to wait. He wrote on his card, "Come right over. Happy to see you." I guess he wrote it in Croatian. The two of us went over to see him, and he laid out the whole story, and when we said there'd been a report in a Western newspaper that there were negotiations going on, he said, *Libre Belgique*. They'd been in touch with him and told him that this item had appeared. He said there's nothing to it, and there was, I guess, nothing to it at that time.

Still the climate was changing, and this was a big change, because in Yugoslavia, in Slovenia, the Bishop of Laibach, Ljubljana, had been knocked down on a railway platform by a bunch of teenage thugs; they poured gasoline on him and set him on fire. Fortunately, he was burned around the neck and the ears, but survived by rolling on the ground and somebody helped him a little bit. But the situation in Croatia was much different, because the Communists tried to get all the priests to join this Peace Association, a Communist mass association. They had only 10 per cent success in Croatia. In Ljubljana, in Slovenia, they had 90 per cent success. And so the battle was really going on. We went to Åžeper. He laid the whole thing out for us, and that started a relationship with him which continues on, I'm sure, to this day, because I talk to Jack Scanlan, who went to see the next cardinal. Åžeper had relatives in Connecticut. His successor is a guy named Kuharic. Remember Joe Kuharic, the quarterback at Notre Dame?

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: That was his nephew. A lot of Croats have relatives in the States. There was a big emigration just before World War I. Everywhere you went, you ran into them.

Cardinal Stepinac died suddenly, and the funeral was to take place, we thought, at the place where he died, Krausic. It's about 15 miles away from Zagreb, a little village. We said we wanted to go. Ted Montgomery told me that we wanted to go to the funeral. Of course, he was a little hesitant. He wasn't sure. "But go over and tell the government that we want to know what's happening." They didn't give me an answer. We used to deal with a guy who dealt with church-state affairs, and he didn't give me an answer. Then all of a sudden we heard that the funeral was going to take place in the cathedral in Zagreb. This was a big change. The Vatican assigned the cardinal of Vienna to come down and represent the Pope. While he was coming down to the funeral, we were all at the funeral. The cathedral was full, people outside, and all that. And it was delayed. We were wondering why the delay? They said they're waiting for the cardinal from Vienna. He was in an automobile accident. He had his jaw broken in four places and a broken leg. The driver was killed. His secretary was all beat up. So all of a sudden there came a lot of excitement in the church, and then the funeral went ahead, and Šeper, who later became a cardinal himself, became the archbishop then, and the cardinal.

He was called to Rome because of the Vatican Council. While he was in Rome, getting ready for the council, he was in a preparatory commission. He had two nieces, one living in Budapest, and he spoke Hungarian. I know because he spoke Hungarian with my wife. Some people who didn't like him said he was really Hungarian. And he had a niece in Belgrade. Both of them were married to Jews. They both wrote to him and said "Dear Uncle Frank, Please, if you're doing something, think about the Catholic attitude toward Jews. Maybe something can be done." He said these two nieces were not in touch with each other. They knew of each other, but they really didn't know each other. So, he said, he took that as a sign, and then during the Vatican Council, sure enough, Archbishop - then Cardinal - Šeper made a statement about anti-Semitism.

The story was, the cardinal thought about it, and he said, this is a sign. The statement he made was, "There's no biblical justification for anti-Semitism." People are anti-Semitic for whatever reason, but they can't say that it's because the Jews killed Christ. It doesn't make sense, when you think about it. No justification for that. The pope we have now has recognized Israel. That started with Cardinal Šeper. I'm not saying it wouldn't have happened anyway, but that incident at the Vatican Council was Šeper.

Another thing that happened was very good. We did a lot of end-use checks because we had a lot of specialty petroleum products. At that time, one item that was very sensitive was boron. Remember the boron additive in oil?

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: The Yugoslavs ordered 50 tons of boron, which was shipped to them. I got the instruction to do an end-use check. It had happened actually that my predecessor had started it, and he had gotten a nonsense answer. They had told him it was being used for glass, as an additive in glass production. But we knew it could be used as part of dry fuel in rockets. So they told us that 25 tons was used up already in various factories. And I said, "I want to see the other 25 tons." They said it was in a warehouse. Len Weiss, whom I mentioned before, called me up and said, "You know, don't worry if they don't give you permission. You know, nobody expects you to be able to go to that warehouse." So I said, well, okay, but my boss and I had a great relationship with the guy, and he said, well, give it a try, what have we got to lose? So I said, okay. "I want to see the warehouse." He said okay. So we went down, and sure enough, there were 25 tons, in these like cement bags, of boron. And I counted the bags and I even got up on top of the pile to look at it. They were letting me do this. And people thought I must have had some kind of marvelous relationship with people that they would let me do this. Nobody expected it to happen. One of the bags had broken open, and I took out a scoop. I said, "Can I take some of this stuff." Sure. So I took a scoop of it and put it in a bag, brought it home, and I had it in a drawer somewhere. And I wrote the report, and I said, "To test their bona fides I asked if I could take a scoop of the stuff, and they said, 'Sure, take it.'" Down in Belgrade they couldn't believe what happened.

I even saw Jules Katz a couple of years later. He looked at me and laughed. He said, "How did you get into that warehouse?" Well, as it turned out, this became the biggest end-use check story of that year, the biggest end-use problem: what about the boron? They finally figured out - maybe they got CIA information - that this was a secret police operation. They believed 25 tons was shipped to the Soviet Union. This generated a lot of dollars, which could be used by the secret police for their operations in the United States. Maybe because we asked about the other stuff, they didn't send it anywhere. I even said to the guy, "Is this used in glass production?" "Yeah, yeah, that's what it's used for - glass production." Boron is used that way apparently, and we have almost an exclusive supply of boron. Death Valley is full of boron.

Q: It's sort of like borax.

MARTIN: Borax is made from boron. Boron is one of the elements, and you have all kinds of things made from it. But at that time it was used for solid fuel for rocket fuel or as stabilizer for rocket fuel.

Q: Of course, the Yugoslavs had no rocket program.

MARTIN: No, and at the same time. So that made me a big hero of end-use checks, but they were conning me, or they thought they were. They really didn't, and we finally got them to admit what really happened - but it took about three years, and Jules Katz was the one - they finally admitted and said they wouldn't do it again. So we let them get away with it.

Q: In talking to the officials and other people there, did you feel that the Tito government was sitting very heavily on them as far as nationalism and all. I mean, everything was brotherhood and unity. Every bridge was "Boulevards of . . . " What was it - bractvo i jedinstvo - it means 'brotherhood and unity' and all that. Were you able to look at this and see that this was all just a surface thing?

MARTIN: Oh, no, that was very important. It was very important because there was a balance which Tito was able to maintain. The Serbs said that he was really a Croat, but he wasn't. But many of those Croats, and I would include him in that category, were really Austro-Hungarian.

Q: Yes, he served in the Austro-Hungarian army.

MARTIN: He served in the Austro-Hungarian army, and he got a medal. He was captured and went to Russia; where he became a Communist. Then he came back. I think people said his father was Croatian and his mother was Slovenian. He was raised in Croatia, but he was not a Croatian nationalist. He was a person who had become a Communist and presumably a believing Communist at one time. However, a guy named Franz Borkenau wrote a book called European Communism, and he said that the Russians figured that Tito was a person who had excellent leadership qualities, but couldn't be trusted ideologically. They figured that out early. So they said, we're going to have to send somebody with him to guide him. In the war, the excitement and everything, that didn't happen, and he started to get his own ideas on Communism, which the Soviet Union couldn't accept.

The Yugoslav ambassador to London at the time of the break was the guy who was my landlord in Croatia, and he was known to British intelligence who told him that if Tito went to the Cominform meeting, he was going to be arrested and tried and executed. The Yugoslav ambassador had it communicated right away to Tito, and Tito didn't go. There had been a lot of trouble up to then, and Stalin was quoted as saying, "I move my little finger, and there'll be no more Tito." But it didn't happen. But he was sitting on his nationalism with a man named Bakaric, who was an ideologue, and he was the head of the Croatian party. And they used to have articles in these publications all the time that reflected what was going on.

When I mentioned the Cardinal's funeral, Western analysts said this is a big departure point in attitude towards the Catholic Church, and I think it was, but there had been signs of it earlier. For example, there were articles in publications. They explored the question, if a Communist Party member's mother dies, and she is having a religious funeral, may he attend the funeral? Up until that time he couldn't. Then the article went on, reaching the conclusion, that he can go to the funeral providing the priest was not a fascist. If the priest is an old fascist, he can't go. But if the priest is not so bad, then he can go. They had all kinds of articles like that.

We also say there was a lot of tension because, if you remember, there was a guy who had written this famous book, and then he got in trouble with Tito. He was a Serb, but he said the whole system was corrupt. The New Class.

Q: Oh, Djilas.

MARTIN: Djilas.

Q: Milovan Djilas.

MARTIN: Milovan Djilas, right. Well, Milovan Djilas -

Q: Montenegrin, actually.

MARTIN: Yes, but Serb from Montenegro. They were all Serbs in there as far as I know. That's what we used to say in Zagreb, anyhow.

Q: Well, if you're from Belgrade, you knew he was Montenegrin.

MARTIN: Anyway, Milovan Djilas had two close friends, colleagues, who were brothers, and one of them wrote a biography of Tito [Tito. (World Affairs: National and International Viewpoints)]. Vladimir Dedijer wrote the biography, a very interesting book to read. His brother was Steve Dedijer, and all these three people were on the outs when we were there. Steve Dedijer had been an American during the war. He was the bodyguard to General Maxwell Taylor and had carried Taylor off the battlefield at one time when he was shot. He was a wonderful guy. He became an atomic or nuclear physicist, the head of the nuclear physics program, such as they had, in Yugoslavia. We used to have end-use checks there too. But by the time we got there, he was on the outs. It was so bad his own wife, who was a Party member, left him and divorced him just because he was in trouble with the Party. Dedijer was a handsome guy. He was interested in Esperanto. There was a communicator in Zagreb who was an Esperanto nut. I remember he said he would not go to a post if they didn't have an Esperanto program or if there wasn't some active Esperantist there. He made contact with Steve Dedijer, and by the time I got there the contact had been passed up to the political officer and the consul general, and Ted Montgomery. We would see him around at parties, and he was a very nice person. He spoke perfect English.

One time the consul general and I were going down to Belgrade. We went about once a month, on the Brotherhood and Unity highway, a straight-line dangerous road, and he met Steve Dedijer at a party. He said, "We're going," and Dedijer said, "I want to go." So we invited Dedijer to come with us. He was in the car with us, and we stopped for coffee somewhere, and there were some Communist Party guys in the place, on the road.

Q: Probably at Sarmsto Mitovica. I mean, that's about half-way.

MARTIN: Yes. We were there, and these guys said hello to him. He said, "You know, things are changing. Six months ago they wouldn't speak to me. Now at least they acknowledge my presence." Things were changing then. There was a little bit of a warming up, a little lessening - not a little bit, a lot lessening - of the fanaticism, certainly towards religion and also in general. Ideologically, they were loosening up.

We used to go once a month to Slovenia. Slovenia was also a very interesting place. The Bishop there had been thrown on the ground and set on fire. He was an interesting character. This guy was definitely a peasant type, and had gone through a lot, but was still around. We knew a lot of newspapermen there. Somebody from Washington used to give us instructions. We used to have a lunch appointment to see someone. We'd know what questions to ask him; they'd be sent to us. Slovenia was quite different from Croatia, less independent-minded but nevertheless very independent at the same time. They were somehow able to appear to be very loyal to Tito; at the same time, they were doing their own thing. Economically they were progressing. And the Croats were more likely to get into trouble politically than the Slovenes. As somebody said, the difference between a Serb, a Croat, and a Slovene - there are a lot of jokes like that - when you tell a Serb to do something, he says "All right," and the Croat says "Okay" but he complains about it, and the Slovene just does it. That's what they used to say. I don't know whether you remember jokes like that.

Q: Yes, I remember those. I remember those.

MARTIN: We talked about the Leipzig Fair. There was the Zagreb Fair every year. Our biggest effort economically was to put something on there. Then we had a wonderful way of covering our district. We used to go on a semiannual trip in the spring and the fall. We would go off in the car to Rijeka. We went to Rijeka quite a lot, and then we'd get on a boat, and go down the coast all the way to Dubrovnik. The car would be waiting for us there. We would stop at various places, and talk to Yugoslavs. You'd get enough for a dispatch. I remember we had a report, some guy, Rabb I think it was. There was a file on him that said he looked like Tito. We said, "You know, you look like Tito." The guy thought that was great, what a compliment it was. He said, "A lot of people say that. Do you really think so?" Then he really opened up on a lot of things. These people were very ready to talk, especially on general international subjects.

At that time, the political situation coming from Belgrade was beginning to change. It didn't happen until a couple of years later, but at that time they were getting the idea of an independent bloc, of Belgrade, Cairo, and New Delhi. Later on you had the non-aligned movement. That was beginning to shape up then. The Yugoslavs were telling us they had such good relations, a good idea would be for us to give our foreign affairs funds to the Yugoslavs to distribute or to run programs in the non-aligned world. People trusted them, and they could do a good job for us.

It was a hard life there in Zagreb in the sense that when you went to the market there wasn't much there. A truck came down every month from Germany delivering stuff. They would stop off, but they gave primary consideration to Belgrade. I remember we were looking for a shipment of turkeys on Thanksgiving. They didn't have any turkeys for us. We didn't get anything, but some chicken. We all agreed we liked chicken better than turkey anyway. That was making do. But we used to go out to Rijeka on a weekend, and then go up to Aviano, which has been in the paper lately, a lot. We would go to the PX there and get all kinds of goodies. We would make maybe three or four trips a year there. It's a little tough in the winter, but the winter was also tough in Zagreb, so you'd want to make a trip before and after.

I don't know whether you were in Belgrade when it happened, but when we were in Zagreb, we stayed in Trieste quite often. Ted Montgomery called it "an escape hatch." That was our escape hatch. We always stayed in a certain hotel. The Cica di Parenzo. The Belgrade people would never stay there, for some reason.

Q: Did the case of Artukovic come up quite a bit while you were in Zagreb?

MARTIN: Yes. People talked about Artukovic a lot because the Pavelic government. They operated concentration camps just like Dachau. It was not a death camp. A lot of people got killed there - Jesirovac. That case is still alive. The wife of the commander just got released by the Croats. And Artukovic eventually was arrested, and after many, many years, Artukovic was brought to Zagreb. He was over 80 years old and ailing, and the Croats stretched the case out till he died in jail.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: The Croatian nationalists didn't think of them so much as fascists. Certainly the present government, this guy Tudjman, ideologically he's not very different from Pavelic. So we were not going to do much to Artukovic.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: But Artukovic was marked by the Department of Justice. It took them about 20 years before they finally nailed him and brought him to Zagreb, and he beat the hangman by dying. Oh yes, people remembered Artukovic.

People talked about that time, but I would say that the typical upper-class - and that's the kind you meet in the Foreign Service, at the parties and elsewhere - was very into going way back. In fact, one of them was a Hapsburg. I remember a woman who was a member of the Hapsburg family. And then there was Countess. I forget her name. And then there was a guy somebody had called "The Red Count." My father-in-law had known him or had met him, because the way they took over, the Yugoslavs didn't really do it right. They jumped in too early, they nationalized things, and later they had to reverse some of it.

One of the things they did, if you had a nice house, they would take it over, but you could avoid the takeover sometimes through some kind of a legal loophole. The Red Count had turned his house into a museum. He had these upper-class widows and people came. He had an open house because if you run a museum, it's got to be open a certain number of hours. His house was open, like, two until five every Thursday. I and other people from the consulate were invited. You could drop in and sometimes play bridge. The way he made it into a museum, some of these women were given the medals of their deceased husbands, and they were mounted and you could walk around and see the medals from General So-and-so or Lieutenant So-and-so. They did similar things.

One guy told us that he got an order he was supposed to paint his house. Houses were painted so-called "Hapsburg yellow." Some of these were wonderful, because Zagreb was not touched during the war. The places were all run down, and one of the Party officials would say you should paint the place. He said, "I'm not going to do it because I don't know if the house is mine. Any day they could come in and say, 'This house is not your house.' They'll show me some kind of a piece of paper and some kind of a paragraph, and it won't be my house anymore, so I won't do it."

That explained a lot of what happened in all of Eastern Europe. There was no point maintaining anything. The system itself was concentrated on building things, not maintaining or finishing things. That's why people would move into a half finished apartment; they were supposed to finish it themselves. All the time. Communism was such a failure as a system that it's a wonder it lasted as long as it did. I always thought that one of the things they were doing that made it last was they were using up their capital. I'll give you an example of it. You take over a house that's already there, and then, "Oh, yes, we have housing for so many people." They were there before. Now it's run down. Some day it won't be there any more if nobody ever paints it.

The Rockefeller Institute was there from before the war, a medical institute. We had a visit there by a medical team headed by Dr. Paul Dudley White, the heart specialist, because that was one of the first places, and he was one of the ones that noticed the diet in different countries is different, and had different results. Some places they have high blood pressure, and other places they eat rice, and they don't have high blood pressure. They did a lot of studies like that. They were doing a study of fat, because in Croatia, along the Dalmatian coast, the diet is heavy in olive oil, and in Zagreb itself it's heavy in bacon fat and pig fat. So it's animal fat versus vegetable fat. It was a public relations thing by Dr. Paul Dudley White to encourage people to come in and have their blood taken and measure the amount and answer a lot of questions about their diet, because it did appear that there were more heart attacks in Zagreb than in Split. So they were doing studies, and could it be explained by the olive oil versus pig fat or not? I think it was a useful contribution to medicine.

Q: Did you notice a difference between the outlook. . . .

MARTIN: On the question of a different attitude between the posts in Zagreb and in Belgrade? Well, it was different. We were very closely associated with Croats. Everywhere we went, we had associations with Croats. We had a Croatian maid, and we had a lot of contact with the people there. We felt that the people in Belgrade, where it was a very large diplomatic corps, that they were more involved with the other diplomats there and with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They reflected a Belgrade point of view, which was not exclusively Serbian, but it was mainly Serbian.

It got stronger later on. You know, Jack Scanlan, later on our ambassador, and also in the breakup of Yugoslavia, when you had Secretary of State Eagleburger - we were the last ones to go along with the breakup of Yugoslavia. That all came from Eagleburger, Scanlan, and those guys with a fixed point of view. They never really got out much. Some did, of course. A guy like Nick Andrews and a guy like Steve Palmer. Get Steve Palmer, he'll tell you. We reflected a Croatian point of view, and to some extent Slovenian, a local point of view, local nationalism, and local events - we were local. And Belgrade was more international affairs.

Another example of how times were changing when I was there was that the United States army started to buy meat. My predecessor had inspected and proposed four meat plants as places that could produce meat that could be sold to the US army in Germany. It was a way of our helping the Yugoslavs. Two of the plants broke down right away; there were two left in Croatia. When I took over from him, I went to visit those two plants. I went to the Gabrilovic plant, walked in, and they didn't qualify for about three different reasons. We had a guy from the Department of Agriculture who came with us to do the inspection, and as the guy told me the plant is old, but the meat is good. I pointed out to him that there were flies all over the place and this could not meet any kind of a standard. But the Croats at the Sljeme plant made all kinds of changes. The first time we went through we said you don't make it for this reason and this reason and this reason. You've got to bring it up to snuff before we'll look at it again. Later they said, "We've done it." We went to see it, and they hadn't. They started buying and didn't assign somebody from the army permanently, but they had someone from the army veterinary corps, which is responsible for meat purchase, He would come down and spend three months with us at a time.

In one interesting consular problem, they were happy down in Belgrade with what we did. This army family was in a hotel with their children, and an Indian assistant commercial attaché<sup>1/2</sup> made an attack on this little child. He invited him into his room, and the kid ran away, but the family told us about it. I tried to find out about it, and then I sent the report to Belgrade. I said, "We didn't raise it with the government." I did go to the hotel and ask about it. They said the guy had left for Belgrade. They raised it with the Indians, the Indians denied that it happened, and it died out. But that was a kind of shocking thing. The family thought it had no permanent effect on the kid. It happened very fast. He had made a grab at the kid, and I think tried to get his clothes off

Another important visit we had showed how times were changing and how Tito was changing also towards the Croats. There was a very famous Croatian-American sculptor Mestrovic. Mestrovic came, and his son worked for the National Geographic. The son made a visit because the National Geographic was doing a story at that time. Then Ivan Mestrovic and his wife came to Zagreb, and he spent a month or so. He got sick, and his wife came in and told us he was not feeling well. He needed orange juice, so my wife gave him some, and we became friendly with him. He was very nice. He was very old at that time. Tito invited him to Mali Losinj on the island of Brioni.

So he went to Brioni. There was Veliki Brioni and Mali Brioni. Mali Brioni was where Tito's place actually was. People went to a guest house in Big Brioni and when the master was ready to see you, you were invited, got into a boat, and went across. He spent time with Tito. We sent in a report on that. And he said, "We talked like two peasants," which of course was the way it was.

Q: I was in Split about a year and a half ago, and they have a Mestrovic museum. Unfortunately, it was closed. It looked like it had been closed for some time.

MARTIN: Too bad, because I've been in that museum. His stuff is so real, you could almost reach out and touch it. It's so good. He was just a peasant, and he applied to the Vienna art school, and they said, "Here's a piece of stone. Do something with this and come back." That was his entry exam. He came back a very short time later with something that was just about perfect. They said come on in. Later on, he went to Syracuse University as the artist in residence. He had been a Croatian nationalist during the war, and they were going to execute him in Zagreb. He could hear the guards talking about the plans and arrangements for the execution, which were changed at the last minute, and he was allowed to leave, or escape. He went to Switzerland. He hated the Swiss because let's say he was tight with money. They tried to extract a lot of money. It was very expensive living in Switzerland. You can buy your way in to Swiss society, but it costs you a lot of money to settle down in Switzerland. He wasn't ready to do that. He came to the United States and went to Syracuse as Artist in Residence and later on to Notre Dame. They built a special building for him. He used to do these big sculptures. His wife made a funny remark, because she was talking about being liked at Notre Dame better than in Syracuse as they had built this big building for him as a museum, and she said, "And now he can do a thing as big as he wants."

Q: They're monumental.

MARTIN: Another person that he knew quite well and who was memorable when I was in Zagreb was the nuncio who later became the archbishop of St. Petersburg. I forget his name, Irish name, of course - but he used to wear his robes - red hat, red everything - very ostentatiously during the time when it was really tough, and they still had a nuncio there. He used to go around in his outfit, and he told an American there that he was being followed. And the American said, "Really, no. They don't follow people around like that any more." He said, "Yes, they're following me, I'm sure." The American said, "Well, maybe it's your imagination, because the way you're dressed, people are naturally going to be looking at you." He said the next day the nuncio came by in front of the consulate, and wore that look and said, "I'm being followed, see. That's the car right there." Then they believed he was being followed. They were watching him closely. They were very nervous about it, but they were much more relaxed, and the reason they were was because of this guy Āeper and the Vatican was following a softer line, and Stepinac was being muzzled as a nationalist.

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Q: Today is the 22nd of February, 1999. Happy birthday, George Washington. Okay, Doug, you wanted to go back a bit.

MARTIN: I wanted to make one point about my army service again. I went through my whole basic training, and I was on the way to the Philippine Islands the day the war ended. It ended while we were on the high seas, but V-J Day was September 1. And I mentioned that being an infantry rifleman, the chances of coming through were low at that time because of the invasion of Japan that was planned. My outfit was going to make a feint towards the Island of Shokoku in corps strength. I was in Ninth Corps, I would have been with the one's to go in. They weren't going to land; they were going to turn back and become strategic reserves. What I wanted to say was, thank you, President Truman, for dropping the Atomic bomb. People can say all kinds of things about what he might have done, but what he did, I think, saved my life and maybe 100,000 other lives.

I want to finish up on Zagreb. One of the most important things I did in Zagreb I forgot to mention. There was a student demonstration while I was there, and it just happened that we were coming back from lunch, and the driver said there's a demonstration going on at the university. I said, "Let's go over there." We actually saw a demonstration, and we reported the whole thing, and we were the only ones to report it. The other consulates apparently missed it, and it was maybe the most important political event of the early 1960's. That's another example of my reporting.

Q: What was the demonstration about?

MARTIN: Apparently the demonstration came about because at the university they combined various eating facilities into one great big dining room. Everybody used to complain about the food there, but in three different dining rooms, it was dispersed. When they all got into one dining room, people started to complain, and they demonstrated. These students were marching down the street complaining, and the way the Communists handled it was to bring workers in from the factories to beat up these students and break up the demonstration. And of course, that was a smart move, in a way, if you want to break up a demonstration, because the workers resented the fact that the students seemed to have a good deal. They all were on scholarships. They were going to be somebody, and the poor guy in the factory had a pretty miserable, low-level job.

Q: It's sort of a typical Communist way of dividing and conquering and using the workers. Well, then, you went to INR in 1960. You were there for about a year.

MARTIN: I was there for one year, and during that year, all the Eastern European countries were in one office, including Yugoslavia. They would have two people doing political; in our section, my boss did the political stuff, I did the economic. As soon as I arrived, they told me I would have to write a paper as part of the national intelligence survey on trade and finance in Yugoslavia. I spent the first six months reading everything, the radio transcripts, the newspapers, the reports from the field, and then I would write it, because I knew the outline. This was a very strict outline you had to follow, not like writing a book and being creative. It's collecting information in an organized way and then writing it down. I did it successfully.

They had a tough editorial system. You had to go through some tough editors. Actually I went through it pretty easily. The thing I enjoyed about that job was being an expert on Yugoslavia. I knew all the people on the Desk. They used to call us frequently to get information on what was going on in Yugoslavia but not what's going on so much as who was who, facts. They wanted facts, factoids, and information, and we had it on file. I was the one on economics. I'd become close already with Jules Katz, who was the economic man for Eastern Europe, and I'm still friends with him. I see him once in a while.

Q: What was your impression of the economic situation during 1960-61 in Yugoslavia? Was it noticeably different from that of, say, Hungary or Czechoslovakia or Rumania and Bulgaria?

MARTIN: Yes, the Yugoslavs were doing better. There were differences within the republics of Yugoslavia. Slovenia was doing the best, Croatia next, and then Serbia, then the rest of Yugoslavia, which really was underdeveloped. There was a big difference between the republics and the level of economic development. The more advanced were getting better and pulling away from the less-developed republics like Macedonia, Montenegro, and parts of Serbia. This caused problems. The US Government, for example, would buy meat in Yugoslavia. They inspected four plants and only passed. The army was buying a million and a half dollars worth of meat from Croatia, and they were very advanced. They wanted to cooperate with the army. They wanted to know how the army wanted sausage made, and they were going to make the sausage for the army the army way, whereas the other plants in Serbia were not flexible or responsive enough to do that.

The Zagreb Fair was successful in generating contracts. I found the Croats, and even more, the Slovenes, to be go-ahead kind of people, and they thought of themselves as Westerners. So there were differences, but in general the whole country was getting a little bit better.

In some respects it wasn't. For example, they had a tourist industry that they were pushing, and it was going very well, but they had a system in Yugoslavia called Workers' Self-Government or Workers' Self-Management. It had some good aspects, but it didn't work very well when it came to a hotel because if you have the waiters and the people who work behind the desk setting policy, they're not going to give the same kind of service as they would when you have a manager making people give good service. They had a case study made, and it was criticized in the press. They identified what was wrong with this worker self-management in that particular case. That was an example, but tourism was gaining, and all the benefit went to Croatia, very little to Slovenia, and just about none to Serbia.

Q: Well, the reason is that it's really the coast that we're talking about.

MARTIN: Yes, the Dalmatian coast, which is beautiful, but even there you could see faults. One of the nice things about going to the coast, you would expect, would be to eat fish. But the fish that they were getting out of the Adriatic were mostly being exported to Italy, so you had trouble getting fish even on the Dalmatian coast, which was really strange. But it was a beautiful place, the whole coast. We used to go there every year. We went to the island of Ra. We knew somebody there. Everybody knew somebody on the coast that they could rent something from. It was very historic. Later some people went to Greece, and later on, I said, maybe we should have gone to Greece, at least to look at the place, because Greece is just as nice, and maybe even nicer. But it's hard to beat the Dalmatian coast as a beautiful place.

Q: Well, in '61, you left INR. What did you do?

MARTIN: Well, one more point about INR, and that was, this "Trade and Finance in Yugoslavia," this report, I had to write. The Yugoslavs belonged to various international organizations, the OECD and so forth, I think -

Q: The OECD wasn't in existence then.

MARTIN: Well, they belonged to some other organization. They promised to give us full data just as all members of international organizations would. But we couldn't get the gold figures out of them. I had everything all set to go; I just needed the gold reserve figure. I was pushing Jules Katz, and he finally told me to forget it, we're not going to get it. They just don't want to give us their gold reserves. I think the Serbs in particular had a thing about gold because during the war they complained and ridiculed General Mihailovich for carrying around his gold reserves on the back of these donkeys. That was the most important thing to him, and they were ridiculing that in the biography of Tito.

They probably also didn't want to tell us because they had more than we thought they had. They were very good at getting the maximum aid out of us. Some historians say we gave them a billion dollars when we could have gotten away for \$500 million. They managed, and they were very clever.

They could be critical of our system. I remember one said to somebody from the Export-Import Bank, "Why do you have all these different organizations? You have an aid program, and then there's the World Bank, and then there's the UN organizations, and then you have the Export-Import Bank. Why do you have all these different organizations?" The fellow from the Export-Import Bank said, "It's because by having more organizations we get more money. If we concentrated everything in one US Government agency for aid, we'd never get nearly that much." I think that also applies to the US marines? That is why the marines are very valuable; because those three marine divisions are added onto whatever the army has. They give us more than we would have otherwise.

Q: So '61 - where to?

MARTIN: I went over to the Office of German Affairs.

Q: You were there when?

MARTIN: '61 to '64.

Q: Was this in INR or in the European Bureau?

MARTIN: This was in the Bureau of European Affairs, and I worked on the Berlin Desk and East German economic and financial stuff. Even though we did not recognize the East German government, they still wanted somebody to cover that.

Q: This is obviously a very interesting time on Berlin. Before we do that, let's talk a bit about East German finances. How did we see East Germany in those days?

MARTIN: Well, there wasn't much information on East Germany. East Berlin was a mess. They hadn't been able to rebuild. The traditional German industry was concentrated in the Ruhr, but more so in Silesia. It had the optical industry, the publishing industry, the printing, and the chemical industry, which was one of the most important industries there. Those were all concentrated in the East. And they were functioning, but in general, West Germany was pulling way ahead of East Germany, and people always saw the contrast. It was hard to say whether East Germany was getting better, but I think it was. East Germany was estimated to be the 10th largest industrial power in the world at that time. A lot of the advanced equipment that the Russians had, they got from East Germany, so East Germany was a very important place to Russia. As far as the economics of the country were concerned though, it wasn't doing well. Now we know something we didn't realize then: that environmentally it was a disaster, because they were doing nothing at all about protecting the environment. The chemical industry smoke from the stacks generally went to the east. They didn't seem to care. The pollution of the rivers was bad, but somehow they didn't do a thing about it.

Q: Was it complete Soviet control, or were the East Germans able to do more with their industry than others?

MARTIN: East Germany was totally state controlled by the East German leaders, Ulbricht mainly, who were old hard-line Communists from way back and very tight with the Soviet Union. The East Germans were running East Germany for the Soviet Union, very tightly. They were not inclined to be independent in any way. They followed the Party line very, very faithfully. Still, I didn't spend a lot of my time on the East German economy or economic matters. Whenever there was a speech by an East German leader, we always analyzed it, and very often the significance of it was economic. We would write something up and feed it up to the Assistant secretary, but not very often. Once I wrote something that was sent up to the Secretary's office, about some East German economic thing. But in general, I would say we followed the East German economy mainly in the speeches of the leaders.

A more important part of my job was West Berlin and East Berlin. In West Berlin we had something called the Berlin Stockpile. As a result of the blockade back in '48, there was an Airlift, and a lot of it was coal because the people were freezing. Afterwards there was an analysis of what had been done and how to prevent that in future, or at least to be prepared. So what we stockpiled coal. Coal dealers were authorized to buy huge amounts of coal, borrowing the money from banks and the West German Government would pay the interest. West Berlin was underwritten by the West German Government. They had all kinds of subsidies to encourage people to move to Berlin. People in Berlin having a baby got a bonus. To encourage people to go to Berlin, they would give them a bonus to marry, and for each child they had they would get a certain amount of money. There was public housing. There was all sorts money, including American, but mostly West German money, going to build things in Berlin. We were encouraging that. The Berlin Government had a lot of imagination. They would subsidize people to visit so they could tell the story of Berlin. One thing was to get people over into East Berlin to see this amazing contrast with West Berlin. If there ever was an advertisement against Communism, it was just to visit Berlin and see the two parts of the city, one that was doing well and one that wasn't.

Q: Doug, I wonder if you could talk about when you arrived at the Desk and the Kennedy Administration had just come in. I've talked to people who were serving in Berlin when Kennedy came in, and I can recall one or two of them expressing a certain disquiet because they were concerned that not just Kennedy but the people around him weren't being tough enough. They felt that we might be a little bit soft on the Berlin situation and give away some of our rights. Did you get that feeling at all when you were on the Desk?

MARTIN: Oh, yes. I used to attend all the staff meetings in the office, and Martin Hillenbrand, who later became our ambassador to Germany, was the office director. He would report to us what happened in these various meetings, and the 1961 meeting in Vienna was a disaster for the United States.

Q: Where Kennedy and Khrushchev met.

MARTIN: Kennedy and Khrushchev met, and Khrushchev, apparently, bullied Kennedy, and Kennedy was shaken by it. Khrushchev came away with a very low opinion of Kennedy and a belief, because he was a true believer in Communism, that Communism was on the way. His impression of Kennedy was that he could bulldoze him into any kind of concession he wanted. That meeting may have led eventually to the Cuban Missile Crisis which was really the last phase, according to Floyd Cola, of the Berlin Crisis. The Soviets were getting tougher and tougher, and we were not making concessions, really, but were ready to make them. And in fact, I heard Ambassador Thompson, who was our ambassador in Moscow at the time -

Q: That's Henry Thompson?

MARTIN: Tommy Thompson, they called him. He said that we should negotiate away East Berlin before they take it, and of course, they did take it, and we let them take it, but what could we have done? I mean, we were not going to start a war. So, it was true that the climate was one where, on their side they thought they were up on us, and on our side, we were wondering whether there was something we could do that could somehow mollify them. I don't say we. I don't say me. But in the White House, they had that feeling.

Q: By the time you arrived, it's almost like a rather esoteric religion as far as Berlin is concerned.

MARTIN: Yes.

Q: I mean everything...

MARTIN: ... was very formalized, yes.

Q: Was like a very formalized Kabuki dance almost because of the fear that if you did this, the other side might ask for more. And so you had to be very careful. Were you indoctrinated into this new religion?

MARTIN: I had served in Berlin as a vice-consul, and I used to attend staff meetings so I was very familiar with the Berlin situation. That was why I got over into the Office of German affairs. Martin Hillenbrand knew me very well, and he liked me, so he even said when I came in that they admired what I did as a consular officer, so they took me in. I did know the legal situation, the factual situation, and I knew the people too.

Q: Were you nervous about the new Kennedy Administration?

MARTIN: I wasn't nervous, but I saw that they were ready to make concessions, and a lot of people thought that maybe it was time to make concessions. Nobody thought that his point of view was necessarily unreasonable or that he was caving in just because he was afraid. But Kennedy was very nervous because right at the beginning of his administration there had been the invasion of Cuba, a disaster. Then he went to the meeting in Vienna with Khrushchev that also was a disaster. So the atmosphere was very bad at that time.

Q: As I recall it, didn't Kennedy come back from Vienna and call up a part of the reserves and talk about putting more troops into Berlin?

MARTIN: No, there were no more troops put in. The 6th Infantry was already in Berlin. But when Kennedy came back, he was very nervous politically. His whole campaign, in 1960, was based on the idea of a missile gap and that we were somehow behind the Russians. The Russians picked up on that and were using it. They tried to give the impression that there was a missile gap. There was none. That was a fake. That was somehow a ploy Kennedy's people had come up with. Maybe they really believed it, but once elected, they saw right away there was no missile gap, because we had extraordinarily good intelligence. Even though later on, the East Germans had agents operating all over West Germany and were doing extremely well against us, I think we were doing well against them too.

Q: A certain amount of transparency on both sides, unplanned, inadvertent transparency.

MARTIN: Right. There was a woman named Eleanor Dulles, who was the sister of John Foster Dulles, and I really took over all of what she had been doing. Of course, I didn't do what she was doing. Because of her connections and her name, she had been able to set up something called the Benjamin Franklin Foundation, which built a congress hall in Berlin, and then she was building a medical center. The foundation was headed by an architect who was the head of the American Institute of Architects at one time, a guy named Leon Chatelain. He didn't want Eleanor Dulles pushing him around.

The first thing that happened was Mrs. Dulles was transferred to something else and resigned very shortly thereafter. But she was still interested. She used to call up, and she could threaten. She would call up and ask a question. If we didn't give her the answer right away, she'd say, well, what if I call my congressman? Then you'd have to write a congressional letter. I mean, she was a little bit indirect, but not very. We would get the point, and anyway, people liked her, taking into account her personality and way of doing things. We liked her, and we liked what she had been doing. But the State Department auditors criticized the foundation. One recommendation which redounded very much to my benefit was they said that whenever the Benjamin Franklin Foundation has a meeting in Germany, somebody from the Desk should go. So that was me and I got four trips to Germany between '61 and '64.

Q: What was the foundation doing?

MARTIN: Encouraging aid to Berlin to build up Berlin as a center, to keep it as the future capital of Germany, which it turned out it is. Somebody told me the Congress Hall has been torn down, and they've built another one that's bigger and better, but still, that was a very advanced architecture, and we were encouraging. The Germans did the same thing. They built a symphony hall which was unbelievably modern. It looked like it was built from the outside in, rather than with the idea of the traditional symphony hall. All kinds of things like that were going on. The Benjamin Franklin Foundation was doing it. But later on, they concentrated on the Berlin Medical Center. They hoped it would be the most advanced medical center in Germany and would take the best of the German tradition in medicine and advance it even further, because the Germans were outstanding in the medical field before the war, up until the time of Hitler, and maybe even after that. It continued to be, I think, the leader in Europe in medicine. We were encouraging that and the Berlin Medical Center was going to be part of that.

On my trips to Berlin to attend those meetings, I would also go to the mission, and see what was going on. I would go over to East Berlin because I had gone over there in my previous job. I would always go to buy books or do something, just to go over and see it. The people from the Foundation always wanted to go over and see East Berlin, and I would go with them. So those trips to Berlin were really great.

I can't remember exactly when, but by the fall of '62, they started to close in on Berlin. They started to limit access; there'd be more and more incidents; and finally, they were threatening to take over East Berlin. They came up with this concept that Berlin was resting on East German soil, that West Berlin, and Berlin in General, was in the Soviet Zone, and that this gave them some kind of rights. It was a very technical thing. It took people like Martin Hillenbrand and the legal people to explain over and over again. There was a whole crowd of people who had served in Berlin over the years who were working in the Office of German Affairs, in the CIA, and others who were, I think, trying to enlighten Kennedy as to our rights. He was very nervous.

I forget exactly what triggered it, but we started something called the Berlin Task Force to deal with the day-to-day threat that Khrushchev would cut Berlin off. We had daily meetings, and Floyd Cola and Martin Hillenbrand would go to the White House, probably two or three times a week and sometimes every day when it really got hot. One thing I got involved in was aviation to Berlin because Pan American Airways got nervous that one of their planes might be shot down. So we started negotiating with them, and part of the plan was to have air force officers fly Pan Am flights into Berlin, because we were determined to keep the access routes open. Then they said, "Well, this causes insurance problems for us." So they began to negotiate, and they wanted us to agree to accept the liability for whatever might happen to Pan Am. We spent a whole weekend once negotiating with Pan Am and negotiating with a man named Gray. He was a famous pilot and later on the president, under the chairman, of Pan Am, and he was an operations man. I saw in the Pan Am building at the JFK airport at that time, which was at that time Idlewild Airport, they had a museum of the history of Pan Am, and Gray was the captain and pilot of various Pan Am flights across the Atlantic in those flying boats that they had in the very early days. He was an impressive guy. He was also very tough, and he could really put on an act during a negotiation, saying that we accused their pilots of being yellow, being afraid to fly, when we told them we'd have air force pilots fly the Pan Am flights if it came down to that.

As a member of the Berlin Task Force, we used to have meetings every day up on the Seventh Floor, and they'd be chaired by Floyd Cola, assistant secretary for European Affairs, who later became our ambassador in Moscow. Martin Hillenbrand remained as director of the Office of German Affairs, and he was assistant director of the Berlin Task Force under Floyd Cola. We would discuss every day, and one thing that impressed me very much about Mr. Cola was that he was very attuned to what we call public diplomacy. He was very interested in how things were playing out in the press, and I remember he was getting very upset with Drew Pearson. He'd become almost apoplectic at some of those columns. We were also following that, because you might say a subset of the Berlin Task Force was something called the Berlin Viability Programs. Kennedy was looking for political cover everywhere. So he would be asking people what they thought, important American people, and in particular he brought in General Clay, who was a hero in Berlin.

Q: Lucius Clay?

MARTIN: General Lucius D. Clay was a relative of Henry Clay and had been a four-star general in World War II and then the head of the whole occupation at the beginning, right after the war. When Eisenhower left, it was General Clay who took over, and the street that the American consulate and the US mission were located on in West Berlin was called Clay-Allee. He was a great hero in West Berlin. They really loved him. He agreed to go to Berlin and stay there during the crisis.

He was totally different from Kennedy, in the sense that he was, if anything, a hawk. People were worried that he was upping our commitment, because people were thinking that if we had a showdown we would have to make some concessions. General Clay was not likely to do that, and so under him we were exercising all our rights, especially our right to travel in East Berlin, which they were restricting at Checkpoint Charlie. There were a number of incidents at Checkpoint Charlie where they tried to prevent us from exercising our right to go into East Berlin. General Clay, with the assistant chief of mission, Alan Leitner, went down and there were tanks right down there at the East Berlin line, and they went into East Berlin just to show that we had a right to go into East Berlin. We were giving up nothing at that time, once General Clay got there.

Q: During this crisis - this is in '62 - that Khrushchev was boosting the pressure, it was also scaring the hell out of the East Germans, wasn't it? I mean, they were beginning to really come into West Berlin, weren't they, at that time?

MARTIN: The number of people going from East Germany into West Berlin or directly into West Germany was between 3,000 and 5,000 a week. When something would happen, that number would go up, closer to 5,000. Then it would come down, closer to 3,000. This had been going on since 1945.

I mentioned public diplomacy and how Ambassador Cola used to follow what was going on in the press all the time. CBS news had by far the best news coverage on radio and television. They had Dan Schorr, and he was doing a great job. NBC was looking bad, and was desperate to be in the game. It started a theme that we were going to win in Berlin politically and militarily, and we're going to lose because everybody would move out of Berlin to West Germany. That was wrong. But there was a flow, and a lot of people in Berlin were from East Germany. But because of these economic incentives, there also were people moving into West Berlin. Under this Berlin Viability Program that I spoke of, General Clay who was in charge of it wrote a letter to 25 leading companies in the United States asking them to consider establishing an office in West Berlin. They all responded very politely, but there wasn't too much interest in doing that. In fact, it was somewhat the opposite. One of the biggest American companies in West Berlin at that time was Gillette. They were making one billion razor blades a year in Berlin and distributing them throughout Germany. When they heard about the Berlin Viability Program, they came in and said, "We're already there. We would like you to give us tax benefits to stay." They were threatening that maybe they would leave, because everybody else was leaving, but everybody else wasn't leaving. It was a veiled threat that they might have to reconsider their operation in Berlin. But if they got a tax break, we could help them, and they would stay. We referred them to the Treasury Department. Tax questions are Treasury questions, and they went away. It was kind of shocking to me that an American company would take advantage of the situation. Pan Am was the same way in asking us to subsidize the insurance that they had. They wanted us to cover the liability so that there would be no increased insurance costs on Pan Am.

Q: Business is business.

MARTIN: Business is business, and that's what lobbying is all about. But it still was disillusioning to me.

Q: Did you feel with the Berlin Task Force that Khrushchev really was trying to squeeze us out of West Berlin at that time?

MARTIN: Nobody really believed it would happen, somehow, no. We thought if we did the right thing, we'd get through it, just like they got through the Airlift. As time went on, it became clear that we were going to get through. Then, on August 13, 1961, they put up the Berlin Wall. Since I was the Berlin guy at that time, the action copy of all of these telegrams would come to my desk. Somebody told me later that in the National War College they used to use as an example what happened after the Berlin Wall went up, and that the telegrams from the State Department were all marked "No Action Necessary." Well, that was wrong. It was crazy, because lots of action was taking place. I mean Cola and Hillenbrand were in the White House every day. We were doing things.

We were preserving the status of Berlin. I remember the telegrams were piling up, all the yellows, and I remember talking to Henry Cox, who was our public affairs guy, and I said, "What are we going to do with all these telegrams?" He said, "NAN them." Not "No Action" - everybody knew plenty of action was taking place. NAN was "No Action Needed," or something like that. Then they would get into the archive system. But that was told as a story in the National War College as if, really, the State Department was taking no action at that time. Complete nonsense.

Funny things were happening as the Wall went up. I was on duty the weekend after the Wall went up. All of a sudden, they closed off a sector, and were moving in huge amounts of materials. We weren't sure what they were going to do at the beginning, but then they started building a wall, and then they built it and built it. It took them months to get it completely built. They started shooting people who tried to go through, because there was a big rush. The first couple of days, when the East Germans realized there's a wall going up, you had the option of leaving before it was finished. So there were a lot going across. Then they started shooting people, and there were some incidents of people being shot right at the sector line. There was one guy who was shot and we couldn't get to help him, and he just lay there and bled to death. So it was very bad, and it was hairy for a while.

On our side, I never had a feeling that we were going to give up Berlin. Some of the Berliners were nervous, but in general there was no such feeling on the part of us or the British or the French. Our position was clear. We were very legalistic. We knew what our rights were. Everybody associated with that desk and the British, everybody had experience in Berlin. We were exercising our rights, and we weren't going to let them cut back on them, even though in effect there was reduction. There was less going over to East Berlin.

There was an incident when an American sergeant and one of his friends went over to East Berlin. They had these political comedians doing satires in night clubs. The guy was saying insulting things about the United States, and the sergeant got up and decked him. He got arrested, and that was a big incident. We got the guy out, but then people were arguing that they should be proud of that sergeant for standing up for the US. They did a study at that time because they were afraid to have people going over into East Berlin. They found that the average American soldier in Berlin never went further than one mile from the barracks. In fact, a lot of them would come out of the barracks and go straight across from Andrews Barracks. There was a place called the Golden Sun, a bar, and over it there were rooms. These guys would go over, pick up the girls, go up in the rooms with them. Some of these guys would take 30 days leave and never get more than 100 yards away from the Andrews Barracks. It turned out that we didn't have to worry about the GI's going over into East Berlin much.

Q: I was an enlisted man in occupied Japan at one point, and believe me, the GI's there didn't go very far. They went to the nearest bar and the nearest brothel. That took care of all their needs, and it was very unusual to get out and around.

MARTIN: Yes. The Korean War was still on, or the aftermath of it. We had a lot of draftees in Berlin. And a lot of these guys who were in college or law school, would get drafted. A lot of them would be sent to Berlin to work in intelligence agencies putting the names of people on cards to be filed somewhere. They would say there were 17 - some said there were nine - different intelligence agencies located in Berlin. These guys were college guys. When they got their annual leave, they would go down to Italy, Switzerland, or France. They did try to travel around. It was a chance to have kind of a junior year abroad in a month. So there was some of that, but the typical soldier did not go very far from the barracks.

Another incident took place there that was very interesting. CBS' Dan Schorr was running away from this NBC guy, I think he's still with NBC out in Los Angeles. NBC wanted to do something. After the Wall went up, there were some tunnels that were dug, and some refugees escaped through tunnels from East Berlin into West Berlin. NBC did something I thought was really bad. They financed a group in West Berlin to dig a tunnel into East Berlin so that people could come through. They made a TV program called "The Tunnel," and got an award for it. The guy from NBC stood up on TV and said, "The State Department didn't want us to build this tunnel." He didn't say not to build. "The State Department didn't want us to do this program. They didn't want the truth to come out, about refugees risking their lives." The guy went on and on, and I was thinking, what a contemptible thing for a newspaper man to make news. They were making the news so that they could get a big story out of it, and then, of course, they got some kind of a big award. It shows how bad the media can be at times. That stood out in my mind, and I've been anti-NBC ever since.

Q: During this time, prior to the Wall going up, was there any divergence among the three basic powers - France, Britain, and the United States - on Berlin, or from your perspective, were we pretty much in harness?

MARTIN: From this time, we started very serious planning, and I was working on the Berlin contingency plans. We had a tripartite group and a quadripartite group. The quadripartite group included the West Germans. Everybody was on board; everybody was planning; everybody wanted to do something; but there was a divergence of opinion. The British were very clear that they were a traditional trading power. I don't know how much of their economy is tied up, but a lot of it is. They were very concerned with any kind of counter-measures that would affect trade. They were willing to plan for all kinds of trade counter-measures, but would agree to impose them only at the very brink of war. We called these the "non-military counter-measures."

There also were naval counter-measures that we heard about, not non-military, but non-warlike. The British didn't want to do anything that would affect trade. The Germans were in favor of doing some things with the navy. They didn't want things happening right in Germany. They were willing to go along with all kinds of planning, but they did not want plans that would start bombs dropping in Germany. They wanted to plan things through the navy and other non-military counter-measures. One thing they could do, they could shut off all the lights on a ship, sneak up on, say, a Soviet ship, which probably would see it on the radar, but maybe not. They would sneak right up and all of a sudden they would shine very powerful lights to disturb anybody on that ship and shake them up, and let them know that Uncle Sam or John Bull or somebody was there. That was one of the things the navy was going to do.

If somebody came into this country, we could impose border measures. We had the Immigration and Naturalization people come in to explain that when you enter the United States, they can hold you for 30 minutes, just make you stand there for 30 minutes, and they can hold people for so long, and they can question their documentation. They can do all kinds of things that would make it very inconvenient, say, for the Russians, if the Russians caused any trouble and they were trying to come in. We could do a lot of things that were inconveniencing. The planning went on for years because it was very difficult to get people to agree, but there was no disagreement on the idea of doing something.

Q: What about the French?

MARTIN: The French were always willing to do things, but they didn't much like planning. But they would participate in the plan, and they'd say, okay, we'll do this or we'll do that, and if it comes to it, we'll do this or we'll do that. The planning exercise took a long time, and it was very interesting to see what could be done, if it came down to a showdown, short of war. I thought the naval counter-measures were very interesting, and we could do things at airports. We could do things also with trade, such as export controls. When you start looking at what the United States and the other countries can do, it's a little difficult sometimes to get agreement as to which contingency would trigger which operation - as I say, the British were very reluctant on any kind of trade counter-measures. The French weren't so tough on that. The Germans didn't want things that involved any kind of land action, affecting German territory itself. They wanted things to be done outside and by the other allies.

Q: What happened when in August of '61 the wall went up?

MARTIN: The 13th, yes.

Q: Did this put into effect a lot of the counter-measures, or how did we do this?

MARTIN: No, the counter-measures were all planning. We didn't do anything, but the planning was going on all the time. A lot more people were involved. A White House guy, a prominent lawyer in town, apparently close to Bobby Kennedy came over, and was managing the non-military counter-measures. I remember spending a couple of afternoons changing "will" to "may", going down everywhere he said "will" do this, we said "may" do that. I know it seems kind of silly, but the idea with the planning was, not just planning, because nothing we planned for ever happened. Nobody planned for the Cuban Missile Crisis. We planned for a lot of other things, but it was planning, and also readiness. Going through the plan for what we could do if this happened, we were then ready, because all these other agencies - the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the army, the navy were all in on the planning; it enabled them to be ready. If something had happened, I would say we were quite ready.

Q: Did we see the Berlin Wall as a defensive measure because too many East Germans were leaving Germany, or was it considered part of a strategy to take over West Berlin?

MARTIN: No, we didn't think of it as a strategy to take over West Berlin. We saw it as a strategy to stop these three to five thousand people a week that they were losing. Right after the end of the war, they had 17 million people in East Germany. By 1961, 15 years later, they still had 17 million people. And they had picked up a lot of refugees along the way. They had a real problem with their economy and with people, and this hemorrhaging of people that was getting worse. No, it was to keep people in. It was not to keep us out, either, because they didn't keep us out. That's why we had these incidents. They would have liked us to give up exercising our rights, but we wouldn't. We kept on exercising our rights to go into East Berlin. I would say this was really a great period in the United States, where we stood up and did something and it worked out well.

Q: In dealing with the Berlin crisis, did we feel that the Soviets were very much both concerned and in charge or was this Ulbricht and his leadership calling the shots?

MARTIN: Oh, this was simply Russia. You hear me say Russians. A lot of people say "the Soviets, the Soviets." It became the thing to say, but Khrushchev used to use the term the Russians. And of course most in the Soviet Union are ethnically Russians. I would say it was a Russian thing, and part of the historical Russian expansion and the idea of their being a great power. They still want to be a great power. Our policy is to try to tell them, "Forget about your reputation. Start doing something about your country recovering from the disaster that was the breakup."

Q: When the Wall went up, did that calm things down?

MARTIN: It did, yes. And the Wall stayed up for a long time. The flow out of East Germany dropped precipitously. They didn't have 3,000 or 5,000 coming; they were trickling across. They were escaping, jumping off ships, going in boats across to Denmark from East Germany. There were some escape routes that the intelligence people knew about, that they could recommend people to go from East Germany directly into West Germany because these 3,000 to 5,000 people I spoke of, half of them were going directly from East Germany into West Germany. The other half were coming through Berlin, from East Berlin into West Berlin. They'd be processed at refugee centers, and most of them would then be transported into West Germany, but some would stay in West Berlin. There were always these contacts between East Berlin and West Berlin.

I mentioned this German friend of mine whose father was a doctor who had a lot of patients who lived in East Berlin. He continued to treat them and would write down in his book or whatever that he had treated them and taken care of them; then he would have East German money. He used to buy cloth from his West German money. Then he would go into East Berlin and use his East German money to have suits made from the cloth that he bought in West Berlin. There were still these contacts. They always had contacts between some of the utility people and the fire departments. There was never a complete separation between East and West Berlin. We didn't want that. But the Russians were running the show. The showdown was between the United States and Russia.

Q: How about the Cuban Missile Crisis? You were still on the Berlin Desk. Were we watching moves in Berlin, expecting something.

MARTIN: Oh, yes. Our intelligence was excellent. I have great respect for the CIA. They knew everything that was going on. The thing is, just because you know somebody is going to take a punch at you, can you stop him? You might not be able to. But we did know a lot. They continued to have very good information coming out of East Germany during that time. I remember at a meeting one time, we had a meeting with the French and British, and Floyd Cola said, "We have information from one of our sources in East Berlin." It wasn't; but he was putting them off. He was very clever, a very smart guy. And Martin Hillenbrand - those two guys, really outstanding. They were regular Foreign Service officers who came up through the ranks, top-level thinkers and doers, influencing President Kennedy every day. He listened to Cola.

Q: What about during the Cuban Missile Crisis? It must have been October of 1962. Were we watching for other moves in Berlin? Was Berlin relatively quiet at that point?

MARTIN: Berlin was quiet then, yes. There was not a lot going on in Berlin. All of a sudden, according to Floyd Cola, the Cuban Missile Crisis was the last gasp of the crisis in Berlin. Khrushchev saw he wasn't getting anywhere, and putting up the Wall, from a propaganda point of view, was a big defeat for them, because it showed that they had to keep their people as prisoners. People were still escaping right and left. There were still these incidents - some people would try to escape, and there'd be a shooting - but in general, it was very quiet at that time in Berlin.

Everybody was focused on the speech that Kennedy made where he said that we know that there are missile sites and missiles there. They agreed to take out the missiles they had there, and we agreed to take out the missiles that were in Turkey, which we apparently planned to take out anyway. That was the concession we made. I just heard an analysis of it. Somebody said that Khrushchev and Kennedy were two people caught up in a world crisis and neither one of them was really up to doing it right, but they somehow got through it.

Q: What about Kennedy's trip to Berlin? Were you on the Desk at that time?

MARTIN: Ich bin ein Berliner.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: Before that we had another famous trip. We were nervous when all of a sudden Vice-President Lyndon B. Johnson said that he was going to go. I'm sure he had the okay from Kennedy. But we went to George C. McGee at that time, who was - and I was his assistant helping him. I was his aide-de-camp helping him get ready to go to Germany. We didn't like the idea of Lyndon B. Johnson going to Berlin.

Q: He was considered pretty much a loose cannon.

MARTIN: We didn't know what he was going to do. So we went to George C. McGee, who was a Texan, and said, "Maybe you can help us get Lyndon B. Johnson not to go." He said, "No, I can't do that. That's something I can't do." He wouldn't do anything. Johnson went, and he saw Adenauer. I didn't go to Berlin on that trip, but Herbie Cox did, and some other people. He said, "We pledge our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor for Berlin." And people were saying he had actually upped our commitment to Berlin, he was so forceful about it. So people were nervous.

Then later, when Kennedy went to Berlin he said, "Ich bin ein Berliner," and that was really a triumphant thing for him. But basically, things were calming down at that time, and I think we basically had won, and General Clay was a big influence on it, because Alan Leitner was a very nice person and very capable and all that, but he didn't have the stature. General Clay going over there, and also President Kennedy relied a lot on General Maxwell Taylor, who got an office on the Seventh Floor, just about the same time. Kennedy didn't like just being a leader. He always wanted to have cover, and he was always trying to find it through other people. For example, bringing General Taylor in and General Clay and some other people who came into the government at that time, and of course, his brother, Bobby Kennedy. It was all Kennedy's way of covering himself, and maybe to get advice from a lot of people.

Q: Did you have any feel for the influence of Bobby Kennedy while you were doing this?

MARTIN: No. Once, I remember there was a fellow named Elwood Williams. I don't know if you ever knew Elwood Williams.

Q: Yes, he had multiple sclerosis. He was Mr. Germany for years.

MARTIN: Right, and actually, I used to take him to the bathroom for a while. I was taking care of him. And we used to have lunch every day together. One day, we had a draft speech because I guess it was Bobby Kennedy would be traveling around the world and making speeches in various places, and he was going to be in Indonesia and make a big speech. We had a draft, I don't know where it came from exactly, but I guess it might have come from PER, but it might have come from the Indonesia Desk. It had to be cleared on the Seventh Floor. So I took Elwood with the speech up to the Seventh Floor, and we got in to see George Ball. There we were, sitting in George Ball's office (he was the undersecretary for political affairs at that time), and he was working on the speech. It was obvious that everybody wanted to get in on the act, and he wanted to get in on things too. He looked at the speech and said, "What's all this crap about Communism?" He didn't like that. He completely rewrote the speech, and we sent it out the way he wanted it. We came down the next day; he redid the speech.

We were there until midnight, and Elwood's wife used to come to pick him up. She had arrived at about 6 o'clock, and it must have been - well, it wasn't midnight, but it was like 10:30 before we got back to the office. She was so mad. They're both dead now.

The Pentagon was also writing a speech. The speeches were coming from different places, and eventually the speech that Bobby Kennedy gave in Indonesia was completely different from the speech that George Ball had drafted, and I'm sure it was different from what the Pentagon had written too. They probably got a lot of Bobby Kennedy and whoever worked with him right at that time, in the speech. But that was the only remote contact I had with Bobby Kennedy, although he went to Europe at some point and he and his wife came for a debriefing and we talked to them.

There were all kinds of people getting into the act then. One big thing we did on the German Desk was handle people coming from Germany to the United States. We set up the program for them, and I learned something there, and Elwood taught me that, the main thing was to get somebody important right away to agree to see whoever it was. I remember the economics minister came over. He saw a lot of important people. And somebody from Berlin, the mayor of Berlin or under-mayor came over, and if we could get somebody important to see him we would use that as kind of an anchor, and we'd call up and say, "Mr. Schmidt is coming over next week, and we're setting up a program for him. He's seeing General Clay on Wednesday at four o'clock. Could you see him on Wednesday morning?"

That always was a good ploy. That always worked - except with George Ball. He had a woman that was his secretary named Mrs. Hanady. I don't know if you ever heard of her. She was a very strong type. You'd call up, you wouldn't get to George Ball right away, and you'd talk to Mrs. Hanady. We would use this on her: he's seeing so-and-so and so-and-so and so-and-so, and we thought maybe Mr. Ball would like to see him. She would say, "Oh, he's seeing all those other people, Mr. Ball doesn't have to see him." I thought that was pretty good. She was tough. If Ball wanted to see him, of course, that would be fitted in. She'd probably tell him, but we always left the option open. We had a very strong ambassador to Germany before McGee. He was a Foreign Service officer, a career ambassador, I think. He was very tough and always wanted to be involved in everything. Anyway, he was somebody you couldn't get to see a visitor very easily. People would go to Berlin or to Bonn and never get to see him.

Q: What about George McGee? How did he operate? What was your impression of George McGee?

MARTIN: When I became his staff aide, they sent me up to the Seventh Floor, where he had an office. He had been bumped. If you remember, shortly after Kennedy came in, like a year later, there was a reshuffling of the people at the top. He said, "I had all the best people, but I didn't have them in the best places for them." McGee got pushed out in the shuffle, and Averell Harriman, who was a favorite of Kennedy's, got his job. He had a cubby-hole of an office on the Seventh Floor. They do have one little office up there for somebody extra. McGee was in there, and the administrative officers for that area were trying to get him out, and I was in between. This guy would tell me that all his phone calls and everything are going to have to be billed to GER, and all this kind of stuff that you can go through with an administrative officer sometimes.

Eventually McGee came down to EUR. No, maybe he didn't. I was the staff aide, and I set up the program for him to see people in the US government, and he wanted to see everybody. So we went to the CIA. I think it was when McCone was the head of the CIA. I went over to the CIA with him. Most of the time, he didn't want me to come in with him.

He knew a tremendous number of people, and he made phone calls. You know, he was a multimillionaire in the oil business, and he was a figure of importance in Texas, and he owned an estate, I think 5,000 acres out in Northern Virginia. He had gotten to know everybody. When he got into foreign affairs, he had somebody get him a collection of books on foreign affairs. He had 25,000 books on foreign affairs, which now have been given to the Georgetown Foreign Service School. That was his private collection of books when he wanted to have a library of books.

You could see he really enjoyed it. We went to see everybody. We went to the Pentagon, the CIA, the Department of Commerce. Somebody told me he at one time had ambitions to be Secretary of Commerce. We went to see Paul Volcker, too. He saw anybody who had any connection with Germany. He wanted to see that person before he went to Germany.

During this time, the budget was coming up. The whole argument about the budget was underway. Congressman Rooney was looking for ways to save money, and he heard about the train. The ambassador in Germany had his own private train, and there was a master sergeant in the army who was the trainmaster. The ambassador used to go to Berlin every month, very often by train, or he could fly, or he could go by car. He liked to go by train because to was exercising our rights. Rooney criticized the train, and we gave the train up as an economy measure that would save one master sergeant's pay and the train. McGee said, "Well, it would have been nice, you know, to go to Berlin by train every month," as the previous ambassador always did. There was an ambassador's residence in Berlin. He'd stay there weekends, then come back. So the last trip on the train was George C. McGee arriving as ambassador in Germany.

Q: Did the death of Kennedy in November of '63 and the coming to power of Lyndon Johnson make any change in how we dealt with Berlin? You were there till '64.

MARTIN: I would say it did not make a great deal of difference. Actually, at the very beginning, the same people stayed in the White House around Johnson, and he was occupied with a lot of other things. He was concerned with the domestic agenda. Things had calmed down. The Berlin Missile Crisis was over, so things were quiet at that time.

One thing I want to mention concerns Eastern Europe. On the German Desk we had East Germany. All the other Eastern European countries were under the Office of Eastern European Affairs. Inevitably, we used to deal with the Eastern European people a lot, so I got to know them. I knew them from having worked on Yugoslavia as well. Our policy of non-recognition of East Germany came up once because the Soviets were always trying to get around it. They were always trying somehow to trick us into doing something that could be interpreted as recognizing East Germany. Eventually we recognized the government but that was much later. I was on kind of a non-committee. All the countries in the world that we didn't recognize were constantly trying to do things to get international recognition. For example, North Korea, Cuba, North Vietnam - whatever country we didn't recognize - there were a bunch of them.

They would always try to do things. There was an international organization of people interested in light aviation. That's parachute jumping, blimps, gliders. There is an American Glider Association, an American Parachute Association; and an American Balloon Association. These guys were always trying to promote themselves. The East Germans would find them somehow and would offer to fund some kind of big contest or competition, but of course the East Germans would have to be invited. We would get wind of it and shoot it down. We were shooting down their participation in the Olympics, any kind of thing.

Chuck Johnson, who was my boss on the Berlin Desk and I used to go to those meetings and try to shoot down East German efforts. Once they sent a note about a plane that had crashed and they tried to inform us in Prague. They sent a note. The ambassador was Outerbridge Horsey, and he opened and read it, and then handed it back to the East Germans. We didn't want him to do that.

So I had to write a letter, or the Czech desk was going to write. We were going to - not reprimand - but remind Outerbridge Horsey that we didn't recognize East Germany, which of course he knew very well. He thought he had done the right thing by opening the thing and handing it back. He wasn't supposed to open it. He wasn't supposed to accept it at all. I remember writing the letter and taking it around to get cleared. Somebody said, "It's almost like you're praising him." I said, "We have to be very careful. You know, Outerbridge Horsey is a feisty guy. He'll get upset and he'll come back at us, so we have to be careful. On the other hand, we're going to tell him."

Harold Veda, who was the head of Eastern European affairs, liked the letter. I was coming up for reassignment at that time, and he saw me in the hallway with Elwood Williams coming back from lunch. I had gone to see him and told him I wanted to go over to Eastern Europe. He said, "Would you be willing to do economic work?" I said, "Sure, and I'd like to go to Eastern Europe, any of the countries. I've been to Yugoslavia, so I'd rather go to one of the other Eastern European countries. About two weeks later he saw me, and he said, "Doug, I put you in to go as chief of the economic section in Poland."

I later met Outerbridge Horsey, a very impressive guy. Later on he taught at St. Anselm's Abbey. His brother was Benedictine monk in England, I think, and Outerbridge Horsey, when he retired, taught a course in international relations. My son took it, and I used to see what he did. He gave a very, very good course, at a very high intellectual level, and it was during the time McGovern was running for election. Horsey came to the office one day, and he had a McGovern for President button and the kid was shocked. He couldn't believe that Horsey - just the way he conducted himself, the way he talked - would be for McGovern.

It was because of that letter that I got to go to Warsaw, and I was very happy to do so. I was supposed to study Polish, but there was some kind of an incident where somebody had to be pulled out early, and so they asked me to go early. I went in April, I think, of '64, and I had been scheduled to go in August. Now this was too bad, because I didn't know any Polish at all. I started taking Polish lessons when I got there, and I had studied Serbo-Croatian, so I guess you can be retreaded, but I never really learned Polish very well. I did most everything there in English.

Q: You were in Poland from '64 until when?

MARTIN: '64 to '67.

Q: As chief of the economic section.

MARTIN: Chief of the Economic Section.

Q: Who was the ambassador?

MARTIN: The ambassador when I first got there was John Moors Cabot, and about halfway through it was John Gronouski. Two more different people could not exist in the world. One was a domestic politician and I don't think he was ever interested in international affairs at all.

Q: John A. Gronouski, from Chicago.

MARTIN: No, Wisconsin. On the other hand, there was John Moors Cabot, who had been in the Foreign Service from the first Foreign Service class in 1924. He had a lot of experience in the Far East. He was a very interesting person in that wherever he had been he had tried to learn the language. He tried to get out and give speeches, and he had been very successful in Northern Europe. I think he had been in Sweden. I know he had been in Finland. He used to go around and give speeches and talk to people in university groups. Since our relations with Poland were pretty good, and we were encouraging the independence of the Eastern European countries, he wanted to do something like that. They really shut him down very early. It's not fair to say he was bitter, but they shut him down, and he didn't retaliate

The Poles needed wheat at one time. We gave them \$500 million in wheat exports under the Title I of PL-480. Title I of PL-480 has to be repaid in dollars. They didn't want to repay it. Title IV didn't have to be repaid in dollars. I forget whether it was Title I or Title IV, but anyway, the provision was they would get \$500 million worth of wheat, and we would use the money they would generate in zlotys on agreed projects within, I guess it was 10 years, or they had to repay in dollars. That date was hanging over the Poles, and they were nervous about it. They came up with something that Cabot considered very carefully, but he knew right away he didn't want it. They wanted us to redo the entire Vistula River in a US Army Corps of Engineers project to make the Vistula navigable and potable and environmentally acceptable, all kinds of things that would be done to the Vistula River. It would have used up the whole \$500 million in a project of seven or eight years and we'd have nothing to show for it politically.

At that time the war was going on in Vietnam, and the Polish press was very anti-our position in Vietnam. So this really put a cloud over everything that Cabot was trying to do, - and I really admire Cabot for this - during one of the bombing campaigns... July 4th was coming up - I guess it was July 4th, 1965. We were going to have a July 4th party, and then we got an intelligence report, that the foreign ministry said that nobody was to come to the party. Rather than let them insult us by having a big party and nobody would show up, Cabot said, "For July 4th this year, we're not going to have a traditional big bash. We're going to have a vin d'honneur, where only certain Polish officials - and half of them didn't show - and the chiefs of mission of the diplomatic corps would be invited. They just served little canapies and champagne and toasted the United States and that was it.

I really admired Cabot for not letting them insult us. He knew how to do things. He was a diplomat. He had been ambassador to about four different countries. One time, way back in Shanghai there was some kind of a riot, and he went out in the middle of the riot. He was a brave person, courageous, smart, but also stubborn. One thing you had to be very careful about was if he ever made up his mind, it was very difficult to get him to unmake his mind.

One time he had to, and it upset him a lot. That was when Churchill died. He wanted the embassy to go into mourning, because he reminded us all, Churchill was an honorary American citizen. Because he was an honorary American citizen, we had to honor him just as if he were an ex-President or something. Naturally everybody went along with this at the staff meeting when he said what we were going to do, but then some people talked to our British colleagues, and the British said, "You know, Winnie had a very long and happy active life. He's a figure of history now. There's no need to feel all that sorry, to mourn, to regret his death. We don't see any reason to go into 30-day mourning for him." It was some guy who was invited to a black-tie function, and Cabot had more or less said you can't go because we're mourning the death of this honorary American citizen. They told him, "Well, the British say they're going, and they don't understand why we're taking this so hard. He said, "You know, I don't know. I don't know what things are coming to. What is this world coming to?"

Q: That was when he was Vice-President?

MARTIN: Right, when he was Vice-President. Bobby Kennedy wanted to capitalize on the enthusiasm which he knew existed in Eastern Europe, when he was about to run for the United States Senate or maybe President. He made a trip to Warsaw, and Cabot was nervous about this, but he said, I'm a great admirer of the Kennedy family, because we're both from Massachusetts.

On the first anniversary of Kennedy's death I was in Warsaw. Some people wanted to have a mass, a one year anniversary service, and Cabot said no. He thought that was a bit much. I think his judgment was right. So we didn't have it. But when Bobby Kennedy came over, he really got the Poles very upset, because it was obvious he didn't care about the Polish Government. He was just out to get crowds, and in fact, he was haranguing a crowd outside. Hundreds of Poles would show up from nowhere and cheer Bobby Kennedy while he was talking to them. The Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs got very upset. We had arranged things Kennedy and his wife liked to do. We were going to bring dolls and toys to an orphanage, and invite all the newspaper people for a good photo opportunity. I went on that one. They didn't produce any kids. They didn't produce a photo opportunity for Kennedy to give toys away. They were dying to shut him down a little bit.

At a dinner, the minister of foreign affairs was very upset. Kennedy arrived about a half hour late. When he came in the deputy minister of foreign affairs took a chair, and said, "Here's a chair, Mr. Kennedy. Why don't you stand on it and make a speech to us?" Kennedy was a little taken aback by that. Then he went with Ambassador Cabot, and stood up on top of the car, and actually crushed the car in. It was one of these Lincolns, with pretty thin roofs. He was standing on it making a speech, and the roof crunched in, and Cabot was inside, hunched up.

Q: Cantilever, yes.

MARTIN: And Bobby Kennedy came, and Mrs. . . . What's her name, the Polish? . She was married to a Polish guy.

Q: Radziwill or something like that.

MARTIN: Radziwill. Now Radziwill is one of the famous names in Poland.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: There are about 10 famous families that were the big people in Polish History - huge landowners and all that. Radziwill is one of them.

Q: This was Jacqueline Kennedy's sister who was married to one, known as Prince Radziwill.

MARTIN: Whatever post I went to, if they needed an ecclesiastical attaché<sup>1/2</sup>, as the joke goes, I was always it. I had to arrange that we should get a priest ready in case they wanted to go to confession. I talked to this Jesuit priest who was a friend of mine. He was all excited, I think, all ready to do whatever honors were to be done, but of course, they were not interested in that.

They stayed at the Europejski hotel, which had a guest book. It was the oldest big great hotel in Warsaw, and they had a guest book, which they brought up for the Kennedys to sign. This guest book went back, like, 100 years or 200 years, a very important leather-bound book. All kinds of important people had been guests at the hotel and signed the guest book, like Pilsudski. The Kennedys packed it up and took it with them when they left. We had to get it back, of course, and we did. But it just showed you it was a chaotic experience with them.

The biggest event while I was in Warsaw was when Gomulka had been in power for quite a long time, and the economy wasn't doing very well. They were coming up on this time when they were going to have to pay us back dollars. It was the thousandth anniversary, the millennium, of Poland. In the meantime, Gronouski had arrived as ambassador. They were planning for this millennium because the date of the founding of the Polish state was also the date of the conversion of Poland to Catholicism. It's through the marriage of a Polish king to a Silesian princess. The state was going to have a huge celebration, and the Church was going to have a huge celebration - competing celebrations.

When Gronouski arrived, Cabot was hoping for another ambassadorship. He was hoping to go to Chile, but he didn't get it. He went back to be the Department of State representative at the National War College, and then a year or so later he retired. He wanted to have 40 years in the Foreign Service, and I think he just about made it. When we came back, we had dinner at the National War College quarters over in Fort Myer with the Cabots. They were always very nice to us.

When Gronouski arrived, his wife was afraid of flying, so they came over by ship. And there was a lot of stuff about him, because he had been a member of the cabinet, the postmaster general. He was pushed aside to make room for O'Brien.

Q: Larry O'Brien?

MARTIN: Larry O'Brien, who was a political operator, and Johnson wanted him when he was going to run for President and to make sure he had a postmaster general who could help him politically. He didn't have that much confidence in Gronouski.

Gronouski had become ambassador almost by a fluke. There was another better candidate who was more Polish, but who didn't have a Polish name, so Gronouski, who was really not conscious of being a Polish-American so much but had a very Polish name, he got the job. Kennedy picked him because it was good politically. Johnson sent Gronouski to be ambassador to Poland but also he wrote a letter. He tried to elevate the job by saying that he wanted to have Gronouski's opinion on a regional policy toward Eastern Europe. So he was making him kind of an ambassador for Eastern Europe, not just Poland. All the other ambassadors, Outerbridge Horsey, but also Elam O'Shaughnessy in Hungary, all took a dim view of this.

Gronouski had to come by surface. So he went by ship to Paris and by train to Vienna, and then we sent somebody to meet him there because we thought he might need help. He didn't know any foreign language at all, never studied a foreign language, never even studied Latin. We sent an Agency guy out, a friend who spoke Polish fluently. He saw Gronouski was standing there, looking at this absolutely desolate Polish countryside - I mean, snow-covered ground and freezing cold and just desolate - and he looked at it for a little while, and not looking at the guy, just out loud, he said, "Lyndon, you son of a bitch! What have you done to me?"

He immediately started trying to learn some Polish, but if you've never studied Polish and you're 50 years old, you're not going to learn much. We had the presentation of credentials, and under the Polish system they have this military tradition and they have a military honor guard out there, they're at order arms, about going to present arms. The ambassador is supposed to say, "I salute you," in Polish, "I salute you Polish soldiers or something." It goes something like rzonierz ponoszczi. So when they went to present arms, he said, "Rzonierz . . . " and he froze. About 30 seconds went by. He had been practicing it so long. And finally it came out, ". . . ponoszczi." And then the arms came down from order arms to present arms. He was returning their salute.

He wanted to make a speech in Polish over Voice over America, and he did, but it was done with a tape recorder where he would memorize three words, and he would say those three words and then they shut the machine off. And then they'd practice the next five words. They'd go through the five words. So he made a speech over Voice of America, about it was a technological feat and an achievement of modern technology; it was not a speech in Polish by somebody who knew any Polish.

He was trying to do things and also went to the other countries. I went with him, because he was an economist, and he thought economics was very important. On his trip to the other places, it was interesting to see the chiefs of mission in the other countries - Floyd Cola, Elam O'Shaughnessy, and Outerbridge Horsey - and how they handled him. Outerbridge Horsey was very polite to him but wouldn't go out at night. Gronouski was a night owl. He used to like to go to night clubs, and he would stay out till two or three in the morning. He always liked people on the staff to be with him. He also liked to think he was very attuned to the press. He was always trying to get a good press.

He was trying to make something out of our contacts in Warsaw with the Chinese, because at that time, we had talks every once in a while with the Chinese. When Cabot was there, all we would tell the press was "We met with the Chinese, spoke with them for one hour and two minutes, and we'll be reporting to Washington" - something like that, very non-committal. Gronouski came in, and he started saying, "Well, we had a very productive talk. We gave a frank and fair exchange of views, and it was a good talk." The Chinese would deny it. They'd come out, "It was not a good talk. We told you what we thought, but it was not a good talk. Why you say good?" Gronouski was a character.

Another interesting aspect of the job there, the embassy, I think, did very well. Any Foreign Service officer who wanted could sit in on the talks as a scribe. There would be four people on each side. There'd be the ambassador, a counselor, a scribe and an interpreter.

The guy who did it for us, Al Harding was the Chinese language officer. There was a guy who was political counselor in Stockholm who was a Chinese specialist who would come down for the talks. I volunteered one time. Nobody ever volunteered twice, because you had to write down everything. You had to get a verbatim account. A telegram had to go out that night with the verbatim account being sent in a couple of days later.

I had bad luck. There was a new Chinese ambassador who was a hard-line kind of a guy. There would be an opening statement on each side and then there'd be talk, points made on each side. It was formalized, and next somebody would propose when the next meeting should take place. Cabot went through his long opening statement, which was already written down, so that was an easy part. Then, they went through all these exchanges of views, and this hard-line Chinese ambassador, who had been talking in a rather hard way, didn't seem to be very polite, said to Cabot, "Now if there's nothing more to say, go ahead and propose a date for the next meeting." Cabot was supposed to propose a date for the next meeting, but he wasn't going to take that. He said, "As a matter of fact, I do have something more to say. I have something important to tell you." And then he went right into a repeat of the opening statement, which went on and on and on. He dragged it out, and then the Chinese ambassador had got the sense of what was happening, and then at the end Cabot said, I propose the next meeting for such-and-such a date. He may even have said, "Unless you have something to respond to that, I propose" such and such. Cabot was a diplomat from way, way back, and he was always standing up for the United States on occasions like that in a diplomatic way. He was very careful to take into account another person's feelings, but he was also very sensitive, and he would not let anybody put one over on the United States. Gronouski was completely different, and would get into trouble. I would imagine that people in Washington were saying, "take it easy."

On these trips to Eastern Europe Outerbridge Horse was very good, because at that time there was the question of the Czech gold. We had a negotiation with all the Eastern European countries about the amount of money they owed us and how they were going to pay. We were getting 10, 11, 12 cents on the dollar from each country, and that's the way we were negotiating. But the Czechs wanted their gold back, because we were holding the Czech gold in Fort Knox. They initialed an agreement where they would get the gold back, and we would get 11 cents on the dollar. So this agreement, initialed on both sides, was sent to Washington and Prague, just at that time the gold price was freed, and goes shooting up in value.

The gold that we were going to give them that was originally worth say \$10 million, was now worth \$40 million. In Washington they were saying, "Hey, hey, everything's changed now." We're not going to give you back the gold until you renegotiate the agreement, because the equities have changed. Things are not as they were when we made the agreement. We would never had initialed the agreement we initialed.

Outerbridge Horsey felt that this was a betrayal by the United States of an agreement that was negotiated, initialed, and approved on each side, and it was just a matter of formality of signing it. He was upset and told Gronouski about this, and then said, "This is where you can help us, with your position in Washington as a member of the President's Cabinet." He wanted him to intervene. Gronouski really couldn't have had any influence on it, but he was flattered by Outerbridge Horsey, so he came away liking him.

We had another incident with Outerbridge Horsey where he was in trouble. IBM was trying to move into Eastern Europe at that time. In Czechoslovakia, Watson, Jr. who was in Paris and the head of IBM in Europe, came with an IBM entourage and made an appointment to see Outerbridge Horsey, at 10 o'clock. Horsey was ready to meet them. At 10:30 there's no Watson, so Horsey left. He wasn't there when they came. Horsey made a point of not being there because they were a half hour late, no excuse, nothing. They were very upset with him. I think they were trying to get him fired because he had insulted Watson. But Watson had insulted him, no apologies or anything. That's the way Horsey was. He also stood, like Cabot, on his position as ambassador.

Gronouski liked Outerbridge Horsey. In Hungary, with Elam O'Shaughnessy, it was a different thing altogether because Cardinal Mindszenty was in the embassy in Hungary, and Elam O'Shaughnessy was like his guardian. Gronouski wanted to see him. Since Gronouski already had this reputation for talking too much to the press, as soon as we arrived, the minute we had an appointment with Elam O'Shaughnessy, with Herb Kaiser, the political counselor, and me, he said to Gronouski, "I know you want to see the Cardinal, and I've arranged for that, but I can only arrange for you to see him if you agree to say nothing to the press. You have to agree to that because I'm telling you that he's under very tight wraps. You've got to be very, very careful of how we handle the Cardinal. Of course that was true. That was US policy; they wanted to keep him because the Cardinal would always try to use any occasion to put himself out in front and against the government.

Gronouski was taken aback by that, and a little bit miffed. He was definitely miffed. Then O'Shaughnessy - he was a friend of mine, I liked him because he used to be the DCM in Belgrade - said, "Herb, you two can't see the cardinal. I'm sorry, but you can't. Only the ambassador." So the ambassador saw him. The press were following Gronouski around at that time, because he was always good for something. They said, "Did you see the cardinal?" He said, "I saw everybody I came to see." But he kept his agreement with O'Shaughnessy. Washington, I heard later, was trying to get him fired for that.

Our wives came along too, and then Mrs. Gronouski was afraid to fly back. She flew down, but she was afraid to fly back. My wife went back with her on the train from Budapest to Warsaw. They were always friends. Mary Gronouski was a nice person. My wife and she got along extremely well, just as my wife had gotten along with Mrs. Cabot very well.

Gronouski did talk to the press. He talked about bridge-building or something, but it worked out all right.

I mentioned that in Poland it was the thousandth anniversary of the founding of the Polish state, and it was a competing thing between the state and the church. And I don't know if you've ever heard of Our Lady of Czestnowa or Czestochowa.

Q: Is that the Black Madonna?

MARTIN: Yes, it's a black Madonna. It goes back God knows how long. It's very old, and it's in a church and we couldn't go there because it was in one of those restricted areas. We restricted the Poles from visiting certain places in the US; they restricted us. I had gone around with Zablocki in Poland. They let him go there, and he and I went in. They had a music box when they showed it. It was inside a safe. It must have been 100 years old. And when they open the safe, the thing creaks up, and then there's a hymn that was written just for that. It's very interesting because it's the Black Madonna. It's covered with coal and you can't really see much. But it's in every church in Poland.

Q: A picture of it.

MARTIN: A picture of it in every church. They not only have that picture, which they wouldn't transport around, but they had the first copy, which is special. That went around Poland to every diocese in Poland and at opening ceremonies Gomulka gave a speech, and naturally they brought in a whole crowd of people to listen to him, but Gomulka had a habit like a lot of Communists of droning on, droning and droning and droning on. As he was doing that, people started to walk out on him, and the press reported this, and it was really a big shame.

Q: Doug, before we finish up this Polish portion, could you talk a bit about the Polish economy during the '64-67 period as we were seeing it?

MARTIN: The Polish economy seemed to be doing badly. Naturally, the Communist system doesn't work well in running an economy. They couldn't get people to work. And the factories were very inefficient. They tried to improve productivity. They were always announcing they'd improved productivity this amount and that amount, but really, they were having a lot of trouble. Alcoholism was a huge problem. You would see people drunk going to work in the morning. In factories it was another big problem. The Poles, although they are very devout Catholics, have no compunction about stealing something if they can get their hands on it, especially if it's in another village or if it's in a factory run by the Communists. There was a saying that the Poles had, "They make-believe they pay us, and we make-believe we work."

The Polish economy was really staggering along; it was not doing very well at all, and this probably was the cause for Gomulka being pushed out. That was just about when I was leaving. The man who came in to replace him was named Gierek. Gierek was the leader in Silesia, which was one part of the economy that was doing well. The Polish coal mining industry was functioning, because they needed coal for the big steel factory that they had built down near Krakow. I visited a coal mine one time. I think some of the big support for the Communists came from coal miners before the war who were members of the union, and the unions had been taken over by Communists. The higher-paid workers in Poland were coal miners. They were always favored, and I think their production was high. So Gierek, who was the head of that area, became the prime minister of Poland. Gomulka fled. It was 1968. It was the time of the war between the Israelis...

Q: Oh, yes. The Six-Day War between the Israelis and Nasser's Egypt.

MARTIN: Right. And nobody realized it. We knew there were many, many Jews in the government in Poland, but I don't think we realized how many there were. There were jokes going around at that time because the population was very much in favor of the Israelis and very happy to see the Russians who supported Egypt taking a beating. There were jokes going around that somebody told the Russian leader, "You've got to stop shipping arms to Egypt." He's surprised at that, and they say, "via Israel." Or Israel via Egypt. There was another joke then, "Are you on the side of the minister or the vice-minister?" because the vice-minister of foreign affairs, the vice-minister of foreign trade - a number of vice-ministers were Jewish. The ministers were not. Because everybody was in favor of Israel at that time, Gomulka was humiliated by that. Gierek came in, from that area of the coal miners where there was a lot of anti-Semitism. They started what amounted to a pogrom. The vice-minister of foreign trade, the head of the North American section, which included Canada and the US, of the Ministry of Foreign Trade; and the American Desk officer in the Ministry of Foreign Trade, were all Jewish. The vice-minister was retired, and the other two emigrated. They were refugees. One of them went to Sweden; the other to England. On the one hand, people were very happy about what happened in the Six-Day War; but the reaction against the Jews was rather dramatic, really bad.

Q: Well, anti-Semitism has always been quite strong in Poland. I had just left Yugoslavia at that time, and the Yugoslavs were also having fun because the leader of Israeli armed forces was of Yugoslav origin, and they took great pride in this, although Tito's regime was supporting Nasser.

MARTIN: The people in Eastern Europe were very much in favor of Israel, and the Communists were very embarrassed by the whole thing.

But to finish up on the millennium, throughout the year, the government was trying to celebrate from the state's point of view, and the Church was celebrating from the Church's point of view, and it was a big victory for the Church over the state. It was very embarrassing for Gomulka, and that also contributed to his demise as prime minister. I attended a couple of ceremonies in Warsaw. These Communists would get in front of a procession, and they would block it. I saw them locking arms and holding people from going into the church. And the Church had these guys with blue berets on who were like their police, patrolling like ushers. The leader of the Church group was trying to shame them: "Do you refuse to let this old lady go into church?" The whole thing was, I think, in the end a big defeat for the state. The whole celebration turned out to be a disaster.

One of the worst disasters was when they stole a picture. They stole the number one image, and they only got it back three weeks later, in order to shut down a couple of other celebrations that had been planned. The devotion to Our Lady of Czestochowa in Poland, is unbelievable. In fact, we left Poland one day, and the next day was a Sunday. The Polish maid used to take my youngest daughter around. She was an old woman and used to take her to church all the time and was always telling her stories. When we got to church at St. Matthew's Cathedral, my daughter was looking all around the church and said to my wife, "Gde matke boszke czestochowe?" [Where is Our Lady of Czestochowa]? She couldn't understand it.

It was a big defeat, and suggested that eventually if there were a Polish pope, it would not really be all that much of a surprise. If there wasn't going to be another Italian pope, it was very logical that there should be a Polish pope. In the church-state debate that was going on, the Communists were always criticizing the Polish church for being outmoded, too conservative, and behind the times. That resonated in Western Europe, and maybe in the United States too. It was an effective propaganda ploy, but within Poland, everybody loved Cardinal Wyszynski, and there was some fallout of the persecution, but not much.

Q: Well, why don't we pick this up the next time. I'll put at the end here, we'll pick this up in 1967. Where did you go?

MARTIN: Vientiane, Laos. That was a shocker.

Q: Okay, we'll do that.

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Q: Today is the 10th of March, 1999. Doug, Laos - how did that come about, and then we'll talk about Laos? This was the 1960's, is that right?

MARTIN: '67.

Q: '67.

MARTIN: When I was leaving Warsaw, since I did have connections in the Office of German Affairs, friends there, somebody offered me the job - it was through Elwood Williams, I'm sure - the job as economic officer in Stuttgart. Frankly, that would have been a real comedown from being chief of the Economic Section at the embassy in Warsaw.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: So I turned it down. In turning it down, I said, "Look, send me anywhere you want, but not Stuttgart. Please, let me out of that." The next thing, I got a letter telling me I was going to go to Vientiane, Laos, and I would be the economic officer at the embassy. That was something of a fiction, because in Laos at that time, the second largest employer was the AID mission, with something like 5,000 people working there. They had one Foreign Service officer, State Department, there, and I was it. I was the deputy in the Program Office, in charge of something called the Economic Stabilization Program.

Q: You were there from '67 to -

MARTIN: - to '70.

Q: '70, okay.

MARTIN: The Economic Stabilization Program had been a three-part program some years before I got there. There were direct grants. Really, they would pay the officials in the Vientiane Government to send family members for medical care in Thailand and even to Paris and direct grants to support embassies. Laos was such a poor country, it could not afford to have embassies in countries where they were really needed, such as Thailand, Paris, London, and the UN in New York, and Washington. We were providing the money for that. That was the first part of the three-part program.

The second part was something called the Commodity Import Program, where we subsidized the import of American products, particularly vehicles. They would be sold to the Lao. That didn't work out because there was a lot of corruption in the government, and, though we kept tightening the Commodity Import Program up, somehow they would get around it. For example, they imported luxury vehicles, and we said no more of that, no more automobiles could come in. So they started importing trucks, but the trucks were really being used as household vehicles, and they were the most luxurious pickup trucks you could get.

The third part of the Economic Stabilization Program was the one that occupied me full time. It was something called the Foreign Exchange Operations Fund, which we called FEOF. It consisted of five contributing countries: the United States, which was by far the major contributor, the United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and France. France's contribution was fake because they used it as a means for cashing francs into Lao currency, which is called the kip, the Lao kip. But the other countries really made a contribution, and they also generated kip, but it was used to pay down the national debt. So basically, every year there'd be a budget deficit, and FEOF was subsidizing the budget deficit just about completely. There were four local banks which would accept kip in return for dollars at a fixed exchange rate, 500 kip to one dollar. That program was always under the scrutiny of the Treasury Department. They didn't like it. First of all, our share of FEOF was high. It started out at about 50 percent and gradually crept up until when I got there it was about 75 percent. Since the French basically used it as a way of changing their money, they did not make any net contribution at all, but they had a chance then to participate with us in negotiations with the Lao Government to try to control the deficit. Basically, in return for their agreeing to limit the deficit to a certain amount, which was really the amount that the government was costing them, we would agree to put in the equivalent in dollars. We would have meetings monthly to discuss progress to see how they were doing so that the deficit wouldn't get out of hand. It was a successful program. By the time I got there, the US was putting in \$10 million, but it was also seen as a way for a Lao with kip to go and get dollars and send them to an account in the West. So the capital flow outwards was something the Treasury Department was concerned with.

I also did the general economic reporting, and a couple of things were important. The ambassador when I got there was Bill Sullivan. I guess he's my favorite ambassador. He has a great sense of humor and is also tremendously capable and a brilliant writer. He was very interested in keeping the war in Laos as quiet as possible, because we were, including CIA, underwriting the Meo tribes. They were called "the sky people," because they live up on top of the mountains. Today they're known as Hmong in the United States and apparently have not adapted very well in this country. Their leader was General Vang Pao, who had been a sergeant in the French army and was actually a brilliant commander and revered by his people as they would a king. One of my most interesting days in Laos was to go and visit General Vang Pao's headquarters, which was near a refugee camp that USAID was operating up in that northern part of the country. I sat on his tremendous porch as we were waiting to see him, and Meo people were also sitting around waiting to see him. He would come out like a medieval king and mediate disputes, handle questions, advise people, like a wise king who was loved by his people.

That program was generating a lot of refugees, so USAID had a big refugee program. Ambassador Sullivan wanted to control any planes going up there. I used to write an annual aviation report, and I had to get the name of every plane in the country, and the number, and who was running it. There were all kinds of funny airlines there. There were airline companies that had no planes, and there were planes you wondered what airline company was running. A New York Times stringer and a New York Times reporter, Edward David Binder, did get up there to the battlefield and learned quite a lot and wrote a book called *The Secret War in Laos*. He got some kind of a prize for it. But the secret war in Laos did remain a secret for quite a long time, and I think it was pretty much a secret still when I was there.

That was one part of my economic reporting. Another was gold. There were no restrictions on gold imports into Laos, although all the surrounding countries had restrictions on gold imports. So the gold used to be shipped into Vientiane. A fee had to be paid to the government for that, and then nobody cared where it went. It was obvious it was going to the Chinese communities in the surrounding countries. Those people liked to collect and hold gold.

But the most important was running the FEOF. Every day, the cashier, a British fellow, whom I'm still friends with, would come in and tell me how much kip was turned in that day, and how many dollars we had sent out. We would have negotiations with the government. We were always afraid of a run on the money, and when we got low, I would send a telegram saying we must have a deposit of a quarter of a million dollars by tomorrow morning or the Western World as we know it will collapse. They always came through with it. I really negotiated with the Australians, Japanese, French, and the British; the British were our closest, you might say, friends on that. The Japanese were sometimes difficult to understand, but I think I learned a lot. It was the first time I was in the Far East since I had been in the army of occupation in Japan for a year.

On the personal side, my son got kicked out of a Jesuit school in Vienna. I had made a mistake, I think, in leaving him there. He came to us and we wanted to get him into a good school. So when my two years were up, I was happy to leave, but this meant our leaving in an off-cycle period. We were really thrown to the winds at that time, and the East Asian bureau wasn't interested in finding any job for me. But I don't know that they had one that would have been really suitable. So I went back to Washington and there were many, many other people who were over complement. They were offering people the opportunity to serve in the Office of Economic Opportunity, the poverty program. Part of the poverty program was the legal services program, which was to provide legal assistance to poor people, not just in the traditional way of helping a person with a case, but in trying to analyze poverty in the community and come up with legal solutions to the problem as a whole.

Q: Doug, before we get into that, I'd like to go back to Laos for a bit. In the first place, can you describe what was happening in Laos when you were there, the war, the economy, the political situation?

MARTIN: Okay. Politically there had been a right-wing government, and then there had been a coup, the Kong Lee coup, and when we were there, there was a coalition government headed by Souvanna Phouma, who was the premier. He was a moderate person and was related to the royal family. I think the king was his uncle. He's in the cadet line of the royal family. The minister of Finance, who was the one I dealt with, was named Sesak Na Champassak. Champassak is an area in the southern part of Laos. His uncle was the warlord in southern Laos and the top guy there, but he was kept in line. He was careful. They would have just bounced him out if he had caused trouble. Then in the center, where we were, Chinese merchants were coming in. There were a couple of families that were very powerful within that area. There was not what you would call a central government that extended through the whole country with schools, hospitals, and that sort of thing. People lived in these little villages.

One reason why we could have an economic program that could underwrite the entire budgetary deficit was because they were a small population - no more than three million people - and because most of that three million people did not live in a money economy. They were people who grew their own rice or caught some fish from the many waters all around there, so they had food. Clothing would just be one piece of clothing. A woman had one dress or two. It wasn't a dress; it was traditional - not a sari either. I forget what they call it. It was just a tubular kind of dress that they wore. And shelter - they could build a house themselves. They were straw houses.

It was not much of a money economy except in Vientiane, where there were lots of stores that sold everything. It was strange, in that although it was not a money economy basically, anywhere you went in the country, you could get imported beer and sandals. So there was import-export business going on. They produced very little themselves. Our aid program was designed to try to get them going. I know we had for example a tire recapping plant.

The AID program was engaged mostly in road-building. The theory of economic development that was being followed or approved in Washington and was the idea of the successive AID directors there, was road development. You build a road, the people will come and the area will be developed. There was a lot of truth in that. We had two kinds of road-building programs going. One was trying to work through the local government, giving them assistance in building roads. Then we had one big road going from Vientiane, the capital, to Luang Prabang that was being built by American highway construction people from the state of Washington. That road was cut soon after I left, because it was under attack.

There was danger there. People were being killed. I had a friend, a guy named Parento, six kids, and he was a navy civilian employee in the Office of Naval Construction or something, basically . . . what do they call those guys?

Q: The Seabees.

MARTIN: The Seabees. He was a civilian employee in the Seabee program: construction of the embassy there and other government buildings.

There was a very, very big CIA operation.

Q: What happened to him? Was he killed?

MARTIN: Parento was killed in an airplane going to look at a school down in the south. He was on the school board, and I was on it with him. The plane crashed. There were lots of plane crashes there. They had all kinds of the so-called "STOL" aircraft, "short take-off and landing." One kind of airplane was called a Porter. People used to travel all over the place by air, because traveling by land was not safe.

There were five Frenchmen killed within a couple of miles of Vientiane while I was there. They were out hunting. Some people suspected they might have been doing something else, some kind of intelligence work, but I don't think so. They were out hunting, and two of them were caught by the Pathet Lao, the Communist insurgent group, and were being held. The others came along and stopped to try to help them. All five were then killed in a shootout. I went to the funeral there.

It was interesting to see the French colons, because that's basically what they were. There were lots of bars and places down on the main street. Lots of the Frenchmen had been veterans of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, and found themselves in French colonial places and stayed there afterwards. There were bars there. I used to go to a bar on Saturday afternoon to have a beer. The owner was a Frenchman who had been in the French Foreign Legion, had fought in the Battle of Dien Bien Phu and because he had a Lao wife he stayed. There were some Hungarians who had somehow gone from Hungary to Paris, Paris to the French Foreign Legion and the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, and then they stayed. One guy we called Jĩ½nos Bĩ½csi, Uncle John. He used to regale me with stories of the French Foreign Legion and the Hungarian army and his opinion of the Lao, Hmong, and others. Anyway, he told me that the French Foreign Legion was "Kinderspiel," child's play, compared with the Hungarian army. He said that was a real army, that was a tough army. We used to love to hear him talk. And there were some others there. My wife is Hungarian. I was in with the Hungarian community, such as it was, all expats and refugees who had somehow found their way there. The woman in charge of the hotel cleaning staff was a Hungarian woman. My wife was friendly with her.

There was a war going on, there was a war atmosphere, and it was what people had said in the press. It was a CIA-client country. They had a big trail-watching program going on. Besides what was going on in the north, the war down in the south, was where the Ho Chi Minh trail went through. It went right through Laos, cutting out from North Vietnam down through Laos and back over into South Vietnam itself. The CIA ran something called a trail-watching program. A lot of what they were doing I wouldn't know anything about, but I knew that they were watching the trail, because it was only a few miles from Savannakhet and Paksay to the other major cities or towns in Laos. They were on the Mekong River or just a few miles away. One thing I would say about the CIA there, they knew what was going on. They couldn't stop it, couldn't do much about it, but they did know what was going on.

Q: Did you find that the CIA was part of the team, or were they off to one side?

MARTIN: They were definitely part of the team, because Ambassador Sullivan was in charge, and they honored him. But they were so big and so rich, they had so much going, that in effect they were something different. They lived in a separate building. They all had the same title, community development advisor, which was kind of a joke. My kids went to the local American school there and most of their friends, it seemed, were people either from the AID mission or from the CIA. The State Department was definitely overwhelmed or outnumbered. The DCM was State.

Q: Who was the DCM, do you remember?

MARTIN: The DCM was . . . I'll think of his name in a minute. He was very good and later got into trouble in the Dominican Republic, where he was the ambassador and he had his general services officer was building. . . . Bob . . .

Q: Hurwitz?

MARTIN: Bob Hurwitz. I liked him a lot. He was very good and very decisive. To show you one incident that showed his character. He was a good DCM in that he was able to go in and talk sense to the ambassador, because Sullivan could get out on a limb, but he also had a great sense of humor and he realized when he had done it. We used to send in a "weeka." I used to send in some economic items for the weeka. They were reviewing the reporting in Washington, and said, "Look, just send in separate reports on anything significant. We don't need the weeka any more." Sullivan blew up. He really got upset at that. He said, "They can't tell me how to report. I'm the ambassador. I'll decide how I'm going to report. If I want to send in a weeka, I will send in a weeka." And that was it. He proclaimed that at a staff meeting. Apparently after the staff meeting, Hurwitz went in to talk to the ambassador. He said, "You know, this might be a break for us. That weeka is getting to be a pain anyway, and I wonder how valuable it is. They might be right. It's better to send in the more important stuff we report separately. We don't have to send in a silly weeka every week with a lot of little items that are more or less insignificant and meaningless." Sullivan said, "Well, I guess you're right. I still can write whatever I want, but okay, let's forget the weeka." That's what I mean by a good DCM. Very few are. Most DCM's are afraid of the ambassador. If you have a strong ambassador, they are supine. They are afraid to say anything because it wouldn't do any good, they think.

I shouldn't say most - I don't know, I haven't had that many, but it seems to me the DCM gets all the bad jobs like running the school board, the housing, and all those things. He takes a load off the ambassador. But the real contribution he can make is to get the ambassador to head in when he's going wrong, and they don't always do that. I think somehow the training program in Washington that trains DCM's tells them that they have to be the alter ego, that is they act as if they're inside the ambassador doing whatever the ambassador would do in those spots. They should be encouraged to dissent a little bit. When the ambassador needs a talking to, they should be able to talk to him.

Q: What was your impression of the war at the time you were there? How was it going?

MARTIN: Not very well. While I was there, the Tet Offensive took place.

Q: That was in January, '68, in South Vietnam.

MARTIN: Yes, I was in Laos. Tet is a big Vietnamese holiday. Because it was like a very long weekend a number of people came, from the AID mission and from other groups in Vietnam to visit Laos. People wanted to visit other countries while they were there. So we had a number of people who came during the Tet Offensive. While we were there, Khe Sanh was going on.

Q: This was the siege of Khe Sanh?

MARTIN: Yes. Near the Vietnamese-Lao border. And people were afraid it was going to turn into another Dien Bien Phu, and we were getting reports every day, and people had maps of Khe Sanh out on the desk looking at what was happening. It was touch and go there. It was getting to look like the war was going to go on forever and we weren't really gaining much.

General Westmoreland was the commanding general, and I'm pretty sure while I was there he was replaced by General Creighton Abrams. The general feeling was that General Abrams was a much greater man and a greater general than General Westmoreland. As it turned out, General Abrams was the one that really got us out of Vietnam in a way to save the American army. That was what they were trying to do at the end. The military side of it was to get the army out, in a sense to save our military from what could have been a terrible and endless mire, going on and on. I didn't realize that when I went in. I just thought, well, if we did bomb north of the military line, bomb North Vietnam, we could subdue them. I think we could have, but I don't know that it was worth it.

I went there because my record showed that I knew French, and I could read French very well. I really couldn't speak it very well. One of my accomplishments there was I took French lessons and I did qualify in the French language. My wife, who speaks a number of languages very well, was very friendly with some of the French. There were a lot of French military there, and we were friendly with one family. He was a lieutenant colonel in the French army, and he said, "You know, we couldn't do it, and I don't think you can either, but I wish you luck." He was right. I think it was just too much for the United States to think we could defeat a Vietnamese insurgent movement that was popular.

So I would say the war wasn't going very well, but we were holding our own. Ambassador Sullivan used to have meetings on Sunday morning targeting where we would bomb in northern Laos. There was a place in northern Laos where the Meo in a sense were protecting our guys. I think they were employees of Lockheed or something, and they were on top of a mountain, and they were guidance for our bombers coming over Vietnam. Gradually the enemy was closing in on that area, and we were keeping it open, knowing that probably we were going to have to give it up. It was overrun and a number of people were killed but some escaped. I remember Ambassador Sullivan showing me a telegram, and he said, "Well, we stayed at Site 129" - or whatever it was - "a day too long. It was too bad that that happened." But the place was serving a very important purpose right up until the minute they overran it. Still it would have been better if we could have destroyed the machines that were there.

Q: Was Sullivan the ambassador the whole time you were there?

MARTIN: No, no. He was succeeded by Ambassador Godley.

Q: Mac Godley.

MARTIN: Mac Godley, who was also very good. I liked him a lot. He's still around. So is Sullivan, for that matter. Ambassador Sullivan lives in Mexico. Ambassador Godley, I would say loved the idea of war. I don't think Sullivan did. Sullivan was having a lot of fun, but I don't think he really loved it. He would have preferred if somehow there could have been a peaceful solution to the thing, whereas Godley really reveled in it. He relied almost completely on the military attaché and the CIA station chief, Ted Shackley. He was very good, too. We were friendly with them because his daughter and mine were in the same class together. The war was not going very well when Godley came in either. Shortly after we left, I read in the paper that the road between Vientiane and Luang Prabang had been cut, and that was a very important event, because the northern part of Laos was being cut off.

Another friend, who had a Hungarian wife who was very nice, was a pilot in Air America, and he was killed while we were there. He was flying, probably delivering, as he used to say, "We deliver 'hard vegetables,'" meaning, of course, we had rice drops going on all over the place. There were a lot of technological advances being made there. How can you drop a bag of rice from maybe 600 or 800 feet high and not have it smash all over and the rice get scattered? We used to put it in three bags, a bag inside a bag inside a bag, so that when it was shattering, if you were lucky it might have just shattered inside one of those bags. And they were pretty good at it. They had people employed on these planes (this was Air America and Continental Air) as "kickers," and believe it or not, the plane would drop its tailgate, and the bags of rice would be on it, and the bags would sometimes get stuck, so these guys would be kicking. At the beginning they were just kicking, and a couple of them fell out of the plane and were killed. Pretty dumb, but anyway, it happened. So by the time I got there, they had straps on. They couldn't fall out of the airplane anymore.

So the rice drops were going on. We had projects going on all over the country. As I said, road building was big. The AID director when I first got there was Joe Mendenhall, and eventually the Lao pushed him out. He went on home leave, and they said they didn't want him to come back because he was death on corruption. He used to brag that our AID program, when we built a school, we brought in all the equipment for the school, all the materials, we purchased it, brought it to the site, and we supervised the school going up. In Vietnam, they would give the money to the Vietnamese and say, "Build a school, and we'll give you the material." The schools weren't getting built. Schools were getting built in Laos, but the money wasn't going into Lao hands. He had cut out programs for medicines, for example. The Ministry of Health and the Veterinary Ministry - medicines weren't getting to the people; the money was going into the hands of the health officials. And Mendenhall was death on corruption, and I really admired him for that, but he got the local Lao officials very upset with him.

Next came Charlie Mann, an old-time AID bureaucrat, and he died six months or so ago. He was a road-builder. He liked roads projects. He didn't worry about corruption; he worried about getting along with the government. When I discussed the two AID directors and my judgment about them as to whether they were good or not, I would always point out that Charlie Mann didn't seem to be concerned about corruption. He'd talk about his program. On the other hand, Joe Mendenhall was always aware of corruption and always on the lookout to prevent it, to reduce it to a minimum, to keep a watch out for it. So I used to tell people that the difference between the two AID directors was that Joe Mendenhall was so good he was bad, because resources weren't coming into the country nearly as much as they should have. Charlie Mann was so bad he was good, because there was a lot of waste under him, but there was a need for resources to come into the country, and they were coming in.

A lot of his favorite projects out in the boondocks got overrun. They would be evaluated as good projects that somehow because of enemy activity got overrun. I would say that Joe Mendenhall was much more aware of political-military stuff and more careful about where the projects got put. Mendenhall's biggest project was to try to get the Lao to grow more rice, because they could easily feed themselves on the rice they were producing. If we could get them to grow two crops of rice a year, which would have been easy if they tried, then they could sell one crop and it would be a good income for the country. The idea was great, but it was very difficult to sell, because the Lao didn't want to grow another crop. They were satisfied with the status quo. It was a very peaceful, wonderful, beautiful country with happy people.

Basically, even though there was a war going on, the Lao - and of course the Meo were suffering badly - the Lao people were very happy. It didn't seem to bother them whatever their political or religious beliefs, if it was up to them, they were happy. The basic term in the language is, mo pin yan, which means "It doesn't matter." So whenever anything would happen, they said mo pin yan, it doesn't matter. I remember we had a maid working for us, and her father died. And I said to her when she came back from being away for a couple of weeks, "I'm very sorry to hear that your father died." She said, "Oh, mo pin yan. It doesn't matter."

The Buddhists - in most religions there are apparently two branches, the strict observers and the loose observers, but of the Buddhists the Lao are definitely the loose observers. We lived just 200 yards from a sacred place for the Buddhists. A holy place is a wat, but this was a that. It's like the difference between their cathedral and a chapel. And a that had to have some relic of Buddha. I've forgotten what it was, but they had a relic of the Buddha, a fingernail or a hair or something, in there. And people used to be streaming by. These monks used to go by our house with these saffron robes and begging bowls, and on feast days the maids would put candles out. They would light the whole house up with candles every couple of yards. It was nice. It was a very nice culture, very nice society, and the people were very nice.

They're coming back now, I guess, but it will always be a backwater. It's a landlocked country, and they were exploited by the Thais while we were there. Anything they shipped through, they were terrible about it. I'm sure, the Vietnamese will also take advantage of them.

They had a feast every year called the Water Feast. At the beginning of the morning the maid would come around and they would bless us with this equivalent of holy water. They would throw a couple of drops on you. Then you would grab the container and throw a couple of drops back, and before it was over, everybody was tossing buckets over everybody else's head. That was done all over. It was the silliest thing. And they had boat races. It was the first country I ever went to that I really did have culture shock. It took a little getting used to. But once we got used to it, we really did like it, and we left with a certain regret. But because of schools, we got out.

Q: You then came back in what, '70?

MARTIN: '70, yes.

Q: '70, and were with the Office of Economic Opportunity [OEO] for how long?

MARTIN: I was there from '70 to '71. I was in and out. I'll come to that. Anyway, as I mentioned, because I was a lawyer, they offered me a chance to be in a legal services project in San Francisco, not a practicing but a bureaucratic attorney, supervising grants. But I said no, because I would only be there two years, and I wanted to go somewhere where my son could finish high school. I said, "Poverty Program, yes; San Francisco, no." So they said okay, and they sent me over to OEO. There were something like 50 foreign service people in the Poverty Program at that time, and when I went there they offered me three jobs. One was state government liaison. Another was disaster planning and support. And the third was in the legal services program itself. I took that. That made me the only Foreign Service officer in the Poverty Program who was not under the control or general supervision of Frank Carlucci. He was the head of the community services side of the Poverty Program, and the legal services program didn't come under him.

While I was there we were inspected. A woman inspector named Gladys Rogers came over and said to me, "Well, the competition over here isn't as great." I was doing very well. I had some kind of report that was great. In fact, it was an outstanding report. There were really top flight people working there.

I was a supervising attorney for the Great Lakes and southwest regions. The Great Lakes region was based in Chicago; the southwest, in Dallas. Their job was to issue grants or supervise the grants issued to these various Legal Aid Societies and their legal services projects in local communities. We were there supervising them. I was basically an inspector. I couldn't go to any places in my region, in southwest or Great Lakes, so I stayed away from Texas and New Mexico and also the Midwest, but I did inspections to see whether projects should be funded for another year in places like Utica, New York, and Boston, San José, California, Portland, Oregon, Monterey, California. It was a lot of fun traveling around the United States and talking with the local community poverty people, because the whole idea was to get poor people involved in the solution of their own poverty. Ultimately, the project was not really successful. The legal services program was bad because they were suing everybody.

Q: I was wondering, I interviewed Frank Carlucci. He said the Legal Services Program caused a lot of grief for the Department because they put themselves in the position of being opposed to the government, on government pay.

MARTIN: Right. It was really, as I say, a new approach.

Q: Did you have trouble getting the lawyers in your area to understand the situation, to be effective but not to challenge to such an extent that they'd blow the whole thing up.

MARTIN: They didn't blow the whole thing up, because there is a legal system, and the legal system does put limits on things, but when you hear about some of the cases they prosecuted, you can't believe it. I inspected a place in Idaho, one of our programs there, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service had a policy that if you turned in an illegal immigrant, there were no questions asked of how you got that information or whether you had participated in the illegality yourself.

You had migrant laborers in Oregon coming in to work in Idaho. They would take these guys in, and usually a Hispanic guy had the contract with a local farmer that he would provide labor, and they got so much an hour for their work. If they stayed through the harvest, they got extra. So they got like \$1.10 an hour, and if they stayed through the harvest, they got \$1.50 an hour for all the hours they worked. So what these bastards were doing, it would turn anybody into a radical. What they would do was hire a whole gang of guys, let them work, and when it got close to the harvest, they would call in the Immigration and Naturalization Service and say all those guys in those barracks are illegal aliens. The INS would round them up, put them on a bus, and ship them back to Mexico. I mean, that is thievery, yet, it was legal.

We were fighting that kind of stuff. They had programs going around the country really protecting poor people from being exploited by farmers in various ways. There were places in the United States where there would be school districts in the state, and some school districts were rich, and some were poor. The taxes in the rich district enabled the school there to be excellent. In the poor neighborhood, the taxes wouldn't cover that and the schools were lousy. There was a lawsuit, and it's now federal law, that goes against that. In a state, the money has to go more or less equally on a per capita basis.

Another example, if you had moved into a new town to the right side of the river and you called up the phone company, it put a phone in, and you pay your phone bill at the end of the month. But not if you were black. If you went into the black side of town, then you had to pay a deposit before you could get a phone. I'm sure it was true that it was more likely people in that neighborhood didn't pay their phone bill and skipped town. It's unfair to do that in advance without having any experience, so we stopped that. We had lawsuits to prevent that everywhere across the country. We were suing electric companies. We were suing telephone companies and gas companies for just this kind of stuff, which I think is definitely unfair. So the Legal Services Project did a lot of good.

On the other hand, they did have these crazy lawyers who were out to save the world according to their lights. I had a friend (we still are friends with him), a guy named Jack Cushman, who was three-star general in the United States army, a troop commander in Korea later on. He had just come back from Vietnam. He was there three times, twice at that time, and he was commander of Fort Devens.

Q: Outside of Boston.

MARTIN: When I went to Boston to inspect the program, we always looked at the lawsuits going. They were suing my friend Jack Cushman. Why? Because the lawyer was basically against the draft. He had found this person who didn't meet the standards to be helped by the Legal Services Program in the first place. Because the kid apparently wanted to get out of the draft and the day he was drafted he changed his mind, wanted to get out, and they were representing him and suing the commanding general of Fort Devens. So there were extremists. There were cases going too far.

A good program can easily go too far. We were suing Vice-President Agnew. We were suing governors all over the place. That's the way you do get change if you accepted the principle that Joe Califano tried to instill.

Q: He was Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.

MARTIN: Health, Education and Welfare. But more than that, he was the originator of the whole domestic program under President Johnson. If you accept the premises that something had to be done to help black people, we were doing something.

Carlucci, of course, was our enemy. The head was Rumsfeld. Carlucci's idea was that the Community Services Program would have the Legal Services Program under it. But we didn't accept that. We could say that the lawyer-client privilege makes it impossible to have us representing people if we are all in one agency. They wanted to have a one-stop system, where you would go to a Community Services project, to get legal assistance if you needed it or to get some medical care at a hospital or something like that. But no, the program was good, and we were independent. Every agency in the government had to have an advisory council. But Terry Lindsner, the head of our program, was a real fighter. Whenever we were in trouble with Rumsfeld and Carlucci at a crisis point he would call for a meeting of the advisory council, which was headed by the man who later investigated President Nixon.

Q: Cox?

MARTIN: No. The head of our advisory council was the head of the American Bar Association. He would come in and he would give a blessing to whatever Legal Services was doing.

You asked, was it hard working there? There was one time when it was hard, because the lawyers - this is the 1960's generation - wanted to go on strike! And so I said, "Look, I'm a Foreign Service officer. I'm with you and all that, but I'm not striking." So I went over to Personnel, and I said, "Look, you may have to pull me out of there because they're about to go on strike." They never called it a strike; they called it a "sick-in" or something like that. Nobody showed up. At that time a guy came in who was a Republican from Pennsylvania. He had been attorney general, a great guy, Fred Speaker. He had become famous by pulling the electric plug out of the electric chair in Pennsylvania because he was opposed to the death penalty. Still he was also a rather conservative guy, and he would try to get the program channeled only into good things rather than good plus some things that were really rather crazy. Carlucci had a point, but he was wrong overall, I would say.

The program is still going. It has been trimmed back and back, but it's good because everywhere we went, when we evaluated a program, the bar was in favor of it. They wanted federal money to come in to provide legal assistance for poor people so that they wouldn't have to. For example, say a poor young woman had a baby, and she'd go to apply for welfare. They'd say, "Well, who's the father of the baby?" She knew who the father was. Had she sued him? No, she hadn't. Before you could qualify, in a place like Ohio, you had to go after the father of the child and make him pay. If the bar wasn't supported by federal money employing lawyers to do that, then because the person really needed help, the judge would assign some lawyer in the community to represent this woman to sue in a paternity case and qualify for welfare. So we were doing crazy things but also absolutely necessary things. There was big support, and that's why the program is still going through Republican and Democratic governments, although they try to restrict it as much as they can. The legal services project is a part of the landscape.

Q: You left there when? In '71?

MARTIN: I got pulled out of there because there was something going on up in New York. There was an outfit called the Jewish Defense League, run by Rabbi Kahane. He was a right-wing fanatic, and his idea was to cause as much grief to the Russians as possible and to some of the Arab embassies, too, because the Russians were not letting Jews out of Russia. They were always campaigning, "Let my people go." Eventually there was a threat the Russians were supporting to move the United Nations from New York, which we didn't want to happen. These guys would be demonstrating and throwing themselves in front of cars and the police were bringing them to court and losing. In one case, a guy from our UN Mission went into the court and was writing down the names of the jurors. The guy was not a lawyer and he didn't realize what he was doing. The defense lawyer for this Jewish Defense League group said, "Who is that writing down these names, and what is he doing?" because they suspected that the State Department didn't like what they were doing. The Department said, we've got to get somebody up there who's going to know what he's doing and we don't get the law enforcement community in a public relations bind.

Q: Well, one of the problems, I suppose, was that almost any jury would contain some Jews in it, and it would be presented in the same way that a decade earlier if you had a white up against a black opponent, the white would always win with the jury.

MARTIN: Sure. In fact, they would poll the jury, and then they would say, "How did you vote? How did you vote?" We had one occasion where I remember one woman juror said, "I would never under any circumstances find a rabbi guilty of anything. I couldn't do that." She let herself get on the jury. She should have said something beforehand.

My job was to go up there and establish liaison with the law enforcement community in New York, since I'm from Brooklyn and I went to Columbia Law School and was a member of the Bar. I was really an ideal candidate.

I went around. I saw judges, and I saw the US attorney in the Southern District and in the Eastern District - that's Brooklyn, where a lot of the cases took place - and I saw the district attorney, Frank Hogan, a famous district attorney (the court house is named after him), and the district attorney in Brooklyn, a guy who jumped off a building. All these judges, whether they were Jewish or not, and not just the jurors, but the political community, were very nervous about this, because the FBI and the New York City police had arrested something like 500 people. Usually these were college kids or high school kids who were under the control of Rabbi Kahane. He had only a few fanatics that were close to him. They really were fanatics.

Q: They were dangerous, too. I mean, they were not -

MARTIN: They were not fooling around. They had arms. When I first went up there, I went to see the people in the US attorney's office in the Southern District there. The FBI guys were at the meeting, and said, "Look, we know about these 500, and those cases are being delayed, postponed, and nothing's happening on them, but we'll keep trying. Those are like mosquito bites. We do have one case going against Rabbi Kahane, and believe us, we're working on it." So I guess I was up there about two months, and they did make an arrest, and then they had a negotiation with Rabbi Kahane's lawyers, where he agreed that everybody would go free except himself and about five or so of his fanatic supporters.

Kahane had a paramilitary camp up in the Catskills where he was training these guys in military stuff, to be terrorists. He had dynamite there, stolen from construction sites, and there were some explosions. What I didn't know and I learned later, is that every stick of dynamite in the United States has a number on it, and if it goes off, very often they recover it. That's why they're gathering all the evidence. They're looking for the number on the stick of dynamite or some such number on a pistol so they can trace it. He had 93 sticks of dynamite left out of a cache of about a hundred, and part of the deal was that the dynamite would be turned over to the FBI. It was done in a way that they would take the dynamite to a certain place. The FBI was following them and picked it up. That was part of the agreement, and nobody was going to get any blame. The case came up before Judge Jack B. Weinstein, who is a liberal. He used to teach at Columbia Law School. Right now he won't sentence anybody in a drug case. He won't handle a drug case because he thinks that the mandatory sentencing laws are ridiculous, and I fully agree with him. He was handling that case, and it was all negotiated. They pleaded guilty, and the question was, what kind of supervision will Rabbi Kahane be under because he was going to be sentenced to five years on probation, on good behavior? The question was, can he go to Israel or not? Just at that time, it happened Ambassador Beam was here. I had been reporting because my pitch, wherever I went, was, there's something in diplomacy called reciprocity. Every time Rabbi Kahane's hooligans smash a Russian's car, one of ours gets smashed in Moscow.

Q: Yes, the KGB people were breaking our cars and beating up our people.

MARTIN: Yes. They respond but they would not testify. To finish Rabbi Kahane, he pleaded guilty with a few of his people. They were on probation. Ambassador Beam had come to the UN at that time -

Q: Ambassador Beam had been Moscow.

MARTIN: He was ambassador to Moscow, and he happened to be in New York for some business, and we had lunch with him. He knew me slightly because he had been in EUR when I was in EUR, very early, during the Hungarian time, and so he knew me by sight. I went up to him, and said, "The question here is, what is the Department's position on Rabbi Kahane going to Israel because he'll be under the supervision of his probation officer, and he's going to ask for permission to go to Israel. They're going to ask what the State Department thinks, and what is our position?" He said, "Let him go. Let him go. Let him go." I said okay. I conveyed that, but I didn't go to court because they wanted me to do this very quietly. They knew the State Department was trying to do something. They didn't know who or what.

I got a terrific report out of Charlie Brower, who was the legal advisor in EUR at that time, because I must say myself, it was very successful. They used to have demonstrations right outside the SMUN, the Soviet Mission to the UN, and I had recommended we appeal a case to stop them and we won on appeal. Charlie Brower said to me, "Where did that idea for appealing come from?" I said, "Well, I thought it was a good idea, and I talked to Ambassador Bush, and he said yes, let's do it." We appealed, and we won.

I become friendly with the head of security at the Soviet mission to the UN. People said he was a Soviet brigadier general. He was very friendly with me, and I was always talking with him about security and how we could protect them, because the anti-Russians were causing them lots of trouble. A lot of the Russians used to rent places in Rockaway Beach.

Q: Yes.

MARTIN: It just happened that very often they were owned by Jews, and so they were being harassed. Their cars were being trashed; air being let out of tires, that kind of stuff. We were trying to help them. Another thing they were doing was funny. They would put an ad in the paper for a massage parlor, "Try Olga for a good massage. \$10." which is much cheaper than the usual price. It was a number of the Russian Mission to the UN. The phone would be all jammed up. Another thing they did was to go to a store, like Bloomingdale's because a lot of Russians used to shop at Bloomingdale's. They used to get caught shoplifting there, but that was another problem for our mission at the UN. They would order stuff and have it sent to the Soviet mission. Nobody there had ordered it, so they'd have a whole bunch of packages being delivered and the department store wanted it paid for.

The telephone problem was serious and the Russians talked to me about it. I called up the telephone company, and they said, "Oh, yes, annoyance calls. Call the annoyance call division. All you have to do is tell them that you're having trouble. The annoyance call division will arrange, if you agree, for the phone to be tapped, and when a call is made, if it's coming from the same district, then we can trace it right away. If it's coming from another district it takes a minute because we have to know what district and in that district we trace it there. But we can do it." I got the guy from the telephone company to come with me to the Soviet mission. He gave his permission for the telephone company to tap his wire. I went back to the US mission, and by the time I got back there, they were looking for me. The DCM - there were like five ambassadors - the DCM wanted to see me right away, as soon as I came in. And so I went up, and he said, "We just got a message; the DCM at the Soviet mission to the UN is saying, no, they do not give permission to have their phones tapped by the American T & T or New York Telephone Company. I actually got permission. When I told our security officer this, he got very nervous. He said, "Do you know what you're doing?" I said, "Sure I know what they were doing, and I think that's really great that he gave his okay and that they will do it."

When that was over, I went back to my job in the Poverty Program, but before we leave that I want to say one thing of a personal nature. When I went up there, I didn't realize it, but it was the last five months of my father's life. I was aware he had cancer at that time. I used to fly up on Monday. I'd get to my office, actually, earlier than I did other days, and then Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday nights I would stay with my family in Brooklyn, so I'd be with my father. He would hang on for the day I'd come home, and we'd have a beer together and talk. It was almost providential that I was able to do that, and I really, somehow I appreciated that the Department of State had sent me up there. I thought that was great to be with my father during the last days of his life. When I left there it was his last month.

I came back for a short time to the Poverty Program. The thing had been a big success up in New York, and the Department was establishing a grievance system. They were worried because a Foreign Service officer had committed suicide after something that should have been in his file didn't get in, and some stuff that shouldn't have been in his file did get in. I think he had been selected out, and he couldn't find a job, and he eventually committed suicide. He had a widow who was also a very dramatic type. She testified before a congressional committee.

Q: It was John Thomas, I think.

MARTIN: John Thomas, yes.

Q: His wife is Cynthia Thomas

MARTIN: Cynthia Thomas, and I remember there was a dramatic exchange between her and Congressman Wayne Hayes. I think she had studied dramatics. She was very effective in her presentation of what happened to her husband, which was a tragedy. Hayes interrupted her and said, "Look, Madam, people lose their jobs every day in this country. That's no reason to commit suicide." It was something rather shocking to say. On the other hand, he was making a point.

Q: Well, if I recall, John Thomas had been selected out, and it was a year later when he did this, so this was not done under shock or something like that.

MARTIN: No, that's right. As I result the Department was preparing to create some sort of a grievance system. First they established some ad hoc panels to look at what they considered to be extreme cases, as they thought the Thomas case would have been because it was based on an incorrect record. But that got out of hand almost immediately. These ad hoc panels were recommending that people get promoted and were promoting people. After three or four cases of people getting promoted, the rest of the system got upset. So they set up grievance regulations, and everybody in the Service, more or less, had an opportunity to submit a grievance over anything that had ever happened to them, and there was a certain deadline for that. A lot of grievances were submitted.

And Earl Ritchie was the director. I worked for Earl Ritchie. There were just the two of us, and at that time they would talk about having an ombudsman in the State Department, and he, Earl Ritchie, was the ombudsman, too. I was the deputy chief of the grievance staff; I was not a deputy ombudsman. There was only one ombudsman. That quickly died, because the grievance staff quickly took over what an ombudsman might do.

We would get a case, analyze it, and send it up to Bob Brewster, who was the deputy director general (he was later ambassador in Latin America). I had tremendous admiration for him. He was very fair. He would get a file. I would summarize the file and the person's grievance, and Earl Ritchie would okay it. We'd send it up to Brewster, and he would come down approving it. Before it went up a level, it would go to the legal advisor, a guy named Knut Mamborg, who was the legal advisor really for administrative and personnel matters.

There was a popular opinion among Foreign Service people, that all these soreheads and complainers were coming in with a lot of grievances. I only saw one case in the whole time I was there - I was there about 18 months - that I would call frivolous. Every other case was fair, and some of them were really outrageous.

Some of them were funny in a way. In one case, a guy was complaining he hadn't been promoted, and that there was a lot of stuff in his file that shouldn't have been. If you looked at his file, you could see what was happening, and Brewster had said we're not going to approve it. At one point, there were these confidential things that an ambassador could adhere could be a two-part efficiency report. Some of it was confidential. It was supposed to be consistent with the other. Well, lots of times it wasn't. Also there were comments about the wife in the efficiency report. In this case the guy's wife was haunting him in the file even though he was divorced from her. When you read the file, you thought, "I'll bet you that's why he didn't get promoted." You couldn't be sure. The boards are separate but you could just see somebody reading his file and reading a file of somebody else with an equal career - somehow this guy's file didn't look as good, and it was because of this wife. First, she used to dress in a very provocative way. Inspectors, everybody commented that she dressed provocatively. She apparently was flirtatious. She was so flirtatious that when this guy was away on a trip, she came to the attention of the FBI because of people visiting her apartment. We laughed about that, but in that case we really couldn't do very much because the comments about the wife had already been put in.

Most of the time it was just people not following the regulations about efficiency reports, because the efficiency report requires the supervisor twice during the rating period to have a consultation discussion about the person's performance. If they didn't do that, they would defend themselves, saying, "Oh, I'm his supervisor, I see him every day." But that's not a discussion of performance. Very often they wouldn't say anything, and then the efficiency report would come around, and they said stuff that they shouldn't have said or they should have brought to the guy's attention, to let the guy do something about it.

One thing that Bob Brewster decided very early was that we were not going to promote anybody. We would not recommend that anybody get promoted. We would try to do what we could to establish a better record on the person. Usually it meant taking out a one-year report and the person would get an extra year in grade. It didn't really help too much because there was a feeling that maybe the boards, when they saw these blanks (they were supposed to disregard them), would figure that the stuff was taken out for good reason, which was always the case. There was a feeling that maybe this would be hurtful for the rated officer. But we were not going to promote anybody. If anybody got promoted, they got promoted by the Foreign Service Grievance Board, because the staff was the Department of State's opportunity to establish a grievance, but we were not going to promote anybody, even though it might seem unfair that they had not been promoted. They could always appeal to the board, and the board could promote, and in a few cases - not very many - they did promote people. I think the system is a very good system, and that it works.

We also had some allowances cases and we had people complaining about travel, how they had traveled in a certain way and the Department made them pay. But most of them were about career problems and efficiency report problems. We could help the person by taking the adverse report out, giving them an extra year, but that's all we could do. After a while we could pretty much tell what the board was likely to do. I think that our recommendations stood up. Now the board, when they rated the Department's grievance staff, they didn't rate us formally, but they commented on the Department's reaction to the grievance system. The man had been in charge of the Federal Mediation Board and was a very distinguished labor lawyer, and he was a nice person too. He said, "You know, the Department of State in handling this whole grievance problem had been good losers." They accepted, and they did things for people.

Oh, yes, I was surprised at how they handled allowances. We had one case of a fellow who was divorced from his wife, he was overseas, and she was overseas, and he claimed and was getting an education allowance for their child. The education allowance was the equivalent of his alimony payments, and he said he was paying his alimony, and he was getting away with it. It wasn't Paris and Brussels, but just say the kid was living in Brussels with his mother and would come to Paris to visit the father, and the education allowance would be used - as it is ordinarily - to send the kid away to school and come home, and all that. He tried to get the allowance when he went to his next post. The budget and fiscal officer said no. He figured, "I was getting it at the last post. I think I'm justified to get it." So he put in for it, and it came up, and I went to the allowances people. We talked about it, and the lawyer said, you know, "You're right. He's not entitled to it because he's not the guardian of the child. He's the father, but not the guardian." That he was using it for alimony was pretty brassy on his part. He got turned down. The board supported us. I said to the allowances people, "This was unjustified. The first time it was unjustified, and the second time he didn't get anything, so are we going to collect from him for that?" They said, no, we'll let it go. They said, the only time the allowances people do anything is if the General Accounting Office questions it. I was surprised at how lenient they were.

I stayed there until 1973. I was transferred to Vienna, 1973 to '76. In Vienna I was the director of the East-West Trade Center. This was the time of detente, and up until then (and I had done that kind of work when I was in Zagreb and in other places too) we were doing export controls, trying to prevent trade with the East. Now there was a switch. We were trying to promote trade with the East. Trade centers were big with the Department of Commerce, and they were coming up with the idea that there should be more State participation. They shouldn't be exclusively Department of Commerce operated trade centers doing catalogue shows and strictly trade promotion. There should be some State control over it.

In Moscow it was exclusively State, but in Vienna it was supposed to be a joint effort. My deputy was a Civil Service guy who had been in the Department of Commerce. He was Danish but spoke German and had spent his life doing shows, putting on exhibits, and he would travel in the East, because the Communist countries were big on trade fairs. We would have exhibits at these trade fairs, and he would go a couple of weeks earlier to set it up. We had something called a modular system, which you could put on the back of a truck and go and assemble it and have an exhibit. He was good at that, and in Vienna he set up a system of information and trade promotion to help American companies that wanted to do business with the East. They were encouraged to come to us.

I had a fellow doing market research on different countries. You can't do market research in the East, but he had a system by which he developed a judgment as to what he believed the market would be by figuring what American exports to the OECD were and that if we had 10 per cent share of the OECD market, we should have a 10 per cent share of the market in Eastern Europe and Moscow. He did a whole lot of stuff on that and came up with a whole lot of information and judgments about what the market for, say, refrigerators would be in Hungary. Some people thought it was kind of silly, but he could produce a lot of paper saying that we have a market for widgets in Russia or the Soviet Union, with \$12, 432,000.15. The guy couldn't realize that that's a nonsense number. You can come up with something that's ballpark, but the way he did it, he would come up with a precise number, and then he would stick with it.

I stayed there for three years. My wife's mother was born in Vienna. Her family owned a villa, which was about five blocks away from where we lived in the 13th District, which is Issing, the classical residential district in Vienna, equivalent to the 16th arrondissement in Paris. If you didn't live right down by the Hofburg, the 13th was where to live. Most Americans lived in the 18th or 19th Districts, which was where the American School was. People didn't want to live in the 13th District, although the ambassador lived there and we had one other villa there. We had basically two apartments, because nobody wanted to live in the downstairs. There was a basement apartment and a first-floor apartment, and so we had, really, two apartments. We could have people in. The furniture was classical furniture that had come from the embassy in Paris. It was really a great setup.

My children went to school in Vienna. My wife used to drive them. The nuns at that school were some of the same nuns my wife had had when she went to the Sacred Heart School in Budapest as a girl. During the time of persecution in Hungary these nuns were told to go back to their houses, they were not nuns any more. But the Vatican somehow was able to negotiate and get them all out to Vienna where they reconstituted the group. Since the number of nuns was declining, even then, most of the nuns in these various schools were Hungarian.

My wife used to work in the study hall as a volunteer teaching the kids English and math (because my wife has a degree in chemistry, and she's very good in math). They don't have the same church and state situation that we have. Even though they're nuns, These teachers are all licensed under Austrian law. It was very much Hungarian nuns, and they liked my wife, because she was Hungarian. There was an opening for a teacher doing what my wife did as a volunteer in the study hall. The nun in charge of the school said, "There's an opening. Why don't you go down and apply for that job?" And she said, "But they're complaining that there are too many Hungarians here." "Don't tell them you're Hungarian." Well, my wife went down and applied, and the man was very polite to her and listened to her and accepted her as qualified and approved her to be a teacher in the Austrian schools. And then he escorted her to the door to say goodbye, and he said, "Mrs. Martin, you're really Hungarian, aren't you?" He knew.

A lot of my ideas of how women should be treated in this country come from Austria. They have a shortage of people there very often. When the economy is booming, they allow refugees and immigrants to come in. When the economy turns down, they try to get rid of them. But one of the things, they do is try to get women out of the families into the workforce. Here you have to have 40 quarters of employment to qualify for Social Security; there a housewife, while she's a housewife, qualifies for Social Security. I think we should have that here, and all the family allowances they have there.

Q: In the East-West Trade Center, did you have much contact with the East?

MARTIN: I traveled all the way to the East and the East was very interested in us. We were right next door to the office of a Russian delegation to international organizations. Right across the park, a few blocks away, was the Russian embassy, and it was headed by somebody who was a member of the Central Committee in Moscow. All their key ambassadors, generally speaking, including the guy who was here, Dobrynin, were members of the Central Committee and so was this guy. The Russians from the Soviet Union, officials, would come in. Let's say we had a catalogue show for three weeks. They'd have a guy come in every day for three weeks and copy stuff out of our catalogues. They were using it as an information database. I had this guy from the Department of Commerce. He had a secretary, and then we had people who were in the Commercial Section. We had two of them working for me; the one from the Department of Commerce, the market research guy I spoke of, worked for me, too.

I had a secretary. It was always hard to find secretaries because the educational system in Vienna trains people in languages, but not in typing. Or they train people in typing but not in languages. To find somebody who knew English and who could type was not very easy. I had to fire somebody who just couldn't type a letter. It would take her all day hunting and pecking like this to do one letter. I got another secretary who was very nice but she wasn't there too long. I got a call to see the security officer. He said, "You know, that person working for you. I didn't want to believe it when I first saw it, so I had it checked out again." He said, "But there's no doubt. She's an Israeli spy." So we had to get rid of her. I said - you know, she's a very nice person, middle aged lady, Catholic, married to a Jewish guy. She was going on leave in about two weeks, "I'll wait until then." He said okay. When she was going on vacation, I said, I want to see you before you go on vacation after work today. She came in to see me. Everybody had gone home. I said, "You know, I like you very much, and I want you to know that we appreciate all the work you've done for us. People like you here." She looked kind of glad. I said, "That's what makes it very difficult for me to tell you what I have to tell you. We're going to have to let you go. I can't tell you specifically why because I don't know specifically why, but I've been told that we can't retain you as an employee here." She cried, and then she left. She knew what I was saying. She did not argue with me. She knew why she couldn't work there. She was a middle-aged woman, past the age of having a baby. She came in some time later after she had gone and said, "You know, I told people that I had a baby and gave it up for adoption while I was away, and that's why I had to stay away."

We had about 50 American companies come to us, and I described our relationship with the East and gave them pointers. We also were getting after the people in the embassies in the East that they should be promoting trade more actively, because this was the time of detente. Our ambassador was great, John P. Humes. Whenever they mentioned him in the paper, they'd always add that he had contributed \$100,000 to the Nixon campaign when he was in the primaries. It was true, but he was also a very good ambassador in that he realized that what he could do would be promote trade and representation. He never got too much into the political. The political reporting from Vienna wasn't all that interesting to him.

Cardinal Mindszenty left Hungary at that time and went to Rome, but I guess he didn't want to stay in Rome, or maybe they didn't want him to stay either, so he came back to Vienna. He had been in effect a prisoner in the American embassy in Budapest, and here he was right next door to us, because what had been the consular academy was our embassy in Vienna and it was right across the street from the university, and right next to it was something called the Pazmaneum, which was a residence college for Hungarian priests studying at the University of Vienna at one time. We didn't really have contact with him, and he died a couple of years later. He was operated on for a prostate problem, and then I guess he threw a clot and died the next day.

I traveled around Austria, and I went to Moscow twice. I went to all the countries. At the mission in West Berlin was a guy named Felix Bloch.

Q: Oh, yes.

MARTIN: And Felix Bloch came down to Vienna a couple of times, and something interesting happened. I kid with people or I say some outrageously things at times. The two of us were walking on Karntnerstrasse, and he went in and bought these brandy snifters at this famous place where they sell glass and crystal in Vienna. These were gigantic brandy snifters, he bought a dozen of them. I said, "Hey, Felix, what are you doing? You can't afford that." I couldn't afford to buy them. He looked at me in a strange way, kind of shocked. But I was just talking, and I didn't say anything to anybody. Later on they said they traced him back to the '70's, and I'm sure he must have been doing something when he came through there.

Q: We're talking about Felix Bloch who was later deputy chief of mission in Vienna and was accused - he still hasn't been convicted - -and dismissed from the Service for being paid by the Soviets.

MARTIN: Right. I knew Felix quite well, and the two of us went to the Leipzig fair. I spent three days with him that time, so I knew Felix quite well. He was a close friend of Henry Bardach, who was the chief of the Economic Section there. And he used to stay with Henry when he came to Vienna. When the thing broke, Henry is not the kind of person you want in a firefight on your side. I said to him, "Hey, Henry, your friend Felix Bloch's in trouble." He said, "Your friend, your friend."

Q: Well, to give Henry due credit, he landed in a glider on D-Day.-

MARTIN: By mistake. He landed a glider on D-Day because he didn't volunteer to be a paratrooper, and they said, "You guys that didn't volunteer to be paratroopers, you're going to be in the gliders."

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Q: Today is the 12th of April of 1999. Doug, it's 1976; you're off to Ankara. You were in Ankara from when to when?

MARTIN: I was there from 1976 to 1978.

Q: What was your job?

MARTIN: I was the deputy secretary general for economic affairs in CENTO, the Central Treaty Organization.

Q: Let's talk about CENTO in '76. What was the status of CENTO, and then the importance, and what you were doing?

MARTIN: You can't talk about CENTO in '76 without going back to its establishment as part of the Baghdad Pact. In the mind of Secretary Dulles, the Baghdad Pact was going to be part of the ring around the Soviet Union for the security of the United States. But the Baghdad Pact presented problems in several ways. First, the Arab countries perceived it as a reestablishment of the old Turkish Empire, so they were suspicious of it. It died because before Iraq tried to join, there was a coup and the king of Iraq was assassinated.

Q: July 14, 1958.

MARTIN: So the participation of Arab countries in the Baghdad Pact never took place. Another factor was Israel. The United States understood that if we established an alliance with some Arab countries, then the Israelis would want something countervailing. They would want us to be in some sort of alliance with them. That wasn't going to work out. But there was a need for something in that area of the world, because on one end you had Turkey, which was a part of NATO, and at the other end was going to be Pakistan, which was a part, I believe, of SEATO. That was to be the connection from SEATO to CENTO to NATO, so you had a security ring of alliances around the Soviet Union.

Because of these various objections, we never actually were members of CENTO. However, through some complicated legal arrangement, that Secretary Dulles was able to work out, we were members of every committee of CENTO. We were members of the Economic Committee, and I was the deputy secretary general for economic affairs. We were members of the Military Committee, and the Military Committee was ruled by a council, which consisted of five three-star generals, and the military implementation of CENTO was under the leadership of an American major general. Both these jobs rotated between air force and army. My colleague was Major General Healy, who had been in charge of special forces in Vietnam, a wonderful person.

In a sense, CENTO almost died a-borning, and though it did survive, and many thought of it as moribund. By the time I got there, there had been a war between India and Pakistan. Pakistan, being a member of CENTO, expected the other CENTO countries to come to their aid, but this wasn't going to happen and didn't happen. Instead we said, "Work that out among yourselves; work it out with the Indians." The Pakistanis were unhappy with CENTO from then on, and the organization was tied up in a situation where they could not agree on the political guidance. The Pakistanis wanted to have an agreement on a policy that would require the other countries to come to Pakistan's aid. Even though we tilted against India, we did not come to their aid with troops or arms or any other supplies. And they were unhappy with that. So the political guidance couldn't be agreed on, and the alliance just kept going along.

I was one of the only people, and the military too who were engaged in something called "region building." We were trying to connect up the three countries: Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, and then the U.S. and the British. We were trying to connect up their communications, transportation, and through any projects that would enable them to cooperate with each other.

For example, in the field of air transportation, we used to run an air traffic control program every year and send people from the three countries to London to the Air Traffic Control School. I went there myself. We had a conference on air traffic control and the problems of air traffic control in that area. We also did a lot of road building. There was transportation coming down from Europe through Turkey to Iran, because at that time there was a lot of economic activity between the US and Iran and Europe and Iran. The Turks were not interested in helping Iranian trade with Western Europe, so they just neglected the roads. As the roads got closer and closer to Iran, going through Turkey, they got worse and worse. We were doing some road building, trying to improve the road connections. We were trying to improve the ferry traffic connection across Lake Van. We also had a project to improve the communications microwave link across Turkey to Iran and Pakistan.

The military people had exercises every year. They'd have a small-infantry-unit cooperative exercise where the five countries would send units and compete with each other. There was a naval exercise every year. The Pakistanis had a submarine, and they would try to chase after some of the Iranian ships during this naval exercise, testing their anti-submarine capabilities and the abilities of the submarine to evade and attack.

We had a science program going, and that was headed by a British scientist who was in Teheran. We were funding a program in dental health, trying to study the effects of fluorine on people's teeth because for some strange reason, the highest concentration of fluoride in the world in water is found in the Aras River, right at the eastern end of Turkey, and the river runs into Iran. So we had some Turkish scientists and some Iranian scientists taking samples from the river and seeing what the effect was on the animals, the cows and cattle, that drank from river. It was being done by an American scientist from the University of Rochester Dental School. They were doing a double-blind study. The Turks didn't have the equipment, didn't have the funds, and the Iranians had everything. Yet the Turkish results seemed to be better and stood up better than the Iranian results.

Another important part of the job was conferences and meetings, in the three countries. I got a great chance to travel throughout the region and also to London, when the committees had their annual meetings. I got a chance to go to Shiraz. I traveled all around Iran. We had a meeting of the secretary general, a top meeting, in Iran one year, and we went to a state dinner given by the Shah of Iran, although he didn't appear at the state dinner; so we didn't actually meet him. We traveled down to Persepolis, which was where Iran the previous year had had a celebration of its 5,000th year. It was unbelievable to see this tent city that had been built, air conditioned tents, but also Persepolis is a marvelous place, celebrating the victory of the Persians 5,000 years ago. Darius defeated somebody.

I traveled throughout the region and also to London, but never got to the United States, because one year when the meeting was going to be held in the United States, it conflicted with a NATO meeting that was taking place.

I traveled all over Pakistan, and became quite familiar with the place. They were very interested in getting a \$500,000 microwave link from us. We wanted it to happen, but it never did. Turkey was a fascinating country for anybody who has even the slightest sense of history. It's where it all started. Everybody in Europe came across the steppes of Russia and either went north around the Black Sea or through Turkey. Yet people didn't know much about it because there's nothing about Turkey in the Bible. They talk about Asia Minor, and a lot happened there, not just the Christian religion but also earlier than that, the Hittites were in Turkey. The first library in the world is found in Turkey among the Hittites. They call it the earliest known formal library. Croesus, the Greeks, it all happened there. So it was a great country to be in and to visit.

Q: What were you getting from CENTO, what was the American military and other civilian impression of, one, the Soviet threat at that time ('76-78) and, two, the capabilities as far as Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan are concerned?

MARTIN: Traditionally this was always a key strategic area because the Russians always had their eye on the south and a warm-water port, going through Iran or through Turkey, and they had invaded. They had occupied part of Turkey, Kars, after World War I. After World War II there was Azerbaijan, where we almost went to war with the Russians before they pulled back. General Michael D. Healy when he gave a briefing, used to say, "We have so many Soviet divisions pinned down here, with our troops, the Turkish, Iranian, and Pakistani armies." But somehow it didn't seem real to me that we were "pinning down" any Russian troops there, as I think their main focus was directed to the west, not to the south. Still, the Soviets, did not like CENTO at all. I remember once meeting a couple of Russians at a reception. Somebody said, "This is Mr. Martin from CENTO," and the Soviet guy went "Ugh! Ugh!" You know, showing disgust toward CENTO. We didn't have any conversation at all. They didn't like it and they were watching what we were doing.

The main thing at that time was that we had an embargo on resupply of weapons to the Turks, because they had invaded Cyprus.

Q: In 1974.

MARTIN: Yes, and there was tension between the Greeks and the Turks. That was the background of our relationship with Turkey at that time. The embargo at first didn't have much effect. It takes time. But by the time I got there in 1976, there was a feeling that maybe shortages of ammunition and spare parts were beginning to hurt the Turks. Still it didn't stop them. I had people from all of the nationalities represented in CENTO and it was my first close contact with Muslims. I had Pakistani Muslims working for me on the clerical staff. I remember going by somebody's office one day, and he was up on his desk going through his morning prayers.

A big thing there was the Hajj. Every Muslim during his life, if he possibly can do it, even at some sacrifice, tries to make the Hajj. These clerical employees of CENTO were horribly low-paid people, but they all wanted to make the Hajj, and if they wanted to go, they could get leave and go. We tried to help them go, and they really appreciated that a lot. The more sophisticated of the Pakistanis - my deputy was a Pakistani - and his wife was quite religious, and she wanted to make the Hajj. So off they went. This fellow used to like to drink, and he got stopped at the border of Saudi Arabia because he had a case of scotch in the back of his car. He didn't want to give it up. He turned around and went back. He didn't make the Hajj. I think his wife continued on with a friend. But he liked to have a supply of scotch wherever he went.

Q: Was there the feeling in CENTO at that time that the Soviets were poised to invade?

MARTIN: There was never a feeling of crisis, never a feeling of tension. We went through our exercises. We had been doing it for years before I got there, and we continued. We would have continued after I left except this crisis with the political guidance eventually led to a stalemate among the political people. Then when the crisis came in Iran, CENTO didn't formally dissolve, but it just vanished. There was no more CENTO because Iran was gone. It didn't make any sense to keep it going, so my job there at the end, when we were getting smaller, was trying to get jobs for my people, get them jobs at the embassy or find someplace for them, so that was my main activity.

Q: You were there when the Shah left, were you?

MARTIN: No, that happened afterwards, but we were already reorganizing CENTO and were trying to find people jobs. For example, we used to give funds to CENTO as a whole, and then there was an American grant that was over and above our general grant to CENTO. I had an American employee. But the secretary general who succeeded the one who was there when I first arrived didn't like that, and neither did the Pakistani deputy secretary general, and so they said they would only accept the grant if they were in charge. We agreed. But once that happened, we were reorganizing, and we were cutting down on American employees there.

There was a lot of tension in Iran, and I remember speaking with one of my Turkish subordinates who had attended a briefing given to all Turkish diplomats. He was telling me that the difference from the way Turkey was then was Turkey had gone through its revolution when Kemal Atatürk came in. Atatürk stomped on the mullahs and got control over the mullahs so you couldn't have this fundamentalist Islamic point of view running a country. He said people laughed at Turks around the world because they wore fezzes. He said you could not wear a fez; it became illegal. You had to wear a cap, and the cap had a peak on it so that you couldn't bend down to the ground and have your forehead touch the ground in prayer. Basically, he secularized the country. By the time I got there, this hurt the Christian and other religions, but it hadn't killed Islam altogether, and Islam was coming back. From what I read in the newspapers, the fundamentalist Islamic party is pretty powerful and there's a real fight going on with the military.

So I would say, at that time, the main background to everything was the American embargo, which tainted our relationship with Turkey.

Q: Was this a subject that came up all the time with the Turks with you?

MARTIN: No, it never came up with me. It was an issue for the embassy. Where we were we had a very happy group. There was a secretary general that rotated -

Q: Who was the secretary general?

MARTIN: Halop Bailokan. He had been a minister in the Turkish Government, and later he was minister of defense, and he was an important ambassador. He was succeeded by Ambassador Gurun, who had been the ambassador to Greece at the time they broke relations with the Turks. He had at that time been on leave somewhere. They couldn't locate him. He was, I would say, a bit in eclipse at the time, but he was very smart, and the Turks were very interested in keeping CENTO going.

There were five of us at the deputy secretary general level. My British colleague was the counselor to the secretary general, and the administrator was Pakistani, the military man. I was the economic man. And the Turkish person was in charge of all files and things like that, all the documentation. That was mainly Turkish. There was an Iranian too. The Iranian was in charge of health programs. But everybody got along very well, and then within each section there were always five employees, from the five different nationalities. My deputy was a Pakistani, a very nice person. He was the fellow that couldn't make the Hajj because he couldn't give up his case of scotch.

One of the American there had done a study showing no one who went to CENTO ever got promoted. It was definitely low on the totem pole in Washington, and the reason for that was that Ankara was part of the European Bureau in Washington, but CENTO was part of the NEA Bureau. It just didn't get much attention back in Washington. That's just the way it was. When I left, the efficiency report had to be written by somebody in the embassy who was in the political-military section, a counselor for political-military affairs. He said I didn't know many Americans there, which was true - because my universe of people and contacts was in the international community - but somehow he thought I should have been known as an embassy employee. But I enjoyed it very much, and can recommend working in any international organization to anybody in the Foreign Service.

Q: While you were there, did the problem of the Kurds come up in CENTO?

MARTIN: Yes. I mentioned this study of fluorine in the water. There were about five villages in eastern Turkey where we visited when we were doing the fluorine study of a river that flowed into Iran. Even though it had a high concentration to the point where it was killing some of the cattle - the sheep would drink this water and after a while they couldn't eat because their mouths became very sensitive and their gums receded from their teeth - the Turks didn't seem to care. They were combining these villages into one watershed, and the water was bad. It was true they were going to have more water, and it seemed all right when you drank it, but you couldn't drink it for long. If you drank it for a couple of years, it would affect you very adversely. I remember when we went to this village, we went into a home of a family - it was just almost a hovel, little more than a tent - but what struck me was the ground was covered with these beautiful carpets. Somebody told me later they were Kurds. The Turks would never tell you you were in a Kurdish village, but the Kurds were there.

Q: At one point during the Kissinger period, we had been supporting the Kurds in Iraq, and then we cut them off. Did our support for the Kurds play any role at all?

MARTIN: Not that I knew of. The Turks would never mention the Kurds. They would never say "Kurds." Somebody said they call them "Mountain Turks." But I never heard them called Mountain Turks either.

There was an air station in Ankara. My kids went to school there; we used to go out to the chapel there and the PX. My kids used to ride horses out there. We owned a couple of horses, which everybody did. If you had teenage girls especially, you'd have horses. The horses were on the edge adjoining the Balgat Air Station. They called it an air station, although there were no planes there, because it was headed by a colonel in the air force. On this adjoining area where the horses were, all the people working there were Kurds. It was a village, and they were all Kurds.

Q: You left there in '78. Where did you go?

MARTIN: In '78 I went to Lagos, Nigeria.

Q: And you were there from when to when?

MARTIN: '78 to '80. I was the counselor for economic affairs, commercial counselor, and AID affairs officer. Nigeria had a reputation, fostered somewhat by my predecessor, of being one of the worst posts in the world, heavily populated. It's the first place I had been assigned where my wife said she was scared. She was scared not because anybody was threatening her so much; just the density of the population, the mass of the people in Lagos was something unbelievable, and it really led to some misperceptions. We used to say there were 100 million people in Nigeria, that every fourth or fifth African was a Nigerian, and that they had 256 tribes, 250 languages, but in fact there were three major groups. The people in the north, the Hausas, who spoke the Hausa languages and who were Muslims, and the Hausa Fulani were the ruling group. In the south, where we were, were the Yorubas. They were Christian and Muslim. In the east were the Ibos who were Christians, mainly Catholic, as a matter of fact.

During the civil war it was the Ibo that had rebelled, and that was where the oil was, in the east. Lagos, Nigeria, was very important at that time because it was the second largest source of oil for the United States after, I think, Venezuela. The 100 million number resulted if you added up what every tribe said it had. They had never had a census. They didn't really know how many people they had. Yet when you drove out of Lagos and went around the country, you had a feeling there were vast empty areas as well. There were these densely populated areas down in the south, and there was a historic reason for that, the people in the north were slave dealers, and they used to go on raids to the south, capture slaves, bring them all the way across Africa and sell them in the Near East. To get away from them the people had moved more and more to the south. Bob Frazier, who was killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was a junior officer there. He was the one that told me this. Those areas that seemed to be empty, he said were empty because they were "slaved out," and there was some Muslim later who said, "When I die, I'll die with a slave in my hands."

Q: I want to move to this period of '78-80. How did we view the economics? Was this the time of port problems and corruption? Could you talk about our view?

MARTIN: The unbelievable port problem was over. That was a major scandal that had taken place, and I had come across it while I was in Vienna. Somebody came into my office with an unbelievably large order for Americans stuff, to be sent to Lagos by ship. I heard that it took four of five months. Every Greek ship in the world seemed to head toward Lagos Harbor and stand out in the harbor waiting to get permission to come in and unload. The crew would fly back to Greece and come back with another ship. They would leave three or four people on board just to keep the ship Greek and waiting, and make money because of these port charges. When I got there, oil was mostly American production by Gulf and Mobil, but there was also some British companies and some smaller oil companies. That was why it was important to us, oil.

Q: How did you find it for getting statistics, for negotiating with the Nigerian Government?

MARTIN: Well, probably our most important report was the monthly oil production statistics, and they were very good about giving us that. We had no trouble. You could go into their oil ministry, and they would give you their figures for the month and tell you something about it. Where you couldn't get reliable statistics was the foreign exchange. They had a fixed exchange rate, and they controlled the foreign exchange. If you were a Nigerian, you could get a permit to buy foreign exchange. You would pay a certain amount of nira, the Nigerian unit of currency, and basically you would be paying like 70, and you would get a dollar, and for the dollar you could get 100 nira cash back on the street. If you could go in a circle long enough, you could become wealthy.

The main thing I wanted to mention is corruption. The country is unbelievably corrupt. It was corrupt at every level, and yet politically we were very happy there because General Obasanjo, who had just become the head of Government there again, was in charge. He had promised to turn the government over to civilian rule. The corruption was very bad to the point where I remember once I was traveling in the country, and the driver wanted to stop to buy some onions in a place fairly far out from Lagos. On the way back to town, he wanted to do some shopping. So we stopped. As soon as we stopped, over came a girl about 12 years old carrying a baby. I reached out to touch the baby on the head, as anybody would do, she pulled the baby away and said, "Dash me," dash being the term for 'bribe.' If you brought a letter to a ministry to get it delivered to a minister, people said you had to pay the secretary or she would not deliver the letter to her own boss. A priest friend who ran a school there told me he came across a kid who didn't do his homework. And he said, "Why didn't you do your homework?" And the kid said, "Father, one of the older boys tapped my notebook." So he said, "I hope when you get to be an older boy, you won't tap the younger boys books." He said, "Father, I'm going to tap all I can."

This culture of corruption was so strong there that I heard about it on the plane coming in. I was talking to an Indian businessman. The Indians were fairly strong there. He said, "You know, it's not whether you pay," because I had said, you know, we don't pay bribes to people. He said, "You know, in Lagos, it's not whether you pay or not - you must pay. It's so corrupt you must pay or you can't get anything done, but the trick is to know how little you can pay to still get it done."

Q: Were we reporting this corruption as being absolutely corrosive? Was the money going into the pockets of the ruling class, or was it getting out to the people?

MARTIN: It wasn't getting out to the little people, no, but it was getting into projects. Certain projects were being done. There were projects, for example, there were roads all over the place. They had roads right through Lagos, although the traffic in Lagos was unbelievably bad. There was a story of somebody who left the embassy to go on a plane leaving the post. He left at noontime to catch a six o'clock flight, and he missed it. If there were no traffic, you could get out to the airport in about an hour. It was pretty far. But on the way, the tie-ups would be unbelievable. Their skill with the language is marvelous. They use words like "a go-slow": "I'm caught in a go-slow." We had electricity going off all the time. There were water shortages. The telephone never worked.

On the other hand, there was a feeling that they could make it work if they wanted to. I'll give you an example. My mother died while I was there. Every once in a while the phone would ring, I'd pick it up, and there'd be nothing. One day the phone rang, and I picked it up and it was my son calling me from the United States to tell me that my mother had died. Now all during the time I was there, people said, "You'd better pay your phone bill." I kept paying my phone bill even though the phone wasn't working, which seemed kind of stupid, but I think the ambassador didn't want people coming and saying so-and-so hasn't paid his phone bill, even though the phone just about never worked. If you wanted to make an international call, you could go down to the main post office kind of building, and then you could make a call to the States, but otherwise the telephone just didn't work.

We had radio communication. We'd call in for radio check all the time, and so we overcame it. For electricity, I had my own generator. I had a beautiful house. It was built during the British colonial days. It was on stilts, so it had a breeze, and large rooms and all that, although it was air conditioned. Robbery was very bad there. It was dangerous. They had the death penalty. They would have public executions regularly, and they were big for reporting in the newspaper the person's last words. That was one of the big things, which we have in our tradition too. When we execute somebody, they always have a little thing in the paper, "Last words." It's part of our Judeo-Christian tradition that a person that's dying can make a statement. They used to bring them down to the beach and shoot them. Huge crowds would show up on a Saturday when they were going to have an execution. The executions were ordered by a military tribunal, for armed robbery. An armed robbery could be with any kind of weapon, even with a stick. But if the person were armed and got caught robbing, he would normally get the death sentence, and they carried it out.

Q: Who was our ambassador at the time?

MARTIN: Don Easum. He was very happy that he had contributed to some extent to the promise of General Obasanjo to transition into a civilian  $\frac{1}{2}$  game. Politically we were on a high point. A year before I came there had been a Presidential visit, which I'm sure that Easum considered the apex of his time there. A visit by President Carter was considered a great success. Following that, we agreed we would have economic talks, and it fell to me to do them with the Nigerians. We had certain issues. For example, Pan American Airways used to have a flight that went down the coast of West Africa. They had two flights a week. They wanted to increase it to four, but the Nigerians wouldn't let them, because they were planning to have their own airline, Nigerian Airways, which would go to the United States. They wanted at the very least to share passengers. Most people would rather go on Pan Am than on Nigerian Airways, and so they would not allow an increase in Pan Am. We kept asking them, and they kept saying no.

Because the government had so much foreign exchange, our aid program was running out. I was the aid affairs officer. We'd just had a program where we were funding a couple of teachers around the country in different places and that money was running out. I did have some residual funds that were left over from projects where they hadn't used up all the money, and eventually I cleaned that up. We made a donation to a library and got rid of the program because it was running out anyway.

Because it had so much foreign exchange, there was an organization established, I think with Saudi Arabia and Nigeria. It was reimbursable foreign aid, where we would offer to come in with our aid resources, do some project, and they would pay for it. I had a man working for me who was responsible for that, and he was really a very capable guy with many years in AID. He would write up a project proposal and present it to them, but they really didn't want to pay for foreign aid, so they would just stall on it. We never got one through.

They did mention AID once in a while. Even though they had this huge foreign exchange, they still were hoping we would give them aid, because after all, we're the United States, and they're Nigeria. Their people are poor. Why not? Finally, AID, which is a bureaucratic institution and wanted to have its own mission there, proposed that we give \$10 million, even though Nigeria had so much money. Easum disappointed me on this. He was very smart, and he knew what he was doing. He said, "Let them fight that out in Washington." I thought we should have gone in and said, this is ridiculous. When Ambassador Stephen Low succeeded Easum, he went around for his briefing and talked to the man in charge of the institution in Washington and said, "There's this proposal for \$10 million for aid to Nigeria. This is ridiculous." But AID wanted it. They sent a guy out, and he was very upset with me that I wasn't giving him full support. I just said, "Well, the embassy can't, but, good luck to you." That's all we said, and he was upset with that.

When I got there, there was a Lieutenant Colonel, United States Army Engineer Corps, who had experience on the Mississippi River. We had a proposal to redo the Niger- Benue River, and it would have cost a huge amount of money, but it would have been of huge benefit to the country. He had talks with them about it, but in the end they weren't going to pay anything for any American aid. We also had a proposal for ID cards, because they had a problem with a lot of people walking around from other African countries who were undocumented. It would have given them the chance to control the population a little better, or know who was what and where. It could have been used as a kind of census. That didn't happen either. There were about six important projects. There had been some major commercial deals by my predecessor there. For example, there was the largest combat boot sale to any institution other than the United States army, because their local combat boots were poor. Combat boots have to have good leather, and the American leather is thicker than the European leather, and so our American combat boots were suitable, and they ordered I don't know how many million. Their army was a very good army, professionally trained, mainly by the British. They still had some British officers up in the north for training the Nigerian army, and it was the only institution that you might call a national institution. It somehow was trying to integrate the different tribal groups.

We had the largest single commercial or trade opportunity I ever dealt with, and it was successful. When I was first there, the Nigerian Government became interested in having a fertilizer plant using the petrochemical resources of the country. Poland Kellogg (now under a different name) was the company that was the leader in petrochemical fertilizer plants and had almost a monopoly. These are very expensive. They came in and made a proposal to build one for \$600 million, which was really very high. The Nigerians told us they wanted it. I told the Poland Kellogg people, who are pretty shrewd negotiators, that they wanted it. They guy said, "Well, if they want it, they're going to have to pay for it."

The Nigerians hired an Irishman who was an expert in this type of fertilizer plant, and then they started negotiating. It took them 18 months, but before I left, they signed an agreement for \$500 million. The Nigerians did feel that this company was trying to take advantage of them, and that they had to watch them very closely, getting them down from the \$600 million down to \$500 million. By the time the \$500 million fertilizer plant was about to be agreed - everything was agreed more or less, a trade mission came over headed by Andrew Young. During that trade mission, and in the presence of General Obasanjo, they agreed to the \$500 million contract, and Andy Young got the credit - it was in Newsweek, and Time. This was very good politically. Andrew Young was our ambassador to the UN. He got fired while he was there, but he helped Easum get to be the head of the African Affairs Institute, which is what he did for about five years after he retired.

Easum loved tennis. As part of the tennis circuit, there was a tournament in Lagos. I think the tennis players considered it to be just at the bottom of the pile, but it did get them points for their ranking. An Austrian came down, named Feigl, and also a guy stayed with me who has since become more or less famous if you follow tennis, Larry Stefanki. Easum encouraged us and I liked that idea, too, of having these tennis players stay with us while they were there. Larry Stefanki later became John McEnroe's trainer and was just in the papers within the past six months or so. He trained this guy who came up and almost became number one, a guy from Chile named Rios, I think. But anyway, Stefanki is a figure now in American tennis. I see his name every once in a while, and during the US Open he's one of the broadcasters, and he's close to John McEnroe.

The transition to civilian rule took place while I was there. Civilian rule was more corrupt, by a lot, than the military rule. It was a shame, because the country could have done something with the oil. Overall, I would say that Nigeria was worse off for having discovered oil, even though it brought them a huge amount of money. It brought the kind of thing where their recent dictator, General Abacha was killed; they brought in three prostitutes and a supply of Viagra, gave it to him, he had a heart attack and died. They think there was something else in the pill - it wasn't just the Viagra that killed him. It was some kind of poison. They assassinated him.

It was kind of a dangerous place and very difficult to deal with servants. This was my introduction to Africa, and I've often thought, if I had it to do over again, I might have liked to be an African specialist because I love Africa.

Q: So in 1980. . . .

MARTIN: Right, in 1980 I left and came back to Washington. I was over complement. That's okay, because they asked me to serve on the Board of Examiners, and I became a deputy examiner. That was a title on the Board of Examiners [BEX]. For three years I did that, traveling around the United States, and that's where you and I met each other.

Q: Yes, '80 to '83.

MARTIN: 1980-83. It was great. I liked it very much, for a number of reasons. In the first place, I was in contact with young people. I got to see the attitudes of younger people. The head of BEX told me a few months after I left, "You know, one-third of the people in the Foreign Service today passed through your hands during that time in 1980-83, and I had something to do with each one of them, in a way, because either I'd be on the panel or I would be going through the final review panel, looking at their security and so forth. It gave me an attitude toward the Foreign Service that was very favorable.

Q: What was your impression of the caliber and the attitude toward the service of this '80-83 contingent that you saw?

MARTIN: In the first place, it was quite clear to me that we were trying to pick the best out of this group, but also this was a time when they were emphasizing women and minorities, so we were paying very close attention to them. The vast majority, 85 or 90 percent - of these people were qualified to be Foreign Service officers and would have done a good job had they been accepted. Unfortunately, we used to start out with perhaps 18,000, and then they'd get about 2,500 passing the written exam, and out of the 2,500 they'd get down to 500 or so who'd get onto the register, and most of those 500 would get an offer of some type or other. Maybe they wanted to be political officers or economic officers or in USIA but they'd be offered a chance to be consular officers or administrative officers, and maybe they didn't want that.

Still, they would get an offer to come into the Foreign Service. I was very favorably impressed. I also was not surprised that there was a sameness about them. They talk about diversity - these people came from many different schools, but they were all alike. For example, I come from a family of people that belong to unions, and I was raised to have a favorable attitude toward unions. These people almost without exception talked negatively about unions. We stopped asking questions on labor, because they know almost nothing about labor except that they don't like unions. I wonder what that's going to do to the country. Union membership in the country is declining, but I sometimes wonder about the American worker. The American workers got no sympathy from the typical kid coming out of college, very smart, able to pass a written exam and the oral exam whose attitude towards the unions was very negative.

I was also surprised at how remarkably good some people were. Some people did really stand out. I can remember one woman. I wanted to find out later where she had gone to school. She had gone to Columbia, which I was happy about. We asked this person a question about the Near East in the wake of the assassination or death of somebody -

Q: Anwar Sadat?

MARTIN: Yes, and she said, the problem was leadership. Then she went around the whole region, every country. She mentioned every country, named the leader and why the person was not quite up to what was needed at that time in the Near East. That's just one example. I was very favorably impressed by the quality of the people, but I also thought that we had so many who had studied Russian and Russian studies, for example. They specialized in some field, and maybe their score was not high enough to get into the political cone, which they would have wanted. I wondered whether they were going to be happy as consular officers. I understand they've changed the system now. It's more amorphous now.

We had a number of lawsuits that caused us to re-examine more people who had passed the written exam. Many people got a chance to be re-examined. We had some very good minority candidates and women candidates, lots of very, very good ones.

Q: Did you find you were making any stretch to pass minorities particularly? In other words, when they came, would you internally - I realize everybody's supposed to be judged the same - but were you reaching out more?

MARTIN: Oh, yes, definitely. We were reaching out, but that didn't mean we didn't have some very good candidates. I remember we had a fellow from my neighborhood in Brooklyn. We used to ask them what they liked to do and what their interests were. We stopped that later on. This guy told us that he liked boxing, and that he thought he was a very good dancer. We never got an answer like that from anybody else. He also gave very good responses to all our questions, and I wonder whether he actually came in. We gave him a very high score, and I'm sure he would have spoken Spanish.

The women candidates were also very good, and the minority candidates, all of them that we looked at. I found a difference in the black candidates. They very often expressed themselves very well orally and not so well in writing. There was some effort to stretch, but I think we got good candidates. I think if those people didn't do well in the Service, it may have been because they did not have the kind of leadership that would say: I've got this guy working for me, I want him to do well, I'm going to make certain that he does a good job.

When I was in Nigeria, we had one young black woman who had a nervous breakdown up in northern Nigeria. She was there by herself with these Nigerians coming around to her house trying to put the make on her. I think her boss was a tough boss, and she just had a nervous breakdown and we had to send her home. She went to another country, and I heard later on that she had been selected out. When it was obvious she couldn't do it up there in the north, she said she wanted to come down and work in the economic section for me, which I thought was nice. I took that as a compliment. But I think that the main problem is not that the people can't do the job. It's that some time when they come in, people don't do enough to make certain that they do a good job.

Q: By the time minority candidates would go through our filtering system, they're obviously top caliber. Was, one, the process too slow to bring them in because there's a lot of competition from commercial businesses or, two, the salary wasn't enough? Was this a problem?

MARTIN: I don't think we thought that way. If we passed somebody, they were likely to come in, because the black community in particular but other minorities as well liked the idea of serving the government, and they feel more secure with a government job. I suppose there is some leakage, and maybe they never even tried for the Foreign Service because they thought that they wouldn't have a chance. The Service hasn't done well in getting minorities in. They've done extremely well with women. We have plenty of women candidates and they're doing a great job. Their performance is probably comparable to that of men, that you probably can't distinguish too well if you didn't know that the person is a woman. But we haven't attracted enough minority people, and those we have are very often of Asian origin. Giving Asians some kind of preference is ridiculous, because in many cases they put a big stress on education. You may remember somebody who was with us on the board of examiners, Lorraine Takahashi. Her parents were interned during World War II, but she went to the University of Southern California and had a master's degree from the Columbia School of Foreign Service. She was a terrific Foreign Service officer, very disciplined, very good. I thought she was really outstanding, and I think she's done quite well in the Service, too. But I would say that there's still a need to do more for minorities.

Q: Well, we're talking particularly the blacks.

MARTIN: Yes, yes.

Q: And Hispanics.

MARTIN: A problem with the Hispanics is that there is a cultural difference between Hispanics and what the Foreign Service is looking for. It is not unbridgeable but, for example, I remember we were trained very carefully, we had very good training in the Board of Examiners on what to look for in a group exercise, and I remember it was a six-person exercise. We had two women, two white males, and two Hispanics in an exercise one time. The two Hispanic guys, who were from Texas and fairly well educated, smart and all that, wouldn't talk to the women. They were listening to the other men and to each other, and they were ignoring the women. It was quite obvious that there was some kind of a cultural gap between these Hispanic guys and the women candidates. I think that probably hurts them in the service as well, and you can train people out of that.

I've just done a case recently, a privacy act case. I saw a guy's file, and it's obvious that some people have said negative things about him, they're always women. He's Hispanic, and they talk about his manner towards women, and I'm sure that's it. In the only case I've seen of sexual harassment, where a guy really got in trouble, he was Hispanic. The woman that he was harassing was a white female. I do think there is a cultural difference between the Hispanic and the general Foreign Service community that sometimes causes trouble.

I was on the Board of Examiners a long time. I liked it. It was obvious I liked it. People liked me, and I accepted the system. I could make some suggestions, I think, for changing the system, but the basic idea of this all-day assessment was a very good one. The suggestions I might make would be to put more emphasis on the written exam and on specialized knowledge that people will need. We had trouble judging people's motivation, and now they've changed that. They try to judge motivation in a different way from before. They try to pass people and then they give them a high pass or a low pass based on a further interview that can go into depth. They try to see whether these people are motivated and get them to show they are motivated if they've studied international affairs or some other field motivating them to come into the Foreign Service.

I also did examining of security officers. I thought that the Bureau of Diplomatic Security did not do a very good job of picking people to be examiners. When they needed somebody, they said, "Hey, you, why don't you go over today?" So there was a big disparity in what these people thought they were looking for from ours. I remember we had one fellow who was fairly high ranking in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security, and he was judging people on whether he thought that eventually they would be able to negotiate in a hostage situation with the local government and some terrorist and the security officer and the ambassador all involved. That was an impossible standard. He was flunking everybody and unless there was some kind of adverse impact against minorities or women, we were really supposed to go along with that. Another person was saying, "Oh, this guy would be okay going around doing the security investigation updates." He could work in what they call WFO, the Washington Field Office, calling people up and say, "Do you think this person is a good American or not."

At the end in the Board of Examiners, they picked me, and I was happy to do it, to go over to the Department of Commerce. There, I ran an assessment program for one year's candidates in the Foreign Commercial Service.

Q: This was what? '84 to

MARTIN: This would have been '83. I went to Spain. We did some assessing there, and some others went to the Far East and did some assessing Singapore. That worked out very well. I got along very well with the head of the Foreign Commercial Service. I was over complement. I know they would have been willing to give me a job in the Department, but I did not want that. I wanted to go overseas, and the head of the Foreign Commercial Service offered me a job as commercial counselor in Yaoundé, Cameroon because they wanted to have somebody in a post in West Africa, an underdeveloped area. The Secretary of Commerce had gone to West Africa, and he said we should have a presence here, and it should be a regional presence. So the job was offered to me, because Cameroon at that time was the only country in West Africa that could get ten-year money from the banks and was doing quite well. I had somebody working for me in Douala, the port and commercial center. I used to go there about once a week, and we had trade missions coming through. My area covered all of West and Central Africa, so I went to neighboring countries, for example, Equatorial Guinea. We didn't have very much trade with them, but I paid a visit there and as far as the Congo and Brazzaville Congo (Old French Congo).

Gabon was the next country over and I went there. The concept of a regional officer, comes to anybody's mind, when they start thinking about having people overseas. But ambassadors, however, are very nervous about anybody with regional responsibility that includes their country unless they're assigned to that country. The ambassador to Gabon, I thought, was trying to sabotage me. He really didn't want anybody coming from another post to where he was the ambassador. Very often you have that. That's a problem that the Foreign Service is going to have to overcome, because the wave of the future is to have posts that are regional. We don't need an ambassador necessarily in Equatorial Guinea, and we haven't had in the past. Usually it was some other ambassador, like the ambassador in Cameroon who was also accredited there. It was a place where you wanted to have an ambassador because sometimes things were happening there.

Anyway, Cameroon. Again -

Q: You were there from when to when?

MARTIN: I was there from '83 to '85. My career was winding down. I was due out in '86. I was trying to stay as long as possible. I left Yaoundé½ in October 1985 and went back to Washington and rejoined the Board of Examiners, but just for a month. I retired January 31, 1986. Before I retired, the Department of Commerce asked me to be on its senior promotion board. I had never served on a promotion board. Early in my career I had seen how a board can work sometimes when the head of the board had a program and he wants to put it through. That was when I was on the board of governors of the Officers' Club in Berlin. We had that with the promotion board. A very strong guy who was the head of personnel in the Department of Commerce, and was later fired for sexual harassment, and he went to jail for some kind of dishonesty. He wanted to push through what he thought was right, and it was hard to oppose him, because I was just the guy from State. We had a public member, and two members from Commerce, who were Foreign Commercial Service guys and this guy in charge, who was trying to ram through some of his candidates. I was a little surprised at how somebody like him, who's strong and smart, can run a board. I think that some of the people who came out low-ranked were people that he may not have liked, and some of the people he promoted were people he favored. Still, I think we did a good job, by and large.

Q: Going back to when you were in Yaoundé½, what were our commercial interests during this mid-'80's period in West Africa?

MARTIN: Our commercial interests were trying to find something for American business to get into, because we were excluded by the French. This is the old French Africa - not exactly, but anyway, Cameroon used to be called "The Cameroons." It was a German colony. At the end of World War I, it was taken over by the League of Nations and divided in two. There were the French Cameroon and the British Cameroons. At the end of World War II, there was a plebiscite, and the northern part of the British Cameroons opted to go with Nigeria. Then you had a country that was one-third English-speaking, with a tradition of English in the schools, and two-thirds French-speaking.

The British, whom I admire very much for their system of indirect rule and how they managed to run an empire with very few people and not putting in much in the way of resources, ran one of the greatest empires, territorially speaking. But they didn't do as good a job in education as the French did, because they didn't try to impose British culture on these people, they just put limits on them. The French actually taught people their language. Anywhere you went in Cameroon, in Gabon, and in the French Congo, people spoke French very well. They spoke correct grammatical French, and they had an idea that the French language was superior to their own language. They called their language mon patois, but they spoke French.

The commercial interest we had was to try to find some kind of a niche, because that was all we could do. The currency was tied to the French currency. The currency of West Africa was supported by the French. Because of that, the trade went to France. For an American company to operate there was difficult, unless they were able to somehow find a niche and deal in French. I would advise companies to try to operate through an agent in France or, if they had a subsidiary French company, to let them do it. If they had a really specialized thing that was needed in the country, I advised them to find a French counterpart that they could somehow hook onto. That was the way to piggy back onto a French entity. Just coming straight and doing it was useless. There were three American banks in Cameroon while I was there, and they were really doing very, very little business. They were getting money from the American AID program as some of it somehow found its way into these American banks, financing things. We were trying because there was a need to promote trade with old French Africa, just as there is a need in some other countries where we don't have much trade. You don't need anybody in Canada from the Foreign Commercial Service. But you do need people where it's been missed through the normal trade policies. You need more than trade policies to promote trade. You need trade promotion, and the way to do that is to get into trade fairs, trade missions, and learning about the country and advising people on how they might find some kind of a niche.

I did meet some American businessmen there. There were people that came through that thought maybe they could find something. The United States has all these agencies that promote foreign trade OPIC [Overseas Private Investment Corporation] and the ExIm Bank, AID programs, and the "Paunch Corps", i.e., the International Executive Service Corps. But there wasn't a lot that could be done. Still what there was could be the beginning of something bigger.

There was a fellow who wanted to sell water because in Cameroon people use to buy water from France. Because it was a monopoly, nobody tried to come in and establish a water company that would get water out of the ground, and meet the standards of the water coming from France. I was trying to help him, but when the Cameroonians realized the opportunity, they got into it themselves. They had good water. They had mountains in Cameroon where you had good spring water.

In another case, I was trying to help a fellow make a movie. He was getting close to 40, and he ran a movie theater. I asked him what were the most popular movies that he showed because there was a big movie inventory in Douala. He used to come in from this little place where he was a chief, and get movies for his movie theater. The Kung Fu movies, martial arts, he said those were knockout movies as everybody loves them. Because of his interest in the movies, he wanted to make a movie, and I was trying to help him. I went to visit the International Executive Service Corps in Stamford, Connecticut and they said they were ready. They had a guy who was going to come over, we just needed \$80,000. To this fellow, I said, "If you can get the \$80,000, I can get the guy to come over and live here and help you make that movie." It was going to be basically a travelogue. It was going to be two people coming from France, a young couple, and they were going to meet and eventually fall in love while they went around Cameroon and saw these different things. Again, in Cameroon, nobody ever says no, but it is very hard to get anything done. This guy said he thought he could get the \$80,000, but it just went on and on and on, and when I left, he still didn't have the \$80,000.

There had been a movie made there a few years before I got there. I don't know whether you saw a movie called Greystoke, about Tarzan. That was made in Victoria, in Cameroon. I went to a restaurant there, and this guy was telling me about Greystoke and about the apes, and he said a lot of apes were in costume, and he was doing an imitation of the apes. And I've since seen a movie about Cameroon called Chocolat, a wonderful movie. You have a feeling, sitting in that theater, that you're in Africa because it's such a slow-moving movie, and it's so bright, the hot sun, and you have a feeling you're in Africa. It's a good movie from that point of view.

Again, in Cameroon, it's hard to get anything done, especially in trade. We had a number of other projects we were trying to get started, and somehow when you went to the ministry, presented the project, they listened very carefully, but then nothing happened.

When I came back to Washington, I was on the Board of Examiners for a couple of weeks, and then I retired, and continued for that season on the Board of Examiners, as a retiree. To sum up my Foreign Service career: I think that the Foreign Service is a great institution. I always considered myself very lucky, even at the time that I got in. I thought I did a great job in some places, some places less so. At the end, my career was really going downhill, and that was too bad. But so what?

It would have been nice to be an ambassador. Had I gone into Africa earlier I might have done it. I never had a connection in the Bureau of African Affairs. I would recommend to anybody, and I do, that they consider the Foreign Service, and if they get in, to go to Africa. Other people seemed to be better able to pick a post and get the one they wanted. I was always willing to go wherever they wanted me to go and to do whatever they told me to do. I was not an economist but spent my career doing economic work. I'm not a businessman - I have no business sense - but I spent a lot of time promoting trade. I'm not an investigator, but I did some end-use checks that amounted to investigation, and I think I did a pretty good job. I think I had a good attitude, and so did my wife. I was very lucky to pick a good wife. She actually was brilliant in languages. Wherever we went, she would learn the language. With Turkish she had a little bit of a hard time, but even in Turkey, where I couldn't learn the language though I studied it and did great in the exercises, even in Turkey, she did a great job and learned to communicate with our maid. In Croatia, there were a lot of Hungarians, and speaking Hungarian helped her. People spoke German there, and of course, she had gone to school at the University of Munich, and one of her first languages was French. She loved French, so in Laos we had a lot of French friends. So my wife was a tremendous asset. The new kind of Foreign Service wife is offered jobs and my wife fitted right into that. She was happy to work. She worked in Nigeria and also in Cameroon. She was the travel lady. I told her she could get anybody anywhere in the world, providing they started off in Yaoundé<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub> and finished up in Yaoundé<sup>1</sup>/<sub>2</sub>. She used to go down to Douala and talk to the travel agents there in French, and she always made friends with the French. She liked the French and always made friends with French-speaking people. That was a lucky break for me, too.

So I would recommend the Foreign Service to anybody. When I was on the Berlin Task Force during the Cuban Missile Crisis, I was on the fringe, but still, associated with something very major going on. People had that chance. Now the Foreign Service has changed. As somebody said about the army, the army is not what it used to be, and it never was. The same thing is true of the Foreign Service. The Foreign Service has been changing since before 1926, the Rogers Act, '24. But maybe it's no longer an elite service. That's too bad. I think one of the indications you can see, if you look at the obituaries in State Magazine, they're just like a paragraph long and it's almost as if they don't care about the Foreign Service people who have died. They're just given the least acknowledgment they can. One of the dangers that I see - because I see a lot of personnel stuff - is the Civil Service almost taking over from the Foreign Service. When a job is hard to fill, it gets offered to Civil Service people, and retirees. I think the total number in the Foreign Service is probably shrinking, and I don't know what the long-term implications of all that is.

Another thing is that there are so many different people in international affairs now. You've got the foundations, lobbies, think-tanks, universities, and congressional staffs, all getting into international affairs. It dilutes the importance of the Foreign Service.

Q: Oh, very definitely.

MARTIN: And who knows what the long-term implications of that are? If you look now at the people playing a big part in what's going on in the Balkans, it's not so much Foreign Service people. There seem to be some people who have been in the Foreign Service part of their career, but in many cases, it's people who had nothing to do with the Foreign Service.

I retired and became a member of the Washington, DC, Bar. I had been a member of the New York Bar. I did volunteer work for 12 years and just resigned December 31st of last year to spend more time with my sister. She was in a nursing home up in Brooklyn and now she's home, and I have to manage her affairs. I'm delaying her income tax because it just was too much for me to do on time. I'm about halfway there, and I'll find something else to do as a volunteer, go to lectures, go to DACOR, do an awful lot of things. I'm a very happy retiree. Some people are very unhappy retired.

End of Interview